财政制度垂直失衡、政府竞争与市场化进程
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摘要
改革开放以来,中国财政体制在逐步的完善过程中推动着中国市场经济的发展。但是,财政分权带来地方财政收支缺口日益增大,出现了财政体制垂直失衡的问题,在影响经济发展的同时,也影响着中国市场化进程。本文采用2005～2014年中国的省级面板数据,分析了中国财政垂直失衡与政府竞争对中国市场化进程的影响。结果发现:总体上看,财政垂直失衡与政府竞争对市场化进程有显著的负向激励;分区域来看,则具有明显的地区差异性特征,财政垂直失衡与政府竞争在阻碍东部地区市场化的同时,对中西部地区市场化进程有促进作用;财政垂直失衡与政府竞争相互影响,共同加剧了对市场化进程的阻碍程度。
Since the adoption of the Reform and Opening-up policy,China' s financial system has been improved gradually,which promotes the development of economy. However,because of the fiscal decentralization,the gap between the local financial revenue and expenditure has been growing and the vertical fiscal imbalance affects the process of marketization in China. This article,based on the provincial panel data from 2005 to 2014,discusses the relationship among vertical fiscal imbalance,the government competition and the marketization process. The findings show that overall speaking,the vertical fiscal imbalance and the government competition have significant negative effects on marketization. But there are obvious regional differences: the vertical fiscal imbalance and the government competition slow down the marketization process in eastern regions of China but speed up the marketization process in central and western regions. Moreover,the vertical fiscal imbalance and the government competition influence each other,and they in combination have intensified the difficulties in the marketization process.
Since the adoption of the Reform and Opening-up policy,China' s financial system has been improved gradually,which promotes the development of economy. However,because of the fiscal decentralization,the gap between the local financial revenue and expenditure has been growing and the vertical fiscal imbalance affects the process of marketization in China. This article,based on the provincial panel data from 2005 to 2014,discusses the relationship among vertical fiscal imbalance,the government competition and the marketization process. The findings show that overall speaking,the vertical fiscal imbalance and the government competition have significant negative effects on marketization. But there are obvious regional differences: the vertical fiscal imbalance and the government competition slow down the marketization process in eastern regions of China but speed up the marketization process in central and western regions. Moreover,the vertical fiscal imbalance and the government competition influence each other,and they in combination have intensified the difficulties in the marketization process.
引文
[1]樊纲,王小鲁,张立文,等.中国各地区市场化相对进程报告[J].经济研究,2003,(3):9-18,89.
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[3]Bouton L.,M.Gassner and V.Verardi,Redistributing Income Under Fiscal Vertical Imbalance[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2008,24(2):317-328.
[4]张宇.论公有制与市场经济的有机结合[J].经济研究,2016,(6):4-16.
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[11]Qian Yingyi.&Roland G.Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J].American Economic Review,1998,88(5):1143-1162.
[12]Crivelli E.A.Leive and T.Stratmann,Subnational Health Spending and Soft Budget Constraints in OECD Countries[Z].IMF Working Paper,2010:10/147.
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[17]Khemani S.Political Capture of Decentralization:Vote-buying through Grants-financed Local Jurisdictions[Z].World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,2010:5350.
[18]楼继伟.健全中央和地方财力与事权相匹配的财政体制[J].经济研究参考,2014,(18):17.
[19]Hunter,J.S.H.Federalism and Fiscal Balance:A Comparative Study[M].Canberra:Australian National University Press,1977.
[20]江庆.中国省、市、县乡级纵向财政不平衡的实证研究[J].安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,(3):134-140.
[21]崔志坤,李菁菁.财政分权、政府竞争与产业结构升级[J].财政研究,2015,(12):37-43.
[22]周业安.地方政府竞争与经济增长[J].中国人民大学学报,2003,(1):97-103.
[23]Wooldridge,J.M.Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data[M].Cambridge:The MIT Press,2010.
[24]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[25]张璟,沈坤荣.财政分权改革、地方政府行为与经济增长[J].江苏社会科学,2008,(3):56-62.
[26]王智勇.产业结构、城市化与地区经济增长:基于地市级单元的研究[J].产业经济研究,2013,(5):23-34.
[27]黄春元,毛捷.财政状况与地方债务规模:基于转移支付视角的新发现[J].财贸经济,2015,(6):18-31.
[28]焦健,罗鸣令.中央-省财政转移与地方财力均衡[J].广西财经学院学报,2017,(4):82-94.
