城市建设用地指标的配置逻辑及其对住房市场的影响
|
摘要
本文致力于构建一个快速城市化和工业化进程中的城市建设用地供给理论,并基于这一理论框架讨论中国"人口、土地和住房"的空间错配机制及其后果。制度背景分析表明:中国城市建设用地供给受制于从中央到地方的指标分配,依次包括了"总量指标的地区配给"和"区县指标的用途配置"两个阶段,住房市场因此受到多级政府指标配置行为的叠加影响。理论模型揭示了财政激励下区县政府对指标的用途配置逻辑以及城市化激励下省级政府对指标的地区配置逻辑。基于实证研究结果,房地产市场上上演的"中国故事"可概述为:逆人口集聚方向的城市建设用地指标地区配给模式,叠加偏向工业的用途配置模式,对居住用地供给和住房市场产生了显著的挤压效应,导致"人口、土地和住房"的空间错配。
Over the past two decades, China has witnessed a continuous rise in housing prices alongside rapid urbanization, especially in large cities in coastal areas. With the rapid growth in housing costs, the speed of urbanization in China has begun to decline in recent years. Many scholars believe that the boom in housing demand is the main reason for the soaring housing prices. However, the cost of land accounts for a large proportion of house prices, so urban land supply also plays an important role. In this paper, we focus on the effect of China's urban land supply on the housing market.Unlike most countries in the world, China uses a quota system to control its urban land supply to protect cultivated land. The operation of the system can be described as a process of quota allocation, with land distributed to regions by central and provincial governments and then allocated further for different purposes by local governments. First, the central government sets up a total quota of urban land supply every year and allocates land to each province. With the help of its agents, the provincial governments, land is eventually distributed to each county through the process of regional allocation. Second, county governments, which hold the power of purpose allocation, set up industrial land quotas, residential land quotas, infrastructure land quotas and land quotas for public management and service purposes.We construct a theoretical model to investigate an incentive mechanism that prompts provincial governments to distribute land to counties and encourages county governments to allocate land for different purposes. Because urban land supply is vital for economic development, fiscal income growth and urbanization, we hypothesize that a financial incentive and an urbanization incentive play important roles. Our model reveals that county governments expand industrial land at the expense of residential land when the financial incentive dominates. However, the land allocated to counties by provincial governments depends both on population agglomeration at the city level and on the pattern of urbanization. When small or medium cities have the priority to develop, large cities are allocated less land, irrespective of their agglomeration ability. Therefore, China's housing market is affected by the land allocation behavior of governments at multiple levels.Our empirical results show that an increase in the financial incentive for county governments decreases the allocation of residential land relative to industrial land significantly. Additionally, large cities are allocated relatively less land. Further analysis finds that both the total amount of urban land allocated by provincial governments to counties and the proportion of residential land allocated by county governments have a positive impact on the sale of houses per capita. However, increasing the financial incentive of county governments significantly reduces the positive impact of the total amount of urban land on the housing market. Given these empirical results, China's real estate market can be summarized as follows. The regional allocation of urban land is negatively related to population agglomeration and the allocation of residential land is reduced to increase industrial land. The combination of these two effects result in the spatial mismatch of population, land and housing.China is experiencing a transition from a planned economy to a market economy. For scholars trying to understand how the Chinese government allocates important resources during this transition period, our study provides important information. Our study also has a silver lining for China's urbanization process, which is now plagued by high housing prices. Our results suggest that to achieve sustainable urbanization, land allocation must be consistent with population agglomeration and the incentive mechanism of residential land supply should be restructured at the county level.
