金融关联与内部控制对企业创新投资的影响:互补抑或替代?
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摘要
本文以2012～2016年沪深A股上市公司为样本,探讨金融关联、内部控制及其交互作用对企业创新投资的影响。研究发现,金融关联和内部控制均能促进企业创新投资,且在促进创新投资过程中,金融关联和内部控制存在替代效应。区分金融关联类型后发现,该替代效应主要存在于银行金融关联之中,而非银行金融关联未影响内部控制作用的发挥。本研究表明,在目前大力推行内部控制制度建设过程中,应当考虑"关系"这一非正式制度背景,进而优化企业创新投资行为。
Taking A-share' s listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as sample,this paper explores the impact of financial connection,internal control and the interaction between the two on corporate innovation investment. It finds that both financial connection and internal control can promote enterprise innovation investment. In the process of innovation investment promotion,there is a substitution effect between financial connection and internal control. After distinguishing the types of financial connection,the study finds that the substitution effect mainly exists in the bank financial connection,and non-bank financial connection has not affected the function of internal control. The research shows that"relationship"should be taken into consideration as informal institutional background when we promote the construction of internal control system,and then the innovative investment behavior can be optimized.
Taking A-share' s listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as sample,this paper explores the impact of financial connection,internal control and the interaction between the two on corporate innovation investment. It finds that both financial connection and internal control can promote enterprise innovation investment. In the process of innovation investment promotion,there is a substitution effect between financial connection and internal control. After distinguishing the types of financial connection,the study finds that the substitution effect mainly exists in the bank financial connection,and non-bank financial connection has not affected the function of internal control. The research shows that"relationship"should be taken into consideration as informal institutional background when we promote the construction of internal control system,and then the innovative investment behavior can be optimized.
引文
[1]于博.技术创新推动企业去杠杆了吗?---影响机理与加速机制[J].财经研究,2017,(11):113-127.
[2]Aboody D.,Lev B.Information Asymmetry,R&D,and Insider Gains[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(6):2747-2766.
[3]邓建平,曾勇.金融关联能否缓解民营企业的融资约束[J].金融研究,2011,(8):78-92.
[4]祝继高,韩非池,陆正飞.产业政策、银行关联与企业债务融资---基于A股上市公司的实证研究[J].金融研究,2015,(3):176-191.
[5]钟凯,吕洁,程小可.内部控制建设与企业创新投资:促进还是抑制?---中国“萨班斯”法案的经济后果[J].证券市场导报,2016,(9):30-38.
[6]Cohen D.A.,Dey A.,Lys T.Z.Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods[J].Accounting Review,2008,83(3):757-787.
[7]Mitra S.,Jaggi B.,Hossain M.Internal Control Weaknesses and Accounting Conservatism:Evidence From the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Period[J].Journal of Accounting Auditing&Finance,2013,28(2):152-191.
[8]张国清.内部控制与盈余质量---基于2007年A股公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2008,(3):112-119.
[9]孙光国,杨金凤.高质量的内部控制能提高会计信息透明度吗?[J].财经问题研究,2013,(7):77-86.
[10]宋常,田莹莹,陈茜.内部控制自愿披露、披露成本与融资需求[J].山西财经大学学报,2014,(1):91-102.
[11]Holmstrom B.Agency Cost and Innovation[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1989,12(3):305-327.
[12]Ahn S.,Choi W.The Role of Bank Monitoring in Corporate Governance:Evidence from Borrowers’Earnings Management Behavior[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2009,33(2):425-434.
[13]Kortum S.,Lerner J.Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2000,31(4):674-692.
[14]Durnev A.,Li K.,Mrck R.,et al.Capital Markets and Capital Allocation:Implications for Economies in Transition[J].Economics of Transition,2004,12(4):593-634.
[15]Bhattacharya S.,Ritter J.R.Innovation and Communication:Signalling with Partial Disclosure[J].The Review of Economic Studies,1983,50(2):331-346.
[16]Coleman J.S.Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital[J].American Journal of Sociology,1988,94(1):95-120.
[17]Manso G.Motivating Innovation[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1823-1860.
[18]Hambrick D.C.,Mason P.A.Upper Echelons:The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J].The Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[19]Hilary G.,Hui K.W.Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in America?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(3):455-473.
[20]谢志华.内部控制:本质与结构[J].会计研究,2009,(12):70-75.
[21]林钟高,陈俊杰.管理防御、企业研发投入与内部控制治理[J].中国注册会计师,2016,(10):52-59.
[22]罗正英,詹乾隆,段姝.内部控制质量与企业高管薪酬契约[J].中国软科学,2016,(2):169-178.
