地权结构和村庄民主对农户林业投入的影响
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摘要
在民主实施集体林权改革的要求下,通过中国南方集体林区658户农户调研数据,运用两步法Double-Hurdle模型重点研究林地产权结构优化及村庄民主程序对农户林业投入的影响。研究发现林地使用权与处置权优化具有显著的投资激励效应,而林地使用权的投资激励效用不显著。更重要的是,村庄民主能够显著正向调节投资激励效应,主要是林地通过使用权与处置权发挥作用的。可能的解释为村庄民主程序能够显著增强农户对林地使用权与处置权的感知、认知与信心。基于研究结论,提出三个方面政策启示:(1)虽然新一轮改革具有一定的投资激励效应,但是法律与制度层面的林地产权制度并未完全落实,基层政府仍有进一步优化和推进改革配套政策有效落实的空间,尤其是要重视林农收益权的提升;(2)相关管理部门须进一步引导农户正确、充分地认知其对于自身林地资源享有的权利,增强农户对林地产权的认知与信心,以加强政策效能;(3)政府仍需推进村庄民主制度建设,加强农民在村庄公共事务决策中的话语权,运用村庄民主程序显化基层群众的政策需求,以辅助政府进行有效的政策供给。
Based on the background of implementing Collective Forest Tenure Reform(Tenure Reform)by democratic procedures,this study investigated,in particular,the effects of village democracy on the farmers' forestry input incentives of the Tenure Reform.We use the Double Hurdle model and micro survey data of 658 households from the southern collective forest region of China to estimate the reduced form equations for probability and quantity of labor and monetary inputs into forestry.The results reveal that the improved forestland use and disposition rights had a stable significant effect on household investments into forestry,while the beneficiary right had not.More importantly,we find that village democracy could significantly strengthen households' forestry investment incentives induced by the improved property rights under the Tenure Reform.These effects may be explained by the fact that village democracy improved households' perception,cognition,and,subsequently,confidence towards,especially,the use and disposition rights of the forests entitled to them.Therefore,we propose three policy enlightenments:(1)Forestland property right system in law and regime has not been put into practice completely,and there is still room for local government to optimize the arrangement of forestry production policy,to boost the implementation of the supporting measures,and to,especially,attach importance to the improvement of households' usufruct of forestland;(2)Related administrative departments should further guide households to correctly and fully understand the right they own towards their forestland resource in order to enhance their confidence towards the property rights of forestland in the future;(3)Government still need to carry the improvement of village democracy system a step forward,to strengthen farmers' discourse power in the decision making of public affairs,and to manifest grass roots' policy needs by employ village democratic procedures better.
Based on the background of implementing Collective Forest Tenure Reform(Tenure Reform)by democratic procedures,this study investigated,in particular,the effects of village democracy on the farmers' forestry input incentives of the Tenure Reform.We use the Double Hurdle model and micro survey data of 658 households from the southern collective forest region of China to estimate the reduced form equations for probability and quantity of labor and monetary inputs into forestry.The results reveal that the improved forestland use and disposition rights had a stable significant effect on household investments into forestry,while the beneficiary right had not.More importantly,we find that village democracy could significantly strengthen households' forestry investment incentives induced by the improved property rights under the Tenure Reform.These effects may be explained by the fact that village democracy improved households' perception,cognition,and,subsequently,confidence towards,especially,the use and disposition rights of the forests entitled to them.Therefore,we propose three policy enlightenments:(1)Forestland property right system in law and regime has not been put into practice completely,and there is still room for local government to optimize the arrangement of forestry production policy,to boost the implementation of the supporting measures,and to,especially,attach importance to the improvement of households' usufruct of forestland;(2)Related administrative departments should further guide households to correctly and fully understand the right they own towards their forestland resource in order to enhance their confidence towards the property rights of forestland in the future;(3)Government still need to carry the improvement of village democracy system a step forward,to strengthen farmers' discourse power in the decision making of public affairs,and to manifest grass roots' policy needs by employ village democratic procedures better.