Over the past two decades, China has witnessed a continuous rise in housing prices alongside rapid urbanization, especially in large cities in coastal areas. With the rapid growth in housing costs, the speed of urbanization in China has begun to decline in recent years. Many scholars believe that the boom in housing demand is the main reason for the soaring housing prices. However, the cost of land accounts for a large proportion of house prices, so urban land supply also plays an important role. In this paper, we focus on the effect of China's urban land supply on the housing market.Unlike most countries in the world, China uses a quota system to control its urban land supply to protect cultivated land. The operation of the system can be described as a process of quota allocation, with land distributed to regions by central and provincial governments and then allocated further for different purposes by local governments. First, the central government sets up a total quota of urban land supply every year and allocates land to each province. With the help of its agents, the provincial governments, land is eventually distributed to each county through the process of regional allocation. Second, county governments, which hold the power of purpose allocation, set up industrial land quotas, residential land quotas, infrastructure land quotas and land quotas for public management and service purposes.We construct a theoretical model to investigate an incentive mechanism that prompts provincial governments to distribute land to counties and encourages county governments to allocate land for different purposes. Because urban land supply is vital for economic development, fiscal income growth and urbanization, we hypothesize that a financial incentive and an urbanization incentive play important roles. Our model reveals that county governments expand industrial land at the expense of residential land when the financial incentive dominates. However, the land allocated to counties by provincial governments depends both on population agglomeration at the city level and on the pattern of urbanization. When small or medium cities have the priority to develop, large cities are allocated less land, irrespective of their agglomeration ability. Therefore, China's housing market is affected by the land allocation behavior of governments at multiple levels.Our empirical results show that an increase in the financial incentive for county governments decreases the allocation of residential land relative to industrial land significantly. Additionally, large cities are allocated relatively less land. Further analysis finds that both the total amount of urban land allocated by provincial governments to counties and the proportion of residential land allocated by county governments have a positive impact on the sale of houses per capita. However, increasing the financial incentive of county governments significantly reduces the positive impact of the total amount of urban land on the housing market. Given these empirical results, China's real estate market can be summarized as follows. The regional allocation of urban land is negatively related to population agglomeration and the allocation of residential land is reduced to increase industrial land. The combination of these two effects result in the spatial mismatch of population, land and housing.China is experiencing a transition from a planned economy to a market economy. For scholars trying to understand how the Chinese government allocates important resources during this transition period, our study provides important information. Our study also has a silver lining for China's urbanization process, which is now plagued by high housing prices. Our results suggest that to achieve sustainable urbanization, land allocation must be consistent with population agglomeration and the incentive mechanism of residential land supply should be restructured at the county level.
引文
白重恩、钱震杰、武康平,2008:《中国工业部门要素分配份额决定因素研究》,《经济研究》第8期。
陈斌开、徐帆、谭力,2012:《人口结构转变与中国住房需求:1999—2025》,《金融研究》第1期。
陈斌开、杨汝岱,2013:《土地供给、住房价格与中国城镇居民储蓄》,《经济研究》第1期。
范剑勇、莫家伟、张吉鹏,2015:《居住模式与中国城镇化——基于土地供给视角的经验研究》,《中国社会科学》第4期。
甘犁、尹志超、贾男、徐舒、马双,2013:《中国家庭资产状况及住房需求分析》,《金融研究》第4期。
国土资源部,2008:《全国土地利用总体规划纲要(2006—2020)》,中国法制出版社。
蒋省三、刘守英、李青,2007:《土地制度改革与国民经济成长》,《管理世界》第9期。
李超、倪鹏飞、万海远,2015:《中国住房需求持续高涨之谜:基于人口结构视角》,《经济研究》第5期。
陆铭,2010:《建设用地指标可交易:城乡和区域统筹发展的突破口》,《国际经济评论》第2期。
陆铭,2011:《建设用地使用权跨区域再配置:中国经济增长的新动力》,《世界经济》第1期。
陆铭、高虹、佐滕宏,2012:《城市规模与包容性就业》,《中国社会科学》第10期。
陆铭、张航、梁文泉,2015:《偏向中西部的土地供应如何推升了东部的工资》,《中国社会科学》第5期。
米晋宏、刘冲,2017:《住房限购政策与城市房价波动分析》,《上海经济研究》第1期。
陶然、陆曦、苏福兵、汪晖,2009:《地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思》,《经济研究》第7期。
陶然、汪晖,2010:《中国尚未完成之转型中的土地制度改革:挑战与出路》,《国际经济评论》第2期。
谭明智,2014:《严控与激励并存:土地增减挂钩的政策脉络及地方实施》,《中国社会科学》第7期。
王小鲁,2010:《中国城市化路径和城市规模的经济学分析》,《经济研究》第10期。
徐建炜、徐奇渊、何帆,2012:《房价上涨背后的人口结构因素:国际经验与中国证据》,《世界经济》第1期。
张德荣、郑晓婷,2013:《“限购令”是抑制房价上涨的有效政策工具吗?》,《数量经济技术经济研究》第11期。
张军、高远、傅勇、张弘,2007:《中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施》,《经济研究》第3期。
张五常,2009:《中国的经济制度》,中信出版社。
郑思齐,2007:《住房需求的微观经济分析》,中国建筑工业出版社。
周飞舟、谭明智,2014:《当代中国的中央地方关系》,中国社会科学出版社。
周黎安,2007:《中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
周黎安,2017:《转型中的地方政府:官员激励与治理》,上海格致出版社。
周雪光,2014:《从“黄宗曦定律”到帝国的逻辑》,《开放时代》第4期。
邹至庄、牛霖琳,2010:《中国城镇居民住房的需求与供给》,《金融研究》第1期。
Au,C.,and J.V.Henderson,2006,“Are Chinese Cities too Small”,Review of Economic Studies,73,549—576.