[23]李万福,林斌,林东杰.内部控制能有效规避财务困境吗?[J].财经研究,2012,(1):125-135.
[24]胡元木.技术独立董事可以提高R&D产出效率吗?---来自中国证券市场的研究[J].南开管理评论,2012,(2):136-142.
[25]Jensen M.C.Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[26]曲进,高升好.银行与企业关联提升抑或降低了企业投资效率?[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2015,(1):36-51.
[27]李万福,林斌,宋璐.内部控制在公司投资中的角色:效率促进还是抑制?[J].管理世界,2011,(2):81-99.
[28]黄寿昌,杨雄胜.内部控制报告、财务报告质量与信息不对称---来自沪市上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2011,(7):81-91.
[29]Krishnan J.,Rama D.,Zhang Y.Costs to Comply with SOX Section 404[J].Auditing A Journal of Practice&Theory,2008,27(1):169-186.
[30]德勤会计师事务所.2012中国企业内部控制调查分析报告:“分类分批”,如何全面实施内部控制[EB/OL].http://wenku.baidu.com/view/38738ce3856a561252d36f5b.html.
[31]逯东,王运陈,王春国,等.政治关联与民营上市公司的内部控制执行[J].中国工业经济,2013,(11):96-108.
[32]陈爽英,井润田,龙小宁,等.民营企业家社会关系资本对研发投资决策影响的实证研究[J].管理世界,2010,(1):88-97.
[33]刘运国,刘雯.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界,2007,(1):128-136.
[34]李文贵.银行关联、所有权性质与企业风险承担[J].财经理论研究,2015,(5):83-91.
[35]张瑾华,何轩,李新春.银行融资依赖与民营企业创新能力---基于中国企业家调查系统数据的实证研究[J].管理评论,2016,(4):98-108.
[36]Berger A.N.,Udell G.F.Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance[J].Journal of Business,1995,68(3):351-381.
[37]Goh B.W.,Li D.Internal Controls and Conditional Conservatism[J].Accounting Review,2011,86(3):975-1005.
[38]Feng M.,Li C.,Mcvay S.Internal Control and Management Guidance[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2009,48(2):190-209.
[39]Ashbaugh-Skaife H.,Collins D.W.,Kinney W.R.,et al.The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies and Their Remediation on Accrual Quality[J].Accounting Review,2008,83(1):217-250.
[40]戴维奇,刘洋,廖明情.烙印效应:民营企业谁在“不务正业”?[J].管理世界,2016,(5):99-115.
(1)Wind资讯的相关数据显示,非银行金融机构资产总额从2011年的26067亿元上升至2016年的79311亿元,增长率为204.26%,利润总额从2011年的598.8亿元上升至2016年的1554.6亿元,增长率为159.62%,非银行金融机构在我国已占据重要地位,大量企业已开始重视建立非银行金融关联。
(1)用银行金融关联高管(现在或曾经在银行任职)人数占企业高管总人数比例衡量银行金融关联,用非银行金融关联高管(现在或曾经在证券公司、基金公司、保险公司、信托公司、期货公司、融资租赁担保公司、金融资产管理公司以及小额贷款公司任职)人数占企业高管总人数比例来衡量非银行金融关联。
[2]Aboody D.,Lev B.Information Asymmetry,R&D,and Insider Gains[J].Journal of Finance,2000,55(6):2747-2766.
[3]邓建平,曾勇.金融关联能否缓解民营企业的融资约束[J].金融研究,2011,(8):78-92.
[4]祝继高,韩非池,陆正飞.产业政策、银行关联与企业债务融资---基于A股上市公司的实证研究[J].金融研究,2015,(3):176-191.
[5]钟凯,吕洁,程小可.内部控制建设与企业创新投资:促进还是抑制?---中国“萨班斯”法案的经济后果[J].证券市场导报,2016,(9):30-38.
[6]Cohen D.A.,Dey A.,Lys T.Z.Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre-and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods[J].Accounting Review,2008,83(3):757-787.
[7]Mitra S.,Jaggi B.,Hossain M.Internal Control Weaknesses and Accounting Conservatism:Evidence From the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Period[J].Journal of Accounting Auditing&Finance,2013,28(2):152-191.
[8]张国清.内部控制与盈余质量---基于2007年A股公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2008,(3):112-119.
[9]孙光国,杨金凤.高质量的内部控制能提高会计信息透明度吗?[J].财经问题研究,2013,(7):77-86.
[10]宋常,田莹莹,陈茜.内部控制自愿披露、披露成本与融资需求[J].山西财经大学学报,2014,(1):91-102.
