并购重组中内幕交易为何如此频繁?——基于社会关系视角的经验研究
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摘要
近年来,中国资本市场内幕信息泄露和内幕交易行为并不少见,对其影响因素的研究逐渐成为热点。从社会资本和社会关系的角度切入,以2007—2016年并购重组中实际发生控制权转移的218家上市公司为样本,对上市公司并购重组中高管的社会关系如何影响内幕交易进行了实证研究。研究发现,上市公司高管的社会关系会对内幕信息泄露程度产生重要影响。高管和政府的社会关系以及高管和金融机构的社会关系均是泄露的途径。上市公司高管在政府以及金融机构的任职经历越丰富,内幕信息泄露行为就越严重。与此同时,在监管机构工作过的人员进入到上市公司担任高管可以起到遏制内幕信息泄露的作用。为了有效防止非法内幕交易,建议监管部门将公司高管在职业生涯中拓展的社会关系作为监管和关注的重点对象。
In recent years,insider information disclosure and insider trading behavior have not been rarely seen on China's capital market,and research on their influencing factors has been heated topic. From the perspective of social capital and social relations,taking 218 listed companies as samples that have actually experienced the control transfer during the years from 2007 to2016,this paper empirically conducts a study on how the social relations of top executives affect insider trading in mergers and acquisitions( M&A) of listed companies. The empirical research shows that the social relations of top executives in listed companies have significant impact on the degree of insider information disclosure. The social relations of top executives with government and financial institutions are both access to information disclosure. The richer the top executives' experience in the government and financial institutions,the more serious the insider information disclosure behavior. At the same time,the research indicates that the persons who worked in the regulatory agency before entering the listed company as top executives can play a role in containment of insider information disclosure. In order to effectively prevent illegal insider trading,the regulatory authority should regard the social relations of a company's top executives in their careers as the focus of supervision and concern.
In recent years,insider information disclosure and insider trading behavior have not been rarely seen on China's capital market,and research on their influencing factors has been heated topic. From the perspective of social capital and social relations,taking 218 listed companies as samples that have actually experienced the control transfer during the years from 2007 to2016,this paper empirically conducts a study on how the social relations of top executives affect insider trading in mergers and acquisitions( M&A) of listed companies. The empirical research shows that the social relations of top executives in listed companies have significant impact on the degree of insider information disclosure. The social relations of top executives with government and financial institutions are both access to information disclosure. The richer the top executives' experience in the government and financial institutions,the more serious the insider information disclosure behavior. At the same time,the research indicates that the persons who worked in the regulatory agency before entering the listed company as top executives can play a role in containment of insider information disclosure. In order to effectively prevent illegal insider trading,the regulatory authority should regard the social relations of a company's top executives in their careers as the focus of supervision and concern.
引文
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[24]HWANG K. Face and favor:the Chinese power game[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1987,92(4):944-974.
[25]罗家德.社会网分析讲义[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2010.
[26]FLORIN J,LUBATKIN M,SCHULZE W. A social capital model of high-growth ventures[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(3):374-384.
[27]边燕,丘海雄.企业的社会资本及其功效[J].中国社会科学,2000(2):87-99.
[28]李善民,黄灿,史欣向.信息优势对企业并购的影响——基于社会网络的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(11):141-155.
[29]史欣向.基于社会资本视角的中国股市IPO定价效率研究[D].广州:华南理工大学,2012.
[30]AKTAS N,DEBODT E,DECLERCK F,et al.The PIN anomaly around M&A announcements[J]. Journal of Financial Markets,2007,10(2):169-191.
[2]朱宝宪.中国并购评论[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2003.
[3]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W. A survey of corporate governance[J]. The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[4]DENIS D K,MCCONNELL J J. International corporate governance[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):1-36.
[5]LAPORTA R L, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A,et al. Law and finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[6]NOE T H. Insider trading and the problem of corporate agency[J]. The Journal of Law,Economics,and Organization,1997,13(2):287-318.
[7]CRUCES J J,KAWAMURA E. Insider trading and corporate governance in Latin America[Z]. Research Department Working Paper Series No. 513,2005.
[8]ANAND A I,BENY L N. Why do firms adopt insider trading policies? Evidence from Canadian firms[J]. American Law&Economics Association Annual Meetings,Bepress,2007,17(3):70.
[9]CZIRAKI P,XU M. CEO job security and risktaking[Z]. University of Toronto Working Paper,2014.
[10]唐齐鸣,张云.基于公司治理视角的中国股票市场非法内幕交易研究[J].金融研究,2009(6):144-160.
[11]姜华东,乔晓楠.股权集中度与证券市场的倒U型内幕交易曲线[J].上海金融,2010(10):7-13.
[12]凌玲,方军雄.公司治理,治理环境对内幕交易的影响[J].证券市场导报,2014(6):63-68.
[13]何贤杰,孙淑伟,曾庆生.券商背景独立董事与上市公司内幕交易[J].财经研究,2014(8):67-80.
[14]FIDRMUC J P,GOERGEN M,RENNEBOOG L.Insider trading,news releases,and ownership concentration[J]. The Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2931-2973.
[15]JAYARAMAN S. Earnings volatility,cash flow volatility,and informed trading[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2008,46(4):809-851.
[16]张丹,杨朝军,廖士光.重大事件披露,股价异常波动与内幕交易——基于重大信息披露违规公司的经验证据[J].上海管理科学,2009(1):23-26.
[17]李捷瑜,王美今.内幕交易与公司治理:来自业绩预报的证据[J].证券市场导报,2008(12):59-66.
[18]岳宝宏,孙健.控制权转移中的内幕交易者收益研究[J].财经问题研究,2011(10):68-75.
[19]沈冰,郭粤,傅李洋.中国股票市场内幕交易影响因素的实证研究[J].财经问题研究,2013(4):54-61.
[20]BOURDIEU P,PASSERON J C. Reproduction in education,society and culture[M]. London:Sage,1990.
[21]NAHAPIET J,GHOSHAL S. Social capital,intellectual capital,and the organizational advantage[J]. The Academy of Management Review,1998,23(2):242-266.
[22]LIN N. Social capital:a theory of social structure and action[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.
[23]费孝通.乡土中国[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006.
[24]HWANG K. Face and favor:the Chinese power game[J]. American Journal of Sociology,1987,92(4):944-974.
[25]罗家德.社会网分析讲义[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2010.
[26]FLORIN J,LUBATKIN M,SCHULZE W. A social capital model of high-growth ventures[J]. Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(3):374-384.
[27]边燕,丘海雄.企业的社会资本及其功效[J].中国社会科学,2000(2):87-99.
[28]李善民,黄灿,史欣向.信息优势对企业并购的影响——基于社会网络的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(11):141-155.
[29]史欣向.基于社会资本视角的中国股市IPO定价效率研究[D].广州:华南理工大学,2012.
[30]AKTAS N,DEBODT E,DECLERCK F,et al.The PIN anomaly around M&A announcements[J]. Journal of Financial Markets,2007,10(2):169-191.