改良技术共享下改良品联合采购联盟的竞合博弈研究
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摘要
改良技术共享与联合采购在一定程度上能够降低改良品采购联盟的运作成本。但是,是否选择进行改良技术创新,改良率提高到什么程度,是否进行改良技术共享,形成改良技术共享与联合采购联盟之后如何进行运作成本分摊可以保持其稳定性,是零售商进行改良技术共享后改良品联合采购联盟所需要解决的关键问题。本文基于经典的EOQ模型,建立了改良技术共享下改良品联合采购联盟成员间既有竞争又有合作的竞合博弈模型。首先,当零售商各自进行改良技术创新并在联盟内共享改良技术时,确定了改良技术共享下改良品联合采购联盟的运作策略与总成本;随后,给出了一种分配方案证明改良技术共享下改良品联合采购合作博弈的核是非空的;最后,指出平均分配方案所得到的改良率将低于集中化决策时零售商的最优改良率,并指出在该合作博弈核的极点的成本分摊规则下,此联合采购联盟的总成本是最低的。本文的研究表明,采用平均分摊成本的方案将不能达到系统最优,而采用核的极点的成本分摊方案将可以使成本降低至系统集中化决策时的水平。
Ameliorating technology sharing and joint purchasing can reduce the operational cost of purchasing coalitions for ameliorating items.However,there are some problems that need to be solved.For example,whether to choose the innovation of ameliorating technology,what the level of improving ameliorating technology is,whether to share the ameliorating technology,how to allocate operational cost that in order to keep the stability of coaliton?In this paper,ajoint purchasing co-opetition game model of ameliorating items with ameliorating technology competing and sharing is constructed based on the classical EOQ model.First of all,given the investment of improving ameliorating technology,the operation strategies and total cost of joint purchasing coalitions for ameliorating items with ameliorating technology sharing are obtained.Then,it is pointed out that the core of cooperative game of joint purchasing coalitions for ameliorating items is non-empty using a special allocating rule.Finally,the ameliorating level obtained by using equally allocating rule will lower than the optimal ameliorating level under centralized system.In addition,the lowest cost of system will be obtained by using the pole of core of cooperative game of joint purchasing of ameliorating items with ameliorating technology sharing.The results show that the equally allocating rule will not achieve the optimal cost by joint purchasing coalitions of ameliorating items with ameliorating technology sharing,however the pole of core can achieve the centralized decision-making level.
Ameliorating technology sharing and joint purchasing can reduce the operational cost of purchasing coalitions for ameliorating items.However,there are some problems that need to be solved.For example,whether to choose the innovation of ameliorating technology,what the level of improving ameliorating technology is,whether to share the ameliorating technology,how to allocate operational cost that in order to keep the stability of coaliton?In this paper,ajoint purchasing co-opetition game model of ameliorating items with ameliorating technology competing and sharing is constructed based on the classical EOQ model.First of all,given the investment of improving ameliorating technology,the operation strategies and total cost of joint purchasing coalitions for ameliorating items with ameliorating technology sharing are obtained.Then,it is pointed out that the core of cooperative game of joint purchasing coalitions for ameliorating items is non-empty using a special allocating rule.Finally,the ameliorating level obtained by using equally allocating rule will lower than the optimal ameliorating level under centralized system.In addition,the lowest cost of system will be obtained by using the pole of core of cooperative game of joint purchasing of ameliorating items with ameliorating technology sharing.The results show that the equally allocating rule will not achieve the optimal cost by joint purchasing coalitions of ameliorating items with ameliorating technology sharing,however the pole of core can achieve the centralized decision-making level.
引文
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[21]Bernstein F,K9k A G,Meca A.Cooperation in assembly systems:The role of knowledge sharing networks[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,240(1):160-171.
[22]肖旦,周永务,钟远光,等.随机需求下库存技术共享零售商联合采购联盟的竞合博弈研究[J].管理工程学报,2017(4):194-199.
[23]Porteus E L.Investing in reduced setups in the EOQ model[J].Management Science,1985,31(8):998-1010.
[2]Mondal B,Bhunia A K,Maiti M.An inventory system of ameliorating items for price dependent demand rate[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2003,45(3):443-456.
[3]Moon I,Giri B C,Ko B.Economic order quantity models for ameliorating/deteriorating items under inflation and time discounting[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2005,162(3):773-785.
[4]Sana S S.Demand influenced by enterprises'initiativesA multi-item EOQ model of deteriorating and ameliorating items[J].Mathematical&Computer Modelling,2010,52(1):284-302.
[5]王勇,孙海雷,陈晓旭.基于数量折扣的改良品供应链协调策略[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(4):51-57.
[6]孙海雷,王勇,陈晓旭,等.基于价格折扣的改良品供应链的协调策略研究[J].系统工程学报,2014,29(1):75-84.
[7]张云丰,王勇,孙海雷,等.数量折扣激励下考虑缺货的改良品供应链协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2016,22(3):813-821.
[8]张云丰,王勇,龚本刚,等.考虑价格折扣与交易信用的改良品供应链协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2017,23(8):1721-1730.
[9]Meca A,Timmer J,Garcia-Jurado I,et al.Inventory games[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2004,156(1):127-139.
[10]Meca A,Garcia-Jurado I,Borm P.Cooperation and competition in inventory games[J]. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research,2003,57(3):481-493.
[11] Meca A,Guardiola L A,Toledo A.P-additive games:A class of totally balanced games arising from inventory situations with temporary discounts[J].TOP,2007,15(2):322-340.
[12]Lin C,Lin Y.A cooperative inventory policy with deteriorating items for a two-echelon model[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,178(1):92-111.
[13]冯海荣,李军,曾银莲.易腐品供应链企业联合采购决策与费用分配研究[J].系统科学与数学,2011,31(11):1454-1466.
[14]Zhang J.Cost allocation for joint replenishment models[J].Operations Research,2009,57(1):146-156.
[15]Chen X.Inventory centralization games with price-dependent demand and quantity discount[J].Operations Research,2009,57(6):1394-1406.
[16]Fiestras-Janeiro M G,García-Jurado I,Meca A,et al.Cost allocation in inventory transportation systems[J].Top,2012,20(2):397-410.
[17]肖旦,刘芳,史欣向,等.随机需求环境下零售商联合采购与合并运输联盟的稳定性分析[J].广州大学学报(自然科学版),2016,15(1):90-95.
[18]肖旦,周永务.数量折扣契约下制造商与零售商库存合作联盟的稳定性[J].运筹与管理,2013,(2):20-26+43.
[19]肖旦,周永务,史欣向,等.分销供应链中零售商横向竞争下采购联盟的稳定结构[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(4):33-41.
[20]张云丰,王勇,龚本刚,等.非瞬时补货下改良品联合采购决策[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):124-132.
[21]Bernstein F,K9k A G,Meca A.Cooperation in assembly systems:The role of knowledge sharing networks[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,240(1):160-171.
[22]肖旦,周永务,钟远光,等.随机需求下库存技术共享零售商联合采购联盟的竞合博弈研究[J].管理工程学报,2017(4):194-199.
[23]Porteus E L.Investing in reduced setups in the EOQ model[J].Management Science,1985,31(8):998-1010.