[11]Holmstrom B.Agency Cost and Innovation[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1989,12(3):305-327.
[12]Ahn S.,Choi W.The Role of Bank Monitoring in Corporate Governance:Evidence from Borrowers’Earnings Management Behavior[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2009,33(2):425-434.
[13]Kortum S.,Lerner J.Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2000,31(4):674-692.
[14]Durnev A.,Li K.,Mrck R.,et al.Capital Markets and Capital Allocation:Implications for Economies in Transition[J].Economics of Transition,2004,12(4):593-634.
[15]Bhattacharya S.,Ritter J.R.Innovation and Communication:Signalling with Partial Disclosure[J].The Review of Economic Studies,1983,50(2):331-346.
[16]Coleman J.S.Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital[J].American Journal of Sociology,1988,94(1):95-120.
[17]Manso G.Motivating Innovation[J].Journal of Finance,2011,66(5):1823-1860.
[18]Hambrick D.C.,Mason P.A.Upper Echelons:The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J].The Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[19]Hilary G.,Hui K.W.Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in America?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(3):455-473.
[20]谢志华.内部控制:本质与结构[J].会计研究,2009,(12):70-75.
[21]林钟高,陈俊杰.管理防御、企业研发投入与内部控制治理[J].中国注册会计师,2016,(10):52-59.
[22]罗正英,詹乾隆,段姝.内部控制质量与企业高管薪酬契约[J].中国软科学,2016,(2):169-178.
[23]李万福,林斌,林东杰.内部控制能有效规避财务困境吗?[J].财经研究,2012,(1):125-135.
[24]胡元木.技术独立董事可以提高R&D产出效率吗?---来自中国证券市场的研究[J].南开管理评论,2012,(2):136-142.
[25]Jensen M.C.Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[26]曲进,高升好.银行与企业关联提升抑或降低了企业投资效率?[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2015,(1):36-51.
[27]李万福,林斌,宋璐.内部控制在公司投资中的角色:效率促进还是抑制?[J].管理世界,2011,(2):81-99.
[28]黄寿昌,杨雄胜.内部控制报告、财务报告质量与信息不对称---来自沪市上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2011,(7):81-91.
[29]Krishnan J.,Rama D.,Zhang Y.Costs to Comply with SOX Section 404[J].Auditing A Journal of Practice&Theory,2008,27(1):169-186.
[30]德勤会计师事务所.2012中国企业内部控制调查分析报告:“分类分批”,如何全面实施内部控制[EB/OL].http://wenku.baidu.com/view/38738ce3856a561252d36f5b.html.
[31]逯东,王运陈,王春国,等.政治关联与民营上市公司的内部控制执行[J].中国工业经济,2013,(11):96-108.
[32]陈爽英,井润田,龙小宁,等.民营企业家社会关系资本对研发投资决策影响的实证研究[J].管理世界,2010,(1):88-97.
[33]刘运国,刘雯.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界,2007,(1):128-136.
[34]李文贵.银行关联、所有权性质与企业风险承担[J].财经理论研究,2015,(5):83-91.
[35]张瑾华,何轩,李新春.银行融资依赖与民营企业创新能力---基于中国企业家调查系统数据的实证研究[J].管理评论,2016,(4):98-108.
[36]Berger A.N.,Udell G.F.Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance[J].Journal of Business,1995,68(3):351-381.
[37]Goh B.W.,Li D.Internal Controls and Conditional Conservatism[J].Accounting Review,2011,86(3):975-1005.
[38]Feng M.,Li C.,Mcvay S.Internal Control and Management Guidance[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2009,48(2):190-209.
[39]Ashbaugh-Skaife H.,Collins D.W.,Kinney W.R.,et al.The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies and Their Remediation on Accrual Quality[J].Accounting Review,2008,83(1):217-250.
[40]戴维奇,刘洋,廖明情.烙印效应:民营企业谁在“不务正业”?[J].管理世界,2016,(5):99-115.
(1)Wind资讯的相关数据显示,非银行金融机构资产总额从2011年的26067亿元上升至2016年的79311亿元,增长率为204.26%,利润总额从2011年的598.8亿元上升至2016年的1554.6亿元,增长率为159.62%,非银行金融机构在我国已占据重要地位,大量企业已开始重视建立非银行金融关联。
(1)用银行金融关联高管(现在或曾经在银行任职)人数占企业高管总人数比例衡量银行金融关联,用非银行金融关联高管(现在或曾经在证券公司、基金公司、保险公司、信托公司、期货公司、融资租赁担保公司、金融资产管理公司以及小额贷款公司任职)人数占企业高管总人数比例来衡量非银行金融关联。