审计服务供需双方的信息不对称会影响审计费用吗?——来自上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
通过建立一个基于审计服务市场信息不对称的测度模型,并利用上市公司的面板数据,对审计服务市场供需双方的信息不对称程度进行测度,并检验了审计服务供需双方的信息不对称程度对于审计服务基准价格的偏离程度,得出如下结论:第一,无论从讨价还价系数来看,还是从总方差分解来看,审计服务供给者相对于需求者,都处于信息优势地位,具体而言,审计服务供给者与需求者讨价还价能力的系数分别为0.986和0.443,审计服务供给者与需求者所掌握的信息在信息因素总影响的比例分别为83. 21%和16. 79%;第二,审计服务供需双方的信息因素的共同影响使得最终确定的审计费用比基准价格高出29. 11%;第三,在其他条件不变条件下,审计服务供需双方信息因素的共同影响使得国有控股公司的审计费用要高于民营控股公司5%左右,审计服务供需双方信息因素的共同影响使得中西部地区公司的审计费用要高于东部地区公司3.64%,在2010—2016期间,审计服务供需双方信息因素共同影响使得审计费用比基准价格基本稳定地高出28%。
Information asymmetry between the supply and demand of audit service will cause a deviation of audit fees from the benchmark price.This paper first establishes a measure model based on information asymmetry in the audit service market and then,using the panel data of listed companies,measures the degree of this information asymmetry,and finally examines the degree of deviation from the benchmark price.We have the following conclusions.First,in terms of either bargaining factor or the decomposition of the total variance,the supplier is in a position of advantage over the demander;their coefficients of the bargaining power are 0.986 and 0.443 respectively,and the information obtained by the supplier and demander accounts for 83.21% and 16.79% respectively in the information factors total effect.Second,the interaction of the information factors of both supply and demand results in an increase of 29.11% of the final audit cost compared with the benchmark price.Third,ceteris paribus,due to the interaction,audit fees of the state-owned enterprises are 5% higher than those in the private sector,and audit fees of enterprises in mid-west China are 3.64% higher than in the East.From 2010 to 2016,the audit fees are 28% higher than the benchmark price.
Information asymmetry between the supply and demand of audit service will cause a deviation of audit fees from the benchmark price.This paper first establishes a measure model based on information asymmetry in the audit service market and then,using the panel data of listed companies,measures the degree of this information asymmetry,and finally examines the degree of deviation from the benchmark price.We have the following conclusions.First,in terms of either bargaining factor or the decomposition of the total variance,the supplier is in a position of advantage over the demander;their coefficients of the bargaining power are 0.986 and 0.443 respectively,and the information obtained by the supplier and demander accounts for 83.21% and 16.79% respectively in the information factors total effect.Second,the interaction of the information factors of both supply and demand results in an increase of 29.11% of the final audit cost compared with the benchmark price.Third,ceteris paribus,due to the interaction,audit fees of the state-owned enterprises are 5% higher than those in the private sector,and audit fees of enterprises in mid-west China are 3.64% higher than in the East.From 2010 to 2016,the audit fees are 28% higher than the benchmark price.
引文
[1] 叶建芳,何开刚,杨庆,等.不可核实的商誉减值测试估计与审计费用[J].审计研究,2016(1):76-84.
[2] HOLTHAUSEN R W,LARKER D F,SLOAN R G.G.Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1995,19(1):29-74.
[3] 高雷,吴茜,张杰.审计费用的影响因素实证研究——基于金融类与非金融类上市公司的比较[J].财经科学,2012(1):109-116.
[4] LANG M H,LUNDHOLM R J.Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior[J].The Accounting Review,1996,71(4) :467-492.
[5] 薛敏正,郭振雄,刘沂佩.信息透明度对审计收费之影响[J].中国会计评论,2009(2):34-56.
[6] 韩丽荣,高瑜彬,姜悦.企业环境信息披露对审计费用影响的实证分析[J].当代经济研究,2014(5):92-96.
[7] JOSEPH D PIOTROSKI,DARREN T ROULSTONE.The influence of analysts,institutional investors and insiders on the incorporation of market,industry and firm-specific information into stock prices[J].Accounting Review,2004,79(4) :1119-1151.
[8] 秦荣生.审计风险探源:信息不对称[J].审计研究,2005(5) :6-10.
[9] DAN A SIMUNIC.The Pricing of Audit Services:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[10] PONG C M,WHITTINGTON G.The Determinants of Audit Fees:Some Empirical Models[J].Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2010,21(8):1071-1095.
[11] LOW L C,TAN P H N,KOH H C.The Determination of Audit Fees:Analysis Is in the Singapore Context,Journal of Business Finance and Accounting [J].2010,17(2):285-295.
[12] 施先旺,李志刚,刘拯.分析师预测与上市公司审计收费研究———基于信息不对称理论的视角[J].审计与经济研究,2015(3):39-48.
[13] MARK LANG.Time-Varying Stock Price Response to Earnings Induced by Uncertainty About the Time-series Process of Earnings[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2) :229-257.