Combes,P.,S.Démurge,and S.Li,2015,“Migration Externalities in Chinese Cities”,European Economic Review,76,152—167.
Du,Z.,and L.Zhang,2015,“Home-Purchase Restriction,Property Tax and Housing Price in China:A Counterfactual Analysis”,Journal of Econometrics,188,558—568.
Han,L.,and J.K.Kung,2015,“Fiscal Incentives and Policy Choices of Local Governments:Evidence from China”,Journal of Development Economics,116,89—104.
Knoll,K.,M.Schularick,and T.Steger,2017,“No Price Like Home:Global House Prices,1870—2012”,American Economic Review,107,331—353.
Li,H.,and L.Zhou,2005,“Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China”,Journal of Public Economics,89,1743—1762.
LYU,X.,and P.Landry,2014,“Show Me the Money:Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China”,American Political Science Review,108,706—722.
Mankiw,N.G.,and D.N.Weil,1989,“The Baby Boom,The Baby Bust,and the Housing Market”,Regional Science and Urban Economics,19,235—258.
Montinola,G.,and Y.Qian,1995,“Federalism,Chinese Style:The Political Basis for Economic Success in China”,World Politics,48,50—81.
Oates,W.E.,1972,“Fiscal Federalism”,New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Oi,J.C.,1992,“Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China”,World Politics,45,99—126.
Qian,Y.,and B.R.Weingast,1997,“Federalism as A Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,11,83—92.
Roodman,D.,2006,“How to Do Xtabond2”,Center for Global Development Working Paper,No.103.
Saiz,A.,2007,“Immigration and Housing Rents in American Cities”,Journal of Urban Economics,61,345—371.
Tiebout,C.M.,1956,“A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure”,Journal of Political Economy,64,416—424.
Wang,Z.,and Q.Zhang,2014,“Fundamental Factors in the Housing Markets of China”,Journal of Housing Economics,25,53—61.
Wu,J.,J.Gyourko,and Y.Deng,2012,“Evaluating Conditions in Major Chinese Housing Markets”,Regional Science and Urban Economics,42,531—543.
Xu,C.,2011,“The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development”,Journal of Economic Literature,49,1076—1151.
(1)中国的住房需求具有显著的空间异质性,“北上广深”等人口集聚地是需求最为旺盛的地区(甘犁等,2013)。
(2)具体细节参见《江苏省国土资源厅关于下达2017年全省土地利用计划的通知》,http://www.jsmlr.gov.cn/gtxxgk/nrglIndex.action?type=2&messageID=2c9082546000f1f201600aba968a01e5。
(3)见《国有建设用地供应计划编制规范》总则第一条,具体的用地结构指的是商服用地、工矿仓储用地、住宅用地、公共管理与公共服务用地、特殊用地、水域及水利设施用地、交通运输用地等各类型用地的比例关系,http://www.jsmlr.gov.cn/gtxxgk/nrglIndex.action?type=2&messageID=8a90825440beba390140c2bc53536f3d。
(4)参见《教育部关于做好2017年普通高等教育招生计划编制和管理工作的通知》,http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/s3011/201705/t20170510_304229.html。
