修改反收购章程条款阻击“野蛮人”:好消息还是坏消息?
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摘要
"宝万之争"爆发以来,中国资本市场掀起了一股修改反收购章程条款以阻击"门口野蛮人"的热潮。那么,上市公司修改反收购章程条款阻击"野蛮人"到底保护了谁的利益?文章手工收集2014-2016年发生的126起上市公司增设反收购条款的公告事件,运用事件研究法对上述问题进行了探究。研究发现,总体而言,投资者普遍认为上市公司在章程中加入反收购条款是一个好消息,表现出显著为正的市场反应。在事件窗口[-1,3]内,目标公司的累积超常收益率平均达2.68%,说明增设反收购条款带来了显著的股东财富增长。相对而言,上市公司增设反收购条款事件的正向市场反应在民营企业、大股东持股比例较高和机构持股比例较低的公司中表现得较弱,说明产权性质、股权集中度、机构持股等股权结构特征是影响上市公司反收购条款价值的重要情境因素。文章基于中国特殊的制度背景,检验了上市公司增设反收购条款的短期市场反应,客观衡量了反收购条款对中国资本市场股东财富的影响。这既丰富了反收购条款和控制权市场等领域的研究文献,也有利于加深对中国上市公司增设反收购条款行为的理解与认识,进而为指导相关实践活动提供有价值的政策建议。
Since the battle of Vanke broke out,there emerges a surge of antitakeover provision amendment trying to protect the company from corporate raiders in China's capital markets,which induces a debate about whether the provisions are in favor of existing shareholders' benefits. However,this debate still remains unsolved. Therefore,this paper aims to figure out whose interests on earth are protected by amending listed companies' antitakeover provisions.Researches about hostile takeover and antitakeover provisions have aroused extensive and constant attentions since 1980s.In July 2015,Baoneng Group bought a large amount of Vanke’s stocks from the capital markets,which led to a tide for antitakeover provision amendment among listed companies in China.According to our results,there are 126 antitakeover provision amendment events of listed companies from 2014 to2016.From this perspective,the market for corporate control and hostile takeover seem to be a potential threat.However,researches about the above problems under Chinese specific institution background are still quite limited,and these antitakeover provision amendment events provide us a good way to investigate the influence of takeover defense,which has not been clarified by scholars under Chinese capital market yet.This study manually collects 116 announcement events of listed companies’antitakeover provision amendment during the period of 2014-2016,and uses the method of event study to investigate the above question.It finds that:(1)Investors perceive that the event of antitakeover provision amendment is good news on the whole,and thus react positively to related event announcements.During the event window of[-1,3],the accumulated abnormal return of focal firms is up to about 2.68%,indicating that antitakeover provisions can improve focal firms’shareholder wealth.(2)Relatively speaking,the positive market reaction to the announcement event of antitakeover provision amendment is less pronounced in private enterprises,in firms having the largest shareholder with higher ownership,and in firms with lower institutional ownership,suggesting that the characteristics of the ownership structure including the nature of property rights,ownership concentration,and institutional ownership are important contingent factors in influencing the value of antitakeover provisions.In addition,this study further finds that ownership concentration,managerial ownership,and the nature of industry monopoly are important determinants of the likelihood of amending antitakeover provisions for listed companies.Overall,the potential contributions of this study are as follows:First,this study takes advantage of China’s special institutional background to investigate the short-term market reaction to the event announcement of listed companies’antitakeover provision amendment by use of the event study method,and in such way we measure the effect of antitakeover provisions on shareholder wealth in China’s capital markets.Second,we find that under different contingent factors,the value of antitakeover provision amending could be varied,which may help us understand the controversial research conclusions before.What’s more,it not only can enrich the literature regarding antitakeover provisions and the market for corporate control,but also can deepen our understanding of listed companies’antitakeover provision amending behavior,and thus provide some valuable implications for practitioners and references for policy makers about hostile takeover and takeover defense.