引文
[1] Yin R,Yaosb,Huo X X.China’s Forest Tenure Reform and Institutional Change in the New Century:What Has Been Implemented and What Remains to Be Pursued?[J].Land Use Policy,2013,30(1):825-833.
[2]厉以宁.土地确权要学习林权改革[J].农村工作通讯,2014(1):44.
[3]姚洋.农地制度与农业绩效的实证研究[J].中国农村观察,1998(6):3-12.
[4]张红,周黎安,徐晋涛,等.林权改革、基层民主与投资激励[J].经济学(季刊),2016(3):845-868.
[5] LU J.Varieties of Electoral Institutions in China’s Grassroots Democracy:Cross-sectional and Longitudinal Evidence From Rural China[J].China Quarterly,2012,210:482-493.
[6]钱忠好.农村土地承包经营权产权残缺与市场流转困境:理论与政策分析[J].管理世界,2002(6):35-45.
[7]沈艳,姚洋.村庄选举和收入分配——来自8省48村的证据[J].经济研究,2006(4):97-105.
[8] Shi T.Voting and Nonvoting in China:Voting Behavior in Plebiscitary and Limited-choice Elections[J].Journal of Politics,1999,61(4):1 115-1 139.
[9] Kennedy J J.The Face of“Grassroots Democracy”in Rural China:Real Versus Cosmetic Elections[J].Asian Survey,2002,42(3):456-482.
[10]徐晋涛,孙妍,姜雪梅,等.我国集体林区林权制度改革模式和绩效分析[J].林业经济,2008(9):27-38.
[11]于艳丽,李桦,姚顺波.林权改革、市场激励与农户投入行为[J].农业技术经济,2017(10):93-105.
[12] Gallani S,Schargroasky E.Property Rights for the Poor:Effects of Land Titling[J].Journal of Public Economics,2010,94(9-10):700-729.
[13]吉登艳,马贤磊,石晓平.林地产权对农户林地投资行为的影响研究:基于产权完整性与安全性——以江西省遂川县与丰城市为例[J].农业经济问题,2015(3):25-33.
[14]曹兰芳,王立群,曾玉林.资金与劳动力:林改后农户林业投入影响因素比较——基于湖南10县500户调查[J].林业经济,2014(8):58-69.
[15]孔凡斌,廖文梅.集体林分权条件下的林地细碎化程度及与农户林地投入产出的关系——基于江西省8县602户农户调查数据的分析[J].林业科学,2012,48(4):119-126.
[16] Liu C,Liu H,Wang S.Has China’s New Round of Collective Forest Reforms Caused an Increase in the Use of Productive Forest Inputs?[J].Land Use Policy,2017,64:492-510.
[17]何文剑,张红霄.林权改革、产权结构与农户造林行为——基于江西、福建等5省7县林改政策及415户农户调研数据[J].农林经济管理学报,2014(2):192-200.
[18]贺东航.新农村建设中的集体林权制度改革与乡村治理[J].东南学术,2008(4):94-97.
[19]何文剑,张红霄,汪海燕.林权改革、林权结构与农户采伐行为——基于南方集体林区7个重点林业县(市)林改政策及415户农户调查数据[J].中国农村经济,2014(7):211-219.
[20] Lin J Y.Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China[J].American Economic Review,1992,82(1):34-51.
[21] Song L,Cannon C H.Impact of Socio-economic Status on the Implementation of China’s Collective Forest Tenure Reform in Zhang Guying Township,Hunan:Potential for Increasing Disparity[J].Forestry,2011,84(3):327-335.
[22]罗必良.新制度经济学[M].太原:山西经济出版社,2005:36-41.
[23]张五常.佃农理论[M].北京:商务印书馆,2000:102-116.
[24] Alchian A A,Demsetz H.The Property Right Paradigm[J].Journal of Economic History,1973,33(1):16-27.