(5)一个证据是:中央政府提出要借助“人地挂钩”政策推进城市化后,各省政府立即予以贯彻。参见《江苏省国土资源厅关于下达2017年全省土地利用计划的通知》,http://www.jsmlr.gov.cn/gtxxgk/nrglIndex.action?type=2&messageID=2c9082546000f1f201600aba968a01e5。
(6)该假设意味着进入区县政府效用函数的“工业税收和土地出让金”完全替代,放弃这一假设并不会对结论产生影响。
(7)稍复杂的建模是进一步考虑拥堵成本,将?定义为?1+?2,?1是土地供给通过降低房价促进城市人口增长的弹性系数,?2是土地供给通过疏解拥堵促进城市人口增长的弹性系数。这样在接下来的(7)式中,?2越大,则城市规模影响指标分配的弹性系数越大。感谢匿名审稿专家的启发。
(8)有些省份尽管公布了指标的地区分配,但仅具体到地级市层面,如安徽省、浙江省等。但指标的用途配置是区县政府完成的,因此无法使用这些数据。具体信息可搜索各省国土资源厅网站“规划计划”栏目。
(9)参见江苏省国土资源厅网站:http://www.jsmlr.gov.cn/gtxxgk/nrglIndex.action?classID=8a908254409a391f01409a4b4fec0009。
(10)因县市改区的行政区划调整,不同年份区县数量有所变动。
(11)参见2017年《江苏统计年鉴》的表6—1“固定资产投资主要指标”中的相关资料。
(12)本处的居住用地比例定义为“商品住房用地/建设用地总量”,它不同于前文的“居住用地与工业用地的比率”。本文也考察了人均居住用地供给的配置逻辑及其对住房市场的影响,但限于篇幅,文中没有展开讨论,感兴趣的读者可来信索取相关回归结果。
(13)在区县数量过多时,晋升机会将变得非常小,反而会减轻晋升压力和财政激励。
陈斌开、徐帆、谭力,2012:《人口结构转变与中国住房需求:1999—2025》,《金融研究》第1期。
陈斌开、杨汝岱,2013:《土地供给、住房价格与中国城镇居民储蓄》,《经济研究》第1期。
范剑勇、莫家伟、张吉鹏,2015:《居住模式与中国城镇化——基于土地供给视角的经验研究》,《中国社会科学》第4期。
甘犁、尹志超、贾男、徐舒、马双,2013:《中国家庭资产状况及住房需求分析》,《金融研究》第4期。
国土资源部,2008:《全国土地利用总体规划纲要(2006—2020)》,中国法制出版社。
蒋省三、刘守英、李青,2007:《土地制度改革与国民经济成长》,《管理世界》第9期。
李超、倪鹏飞、万海远,2015:《中国住房需求持续高涨之谜:基于人口结构视角》,《经济研究》第5期。
陆铭,2010:《建设用地指标可交易:城乡和区域统筹发展的突破口》,《国际经济评论》第2期。
陆铭,2011:《建设用地使用权跨区域再配置:中国经济增长的新动力》,《世界经济》第1期。
陆铭、高虹、佐滕宏,2012:《城市规模与包容性就业》,《中国社会科学》第10期。
陆铭、张航、梁文泉,2015:《偏向中西部的土地供应如何推升了东部的工资》,《中国社会科学》第5期。
米晋宏、刘冲,2017:《住房限购政策与城市房价波动分析》,《上海经济研究》第1期。
陶然、陆曦、苏福兵、汪晖,2009:《地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思》,《经济研究》第7期。
陶然、汪晖,2010:《中国尚未完成之转型中的土地制度改革:挑战与出路》,《国际经济评论》第2期。
谭明智,2014:《严控与激励并存:土地增减挂钩的政策脉络及地方实施》,《中国社会科学》第7期。
王小鲁,2010:《中国城市化路径和城市规模的经济学分析》,《经济研究》第10期。
徐建炜、徐奇渊、何帆,2012:《房价上涨背后的人口结构因素:国际经验与中国证据》,《世界经济》第1期。
张德荣、郑晓婷,2013:《“限购令”是抑制房价上涨的有效政策工具吗?》,《数量经济技术经济研究》第11期。
张军、高远、傅勇、张弘,2007:《中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施》,《经济研究》第3期。
张五常,2009:《中国的经济制度》,中信出版社。
郑思齐,2007:《住房需求的微观经济分析》,中国建筑工业出版社。
周飞舟、谭明智,2014:《当代中国的中央地方关系》,中国社会科学出版社。
周黎安,2007:《中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
周黎安,2017:《转型中的地方政府:官员激励与治理》,上海格致出版社。
周雪光,2014:《从“黄宗曦定律”到帝国的逻辑》,《开放时代》第4期。
邹至庄、牛霖琳,2010:《中国城镇居民住房的需求与供给》,《金融研究》第1期。
Au,C.,and J.V.Henderson,2006,“Are Chinese Cities too Small”,Review of Economic Studies,73,549—576.
Combes,P.,S.Démurge,and S.Li,2015,“Migration Externalities in Chinese Cities”,European Economic Review,76,152—167.
Du,Z.,and L.Zhang,2015,“Home-Purchase Restriction,Property Tax and Housing Price in China:A Counterfactual Analysis”,Journal of Econometrics,188,558—568.
Han,L.,and J.K.Kung,2015,“Fiscal Incentives and Policy Choices of Local Governments:Evidence from China”,Journal of Development Economics,116,89—104.
Knoll,K.,M.Schularick,and T.Steger,2017,“No Price Like Home:Global House Prices,1870—2012”,American Economic Review,107,331—353.