[14] PITTMAN J A,FORTIN S.Auditor Choice and the Cost of Debt Capital for Newly Public Firms[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37(1):113-136.
[15] LINDA ELIZABETH DEANGELO.Auditor Independence,Low Balling,and Disclosure Regulation[J].Journal of accounting and economics,1981,3(2):113-127.
[16] ERIC JOHNSON,KENTON WAKER,ERIC WESTERGAARD.Supplier Concentration and Pricing of Audit services in New Zealand[J].Auditing:A Journal of practice & theory,1995,14 (2):74-89.
[17] 王兵,辛清泉.分所审计是否影响审计质量和审计收费?[J].审计研究,2010(2):70-76.
[18] GUL F A,KIM J B,QIU A A.Ownership Concentration,Foreign Shareholding,Audit Quality,and Stock Price Synchronicity:Evidence from China [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(3):425-442.
[19] 苏文兵,李心合,常家瑛,等.事务所行业专长与审计收费溢价的相关性检验——来自中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2010,46(3):38-45.
[20] SUBAL C KUMBHAKAR,CHRISTOPHER F Parmeter.The Effects of Match Uncertainty and Bargaining on Labor Market Outcomes:Evidence from Firm and Worker Specific Estimates[J].Journal of Productivity Analysis,2009,31(1):1-14.
[21] 卢洪友,连玉君,卢盛峰.中国医疗服务市场中的信息不对称程度测算[J].经济研究,2011,46 (4):94-106.
(1)在本文中,基准价格,是指供需双方在信息对称情况下,审计服务供需双方所达成的市场交易价格。
[2] HOLTHAUSEN R W,LARKER D F,SLOAN R G.G.Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1995,19(1):29-74.
[3] 高雷,吴茜,张杰.审计费用的影响因素实证研究——基于金融类与非金融类上市公司的比较[J].财经科学,2012(1):109-116.
[4] LANG M H,LUNDHOLM R J.Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior[J].The Accounting Review,1996,71(4) :467-492.
[5] 薛敏正,郭振雄,刘沂佩.信息透明度对审计收费之影响[J].中国会计评论,2009(2):34-56.
[6] 韩丽荣,高瑜彬,姜悦.企业环境信息披露对审计费用影响的实证分析[J].当代经济研究,2014(5):92-96.
[7] JOSEPH D PIOTROSKI,DARREN T ROULSTONE.The influence of analysts,institutional investors and insiders on the incorporation of market,industry and firm-specific information into stock prices[J].Accounting Review,2004,79(4) :1119-1151.
[8] 秦荣生.审计风险探源:信息不对称[J].审计研究,2005(5) :6-10.
[9] DAN A SIMUNIC.The Pricing of Audit Services:Theory and Evidence[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[10] PONG C M,WHITTINGTON G.The Determinants of Audit Fees:Some Empirical Models[J].Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,2010,21(8):1071-1095.
[11] LOW L C,TAN P H N,KOH H C.The Determination of Audit Fees:Analysis Is in the Singapore Context,Journal of Business Finance and Accounting [J].2010,17(2):285-295.
[12] 施先旺,李志刚,刘拯.分析师预测与上市公司审计收费研究———基于信息不对称理论的视角[J].审计与经济研究,2015(3):39-48.
[13] MARK LANG.Time-Varying Stock Price Response to Earnings Induced by Uncertainty About the Time-series Process of Earnings[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2) :229-257.
[14] PITTMAN J A,FORTIN S.Auditor Choice and the Cost of Debt Capital for Newly Public Firms[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2004,37(1):113-136.
[15] LINDA ELIZABETH DEANGELO.Auditor Independence,Low Balling,and Disclosure Regulation[J].Journal of accounting and economics,1981,3(2):113-127.
[16] ERIC JOHNSON,KENTON WAKER,ERIC WESTERGAARD.Supplier Concentration and Pricing of Audit services in New Zealand[J].Auditing:A Journal of practice & theory,1995,14 (2):74-89.
[17] 王兵,辛清泉.分所审计是否影响审计质量和审计收费?[J].审计研究,2010(2):70-76.
[18] GUL F A,KIM J B,QIU A A.Ownership Concentration,Foreign Shareholding,Audit Quality,and Stock Price Synchronicity:Evidence from China [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,95(3):425-442.
[19] 苏文兵,李心合,常家瑛,等.事务所行业专长与审计收费溢价的相关性检验——来自中国上市公司审计市场的经验证据[J].产业经济研究,2010,46(3):38-45.
[20] SUBAL C KUMBHAKAR,CHRISTOPHER F Parmeter.The Effects of Match Uncertainty and Bargaining on Labor Market Outcomes:Evidence from Firm and Worker Specific Estimates[J].Journal of Productivity Analysis,2009,31(1):1-14.
[21] 卢洪友,连玉君,卢盛峰.中国医疗服务市场中的信息不对称程度测算[J].经济研究,2011,46 (4):94-106.
(1)在本文中,基准价格,是指供需双方在信息对称情况下,审计服务供需双方所达成的市场交易价格。