Since the battle of Vanke broke out,there emerges a surge of antitakeover provision amendment trying to protect the company from corporate raiders in China's capital markets,which induces a debate about whether the provisions are in favor of existing shareholders' benefits. However,this debate still remains unsolved. Therefore,this paper aims to figure out whose interests on earth are protected by amending listed companies' antitakeover provisions.Researches about hostile takeover and antitakeover provisions have aroused extensive and constant attentions since 1980s.In July 2015,Baoneng Group bought a large amount of Vanke’s stocks from the capital markets,which led to a tide for antitakeover provision amendment among listed companies in China.According to our results,there are 126 antitakeover provision amendment events of listed companies from 2014 to2016.From this perspective,the market for corporate control and hostile takeover seem to be a potential threat.However,researches about the above problems under Chinese specific institution background are still quite limited,and these antitakeover provision amendment events provide us a good way to investigate the influence of takeover defense,which has not been clarified by scholars under Chinese capital market yet.This study manually collects 116 announcement events of listed companies’antitakeover provision amendment during the period of 2014-2016,and uses the method of event study to investigate the above question.It finds that:(1)Investors perceive that the event of antitakeover provision amendment is good news on the whole,and thus react positively to related event announcements.During the event window of[-1,3],the accumulated abnormal return of focal firms is up to about 2.68%,indicating that antitakeover provisions can improve focal firms’shareholder wealth.(2)Relatively speaking,the positive market reaction to the announcement event of antitakeover provision amendment is less pronounced in private enterprises,in firms having the largest shareholder with higher ownership,and in firms with lower institutional ownership,suggesting that the characteristics of the ownership structure including the nature of property rights,ownership concentration,and institutional ownership are important contingent factors in influencing the value of antitakeover provisions.In addition,this study further finds that ownership concentration,managerial ownership,and the nature of industry monopoly are important determinants of the likelihood of amending antitakeover provisions for listed companies.Overall,the potential contributions of this study are as follows:First,this study takes advantage of China’s special institutional background to investigate the short-term market reaction to the event announcement of listed companies’antitakeover provision amendment by use of the event study method,and in such way we measure the effect of antitakeover provisions on shareholder wealth in China’s capital markets.Second,we find that under different contingent factors,the value of antitakeover provision amending could be varied,which may help us understand the controversial research conclusions before.What’s more,it not only can enrich the literature regarding antitakeover provisions and the market for corporate control,but also can deepen our understanding of listed companies’antitakeover provision amending behavior,and thus provide some valuable implications for practitioners and references for policy makers about hostile takeover and takeover defense.
引文
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[4]陈玉罡,许金花,李善民.对累积投票制的强制性规定有效吗?[J].管理科学学报,2016,(3):34-47.
[5]顾慧莹,王小妹,姚铮.管理者反收购策略研究评述和展望[J].外国经济与管理,2017,(5):115-128.
[6]李善民,许金花,张东,等.公司章程设立的反收购条款能保护中小投资者利益吗-基于我国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2016,(4):49-62.
[7]李维安,齐鲁骏,李元祯.从“宝万之争”的治理启示解读“杠杆收购”[J].清华金融评论,2017,(1):34-37.
[8]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排-来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,(12):3-13.
[9]罗进辉.“国进民退”:好消息还是坏消息[J].金融研究,2013,(5):99-113.
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[15]Bates T W,Becher D A,Lemmon M L.Board classification and managerial entrenchment:Evidence from the market for corporate control[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(3):656-677.
[16]Claessens S,Djankov S,Lang L H P.The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1-2):81-112.
[17]Cohen A,Wang C C Y.How do staggered boards affect shareholder value?Evidence from a natural experiment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,110(3):627-641.
[18]DeAngelo H,Rice E M.Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(1-4):329-359.
[19]Gompers P,Ishii J,Metrick A.Corporate governance and equity prices[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118(1):107-156.
[20]Grossman S J,Hart O D.Takeover bids,the free-rider problem,and the theory of the corporation[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(1):42-64.
[21]Heron R A,Lie E.On the use of poison pills and defensive payouts by takeover targets[J].Journal of Business,2006,79(4):1783-1807.
[22]Hwang L S,Lee W J.Do takeover defenses impair equity investors’perception of“Higher Quality”earnings?[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2012,27(3):325-358.
[23]Johnson S,La Porta R,Lopez-de-Silanes F,et al.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27.