Li,H.,and L.Zhou,2005,“Political Turnover and Economic Performance:The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China”,Journal of Public Economics,89,1743—1762.
LYU,X.,and P.Landry,2014,“Show Me the Money:Interjurisdiction Political Competition and Fiscal Extraction in China”,American Political Science Review,108,706—722.
Mankiw,N.G.,and D.N.Weil,1989,“The Baby Boom,The Baby Bust,and the Housing Market”,Regional Science and Urban Economics,19,235—258.
Montinola,G.,and Y.Qian,1995,“Federalism,Chinese Style:The Political Basis for Economic Success in China”,World Politics,48,50—81.
Oates,W.E.,1972,“Fiscal Federalism”,New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Oi,J.C.,1992,“Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China”,World Politics,45,99—126.
Qian,Y.,and B.R.Weingast,1997,“Federalism as A Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,11,83—92.
Roodman,D.,2006,“How to Do Xtabond2”,Center for Global Development Working Paper,No.103.
Saiz,A.,2007,“Immigration and Housing Rents in American Cities”,Journal of Urban Economics,61,345—371.
Tiebout,C.M.,1956,“A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure”,Journal of Political Economy,64,416—424.
Wang,Z.,and Q.Zhang,2014,“Fundamental Factors in the Housing Markets of China”,Journal of Housing Economics,25,53—61.
Wu,J.,J.Gyourko,and Y.Deng,2012,“Evaluating Conditions in Major Chinese Housing Markets”,Regional Science and Urban Economics,42,531—543.
Xu,C.,2011,“The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development”,Journal of Economic Literature,49,1076—1151.
(1)中国的住房需求具有显著的空间异质性,“北上广深”等人口集聚地是需求最为旺盛的地区(甘犁等,2013)。
(2)具体细节参见《江苏省国土资源厅关于下达2017年全省土地利用计划的通知》,http://www.jsmlr.gov.cn/gtxxgk/nrglIndex.action?type=2&messageID=2c9082546000f1f201600aba968a01e5。
(3)见《国有建设用地供应计划编制规范》总则第一条,具体的用地结构指的是商服用地、工矿仓储用地、住宅用地、公共管理与公共服务用地、特殊用地、水域及水利设施用地、交通运输用地等各类型用地的比例关系,http://www.jsmlr.gov.cn/gtxxgk/nrglIndex.action?type=2&messageID=8a90825440beba390140c2bc53536f3d。
(4)参见《教育部关于做好2017年普通高等教育招生计划编制和管理工作的通知》,http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/s180/s3011/201705/t20170510_304229.html。
(5)一个证据是:中央政府提出要借助“人地挂钩”政策推进城市化后,各省政府立即予以贯彻。参见《江苏省国土资源厅关于下达2017年全省土地利用计划的通知》,http://www.jsmlr.gov.cn/gtxxgk/nrglIndex.action?type=2&messageID=2c9082546000f1f201600aba968a01e5。
(6)该假设意味着进入区县政府效用函数的“工业税收和土地出让金”完全替代,放弃这一假设并不会对结论产生影响。
(7)稍复杂的建模是进一步考虑拥堵成本,将?定义为?1+?2,?1是土地供给通过降低房价促进城市人口增长的弹性系数,?2是土地供给通过疏解拥堵促进城市人口增长的弹性系数。这样在接下来的(7)式中,?2越大,则城市规模影响指标分配的弹性系数越大。感谢匿名审稿专家的启发。
(8)有些省份尽管公布了指标的地区分配,但仅具体到地级市层面,如安徽省、浙江省等。但指标的用途配置是区县政府完成的,因此无法使用这些数据。具体信息可搜索各省国土资源厅网站“规划计划”栏目。
(9)参见江苏省国土资源厅网站:http://www.jsmlr.gov.cn/gtxxgk/nrglIndex.action?classID=8a908254409a391f01409a4b4fec0009。
(10)因县市改区的行政区划调整,不同年份区县数量有所变动。
(11)参见2017年《江苏统计年鉴》的表6—1“固定资产投资主要指标”中的相关资料。
(12)本处的居住用地比例定义为“商品住房用地/建设用地总量”,它不同于前文的“居住用地与工业用地的比率”。本文也考察了人均居住用地供给的配置逻辑及其对住房市场的影响,但限于篇幅,文中没有展开讨论,感兴趣的读者可来信索取相关回归结果。
(13)在区县数量过多时,晋升机会将变得非常小,反而会减轻晋升压力和财政激励。