[25]陈前恒,林海,吕之望.村庄民主能够增加幸福吗?——基于中国中西部120个贫困村庄1 800个农户的调查[J].经济学(季刊),2014,13(1):723-744.
[2]厉以宁.土地确权要学习林权改革[J].农村工作通讯,2014(1):44.
[3]姚洋.农地制度与农业绩效的实证研究[J].中国农村观察,1998(6):3-12.
[4]张红,周黎安,徐晋涛,等.林权改革、基层民主与投资激励[J].经济学(季刊),2016(3):845-868.
[5] LU J.Varieties of Electoral Institutions in China’s Grassroots Democracy:Cross-sectional and Longitudinal Evidence From Rural China[J].China Quarterly,2012,210:482-493.
[6]钱忠好.农村土地承包经营权产权残缺与市场流转困境:理论与政策分析[J].管理世界,2002(6):35-45.
[7]沈艳,姚洋.村庄选举和收入分配——来自8省48村的证据[J].经济研究,2006(4):97-105.
[8] Shi T.Voting and Nonvoting in China:Voting Behavior in Plebiscitary and Limited-choice Elections[J].Journal of Politics,1999,61(4):1 115-1 139.
[9] Kennedy J J.The Face of“Grassroots Democracy”in Rural China:Real Versus Cosmetic Elections[J].Asian Survey,2002,42(3):456-482.
[10]徐晋涛,孙妍,姜雪梅,等.我国集体林区林权制度改革模式和绩效分析[J].林业经济,2008(9):27-38.
[11]于艳丽,李桦,姚顺波.林权改革、市场激励与农户投入行为[J].农业技术经济,2017(10):93-105.
[12] Gallani S,Schargroasky E.Property Rights for the Poor:Effects of Land Titling[J].Journal of Public Economics,2010,94(9-10):700-729.
[13]吉登艳,马贤磊,石晓平.林地产权对农户林地投资行为的影响研究:基于产权完整性与安全性——以江西省遂川县与丰城市为例[J].农业经济问题,2015(3):25-33.
[14]曹兰芳,王立群,曾玉林.资金与劳动力:林改后农户林业投入影响因素比较——基于湖南10县500户调查[J].林业经济,2014(8):58-69.
[15]孔凡斌,廖文梅.集体林分权条件下的林地细碎化程度及与农户林地投入产出的关系——基于江西省8县602户农户调查数据的分析[J].林业科学,2012,48(4):119-126.
[16] Liu C,Liu H,Wang S.Has China’s New Round of Collective Forest Reforms Caused an Increase in the Use of Productive Forest Inputs?[J].Land Use Policy,2017,64:492-510.
[17]何文剑,张红霄.林权改革、产权结构与农户造林行为——基于江西、福建等5省7县林改政策及415户农户调研数据[J].农林经济管理学报,2014(2):192-200.
[18]贺东航.新农村建设中的集体林权制度改革与乡村治理[J].东南学术,2008(4):94-97.
[19]何文剑,张红霄,汪海燕.林权改革、林权结构与农户采伐行为——基于南方集体林区7个重点林业县(市)林改政策及415户农户调查数据[J].中国农村经济,2014(7):211-219.
[20] Lin J Y.Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China[J].American Economic Review,1992,82(1):34-51.
[21] Song L,Cannon C H.Impact of Socio-economic Status on the Implementation of China’s Collective Forest Tenure Reform in Zhang Guying Township,Hunan:Potential for Increasing Disparity[J].Forestry,2011,84(3):327-335.
[22]罗必良.新制度经济学[M].太原:山西经济出版社,2005:36-41.
[23]张五常.佃农理论[M].北京:商务印书馆,2000:102-116.
[24] Alchian A A,Demsetz H.The Property Right Paradigm[J].Journal of Economic History,1973,33(1):16-27.
[25]陈前恒,林海,吕之望.村庄民主能够增加幸福吗?——基于中国中西部120个贫困村庄1 800个农户的调查[J].经济学(季刊),2014,13(1):723-744.