[24]Luo J H,Wan D F,Cai D,et al.Multiple large shareholder structure and governance:The role of shareholder numbers,contest for control,and formal institutions in Chinese family firms[J].Management and Organization Review,2013,9(2):265-294.
[25]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Greenmail,white knights,and shareholders’interest[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1986,17(3):293-309.
[26]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[27]Stein J C.Takeover threats and managerial myopia[J].Journal of Political Economy,1988,96(1):61-80.
[28]Straska M,Waller H G.Antitakeover provisions and shareholder wealth:A survey of the literature[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2014,49(4):933-956.
[2]陈玉罡,傅豪.控股股东影响了控制权市场的作用吗?[J].财经研究,2012,(4):80-90.
[3]陈玉罡,石芳.反收购条款、并购概率与公司价值[J].会计研究,2014,(2):34-40.
[4]陈玉罡,许金花,李善民.对累积投票制的强制性规定有效吗?[J].管理科学学报,2016,(3):34-47.
[5]顾慧莹,王小妹,姚铮.管理者反收购策略研究评述和展望[J].外国经济与管理,2017,(5):115-128.
[6]李善民,许金花,张东,等.公司章程设立的反收购条款能保护中小投资者利益吗-基于我国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2016,(4):49-62.
[7]李维安,齐鲁骏,李元祯.从“宝万之争”的治理启示解读“杠杆收购”[J].清华金融评论,2017,(1):34-37.
[8]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排-来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,(12):3-13.
[9]罗进辉.“国进民退”:好消息还是坏消息[J].金融研究,2013,(5):99-113.
[10]罗进辉,李雪,黄泽悦.关键高管的人力资本价值评估-基于关键高管突然去世事件的经验研究[J].中国工业经济,2016,(5):127-143.
[11]沈艺峰,许年行,杨熠.我国中小投资者法律保护历史实践的实证检验[J].经济研究,2004,(9):90-100.
[12]吴磊磊,陈伟忠,刘敏慧.公司章程和小股东保护-来自累积投票条款的实证检验[J].金融研究,2011,(2):160-171.
[13]郑志刚.从万科到阿里:分散股权时代的公司治理[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2017.
[14]郑志刚,许荣,徐向江,等.公司章程条款的设立、法律对投资者权力保护和公司治理-基于我国A股上市公司的证据[J].管理世界,2011,(7):141-153.
[15]Bates T W,Becher D A,Lemmon M L.Board classification and managerial entrenchment:Evidence from the market for corporate control[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(3):656-677.
[16]Claessens S,Djankov S,Lang L H P.The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1-2):81-112.
[17]Cohen A,Wang C C Y.How do staggered boards affect shareholder value?Evidence from a natural experiment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2013,110(3):627-641.
[18]DeAngelo H,Rice E M.Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(1-4):329-359.
[19]Gompers P,Ishii J,Metrick A.Corporate governance and equity prices[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118(1):107-156.
[20]Grossman S J,Hart O D.Takeover bids,the free-rider problem,and the theory of the corporation[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(1):42-64.
[21]Heron R A,Lie E.On the use of poison pills and defensive payouts by takeover targets[J].Journal of Business,2006,79(4):1783-1807.
[22]Hwang L S,Lee W J.Do takeover defenses impair equity investors’perception of“Higher Quality”earnings?[J].Journal of Accounting,Auditing&Finance,2012,27(3):325-358.
[23]Johnson S,La Porta R,Lopez-de-Silanes F,et al.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27.
[24]Luo J H,Wan D F,Cai D,et al.Multiple large shareholder structure and governance:The role of shareholder numbers,contest for control,and formal institutions in Chinese family firms[J].Management and Organization Review,2013,9(2):265-294.
[25]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Greenmail,white knights,and shareholders’interest[J].The RAND Journal of Economics,1986,17(3):293-309.
[26]Shleifer A,Vishny R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[27]Stein J C.Takeover threats and managerial myopia[J].Journal of Political Economy,1988,96(1):61-80.
[28]Straska M,Waller H G.Antitakeover provisions and shareholder wealth:A survey of the literature[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2014,49(4):933-956.