[29]邓蒙芝.地方财政分权、劳动力选择性转移与农村基础教育投入[J].贵州财经大学学报,2017,(3):93-100.
[30]张曾莲,张敏.基于门槛效应的财政分权与政府治理能力提升研究[J].现代财经,2017,(7):58-70.
(1)2009年中国对转移支付重新进行了划分,简化了转移支付的分类,将转移支付分为专项转移支付和一般性转移支付。这一重新分类使得转移支付数据不再具有连续性,因此我们借鉴了黄春元和毛捷(2015)的做法来具体测算转移支付。
[2]吕炜.中国经济转轨实践的理论命题[J].中国社会科学,2003,(4):4-17.
[3]Bouton L.,M.Gassner and V.Verardi,Redistributing Income Under Fiscal Vertical Imbalance[J].European Journal of Political Economy,2008,24(2):317-328.
[4]张宇.论公有制与市场经济的有机结合[J].经济研究,2016,(6):4-16.
[5]白永秀.市场在资源配置中的决定性:计划与市场关系述论[J].改革,2013,(11):5-16.
[6]Kornai J.Economics of Shortage[M].Amsterdam:Elsevier Science Ltd Press,1980.
[7]王全斌.关于我国市场化进程的研究[J].经济研究参考,2003,(1):58.
[8]张晓晶.中国市场化进程报告:现状分析与未来预测[J].管理世界,2004,(3):5-13,155.
[9]樊纲,王小鲁,马光荣.中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J].经济研究,2011,(9):4-16.
[10]Cumberland J.H.Efficiency and Equity in Interregional Environment Management[J].Review of Regional Studies,1981,10(2):1-9.
[11]Qian Yingyi.&Roland G.Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint[J].American Economic Review,1998,88(5):1143-1162.
[12]Crivelli E.A.Leive and T.Stratmann,Subnational Health Spending and Soft Budget Constraints in OECD Countries[Z].IMF Working Paper,2010:10/147.
[13]何梦笔,赵冬梅.论中国转型中的内生性政治约束:一种演化论的视角[J].国外理论动态,2013,(3):50-64.
[14]周黎安,陶婧.官员晋升竞争与边界效应:以省区交界地带的经济发展为例[J].金融研究,2011,(3):15-26.
[15]王文剑,仉建涛,覃成林.财政分权、地方政府竞争与FDI的增长效应[J].管理世界,2007,(3):13-22,171.
[16]Fahy,C.A.The Choice of Local Government Structure in Massachusetts:A Historical Public Choice Perspective[J].Social Science Quarterly,1998,79(2):433-444.
[17]Khemani S.Political Capture of Decentralization:Vote-buying through Grants-financed Local Jurisdictions[Z].World Bank Policy Research Working Paper,2010:5350.
[18]楼继伟.健全中央和地方财力与事权相匹配的财政体制[J].经济研究参考,2014,(18):17.
[19]Hunter,J.S.H.Federalism and Fiscal Balance:A Comparative Study[M].Canberra:Australian National University Press,1977.
[20]江庆.中国省、市、县乡级纵向财政不平衡的实证研究[J].安徽大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,(3):134-140.
[21]崔志坤,李菁菁.财政分权、政府竞争与产业结构升级[J].财政研究,2015,(12):37-43.
[22]周业安.地方政府竞争与经济增长[J].中国人民大学学报,2003,(1):97-103.
[23]Wooldridge,J.M.Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data[M].Cambridge:The MIT Press,2010.
[24]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[25]张璟,沈坤荣.财政分权改革、地方政府行为与经济增长[J].江苏社会科学,2008,(3):56-62.
[26]王智勇.产业结构、城市化与地区经济增长:基于地市级单元的研究[J].产业经济研究,2013,(5):23-34.
[27]黄春元,毛捷.财政状况与地方债务规模:基于转移支付视角的新发现[J].财贸经济,2015,(6):18-31.
[28]焦健,罗鸣令.中央-省财政转移与地方财力均衡[J].广西财经学院学报,2017,(4):82-94.
[29]邓蒙芝.地方财政分权、劳动力选择性转移与农村基础教育投入[J].贵州财经大学学报,2017,(3):93-100.
[30]张曾莲,张敏.基于门槛效应的财政分权与政府治理能力提升研究[J].现代财经,2017,(7):58-70.
(1)2009年中国对转移支付重新进行了划分,简化了转移支付的分类,将转移支付分为专项转移支付和一般性转移支付。这一重新分类使得转移支付数据不再具有连续性,因此我们借鉴了黄春元和毛捷(2015)的做法来具体测算转移支付。