企业内部治理对跨国并购绩效的影响——基于不同制度环境的研究
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摘要
本文以2003—2014年中国A股上市企业跨国并购为样本,选用43个企业内部治理属性指标构建企业治理指数CGI,通过多种模型设定实证检验不同制度环境下企业内部治理对跨国并购绩效的影响。实证研究结论表明:企业内部治理对跨国并购绩效有积极的影响;制度环境越好,企业内部治理对跨国并购绩效的积极影响越显著,两者之间呈正相关关系。
Based on a sample of cross-border M&As of Chinese A-share listed companies between 2003 and 2015,this paper constructed a corporate governance index CGI by using 43 corporate governance indicators,and empirically tested the effect of corporate governance,institutional environment and their interaction on the cross-border M&A performance. The result shows that the impact of corporate governance on the performance of cross-Border M&As is limited by the role of the regional institutional environment,and only in the optimal institutional environment there is a significant positive correlation between corporate governance and cross-border M&A performance.
Based on a sample of cross-border M&As of Chinese A-share listed companies between 2003 and 2015,this paper constructed a corporate governance index CGI by using 43 corporate governance indicators,and empirically tested the effect of corporate governance,institutional environment and their interaction on the cross-border M&A performance. The result shows that the impact of corporate governance on the performance of cross-Border M&As is limited by the role of the regional institutional environment,and only in the optimal institutional environment there is a significant positive correlation between corporate governance and cross-border M&A performance.
引文
[1]顾露露,ROBERT REED.中国企业海外并购失败了吗[J].经济研究,2011(7):116-129.
[2]王怀明,宿金香.董事会特征与企业自愿信息披露[J].审计与经济研究,2007,22(3):73-76.
[3]AGUILERA R V,FILATOTCHEV L,GOSPEL H. An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance:Costs,Contingencies,and Complementarities[J]. Organization Science 2008,19(3):475-492.
[4]AMIHUD Y,BARUCH L. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1981(12):605-618.
[5]AMMANN M,OESCH D,SCHMID M. Product Market Competition,Corporate Governance,and Firm Value:Evidence from the EU Area[J]. European Financial Management,2013,19(3):452-469.
[6]ARARAT M,BLACK B S,YURTOGLU B B. The Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Value and Profitability:Time-series Evidence from Turkey,Emerging Markets Review,2017(30):113-132.
[7]ARMOUR J,SIMON D,SARKAR P,SIEMS M,SINGH A. Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development:An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis[J]. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies,2009,6(2):343-380.
[8]BAI C E,LIU Q,LU J Z,SONG F M,ZHANG J. Corporate Governance and Firm Valuations in China[J]. J.Comp. Econ,2004(32):599-616.
[9]BEBCHUK L,FRIED J. Pay without Performance:The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2004:10-20.
[10]BERTRAND O,BETSCHINGER M. Performance of Domestic and Cross-border Acquisitions:Empirical Evidence from Russian Acquires[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2012,40(3):413-437.
[11]CHO H,AHN H S. Research Article Full Text Access Stock Payment and The Effects of Institutional and Cultural Differences:A Study of Shareholder Value Creation in Cross-border M&As[J]. International Business Review,2017,26(3):461-475
[12]DEMSETZ H,LEHN K. The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[13]DUNNE K,NDUBIZU G. International Acquisition Accounting Method and Corporate Multinationalism:Evidence from Foreign Acquisition[J]. Journal of International Business Studies,1995(26):361-377.
[14]DYCK A. Privatization and Corporate Governance:Principles,Evidence,And Future Challenges[J]. The World Bank Research Observer,2001,16(1):59-84.
[15]FAMA E F,JENSEN M C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983(26):301-325.
[16]FILATOTCHEV I,GREGORY JACKSON,CHIZU NAKAJIMA. Corporate Governance and National Institutions:A Review and Emerging Research Agenda[J]. Asia Pac Manag,2013(30):965-986.
[17]GIROUD X,MUELLER H M. Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and Equity Prices[J].Journal of Finance,2011(66):563-600.
[18]HOLDERNESS C G,SHEEHAN D P. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):317-346.
[19]HUANG Z,XINZHONG XU,YUE Y. The Analysis on Board Structure of Chinese Listed Firms[J]. Management World,2006(11):128-134.
[20]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3):305-360.
[21]JENSEN M C. The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and The Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]. The Journal of Finance,1993(48):831-880.
[22]JENSEN M C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[23]KING L P. The Basic Features of Post Communist Capitalist,In Eastern Europe:Firms in Hungary,The Czech Republic,and Slovakia. Westport,CT:Praeger,2001.
[24]KLAPPER L,LOVE I. Corporate Governance,Investor Protection,and Performance in Emerging Markets[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004(10):703-728.
[25]LA PORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998(106):1113-1155.
[26]MOELLER S B,FREDERIK P S,STULZ R M. Firm Size and The Gains from Acquisitions[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2004(73):201-228.
[27]MORCK R,SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W. Do Managerial Incentives Drive Bad Acquisitions?[J]. Journal of Finance,1990(45):31-48.
[28]NORTH D C. Institutions,Institutional Change and Economic Performance,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1990.
[29]OSCASIO W. Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance:The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1999(44):384-416.
[30]PENG M W. Business Strategies in Transition Economies,Thousand Oaks,CA:Sage,2000.
[31]ROLL R. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers[J]. Journal of Business,1986(59):197-216.
[32]SERVAES,HENRI. Tobin's q and the Gains from Takeover[J]. Journal of Finance,1991(46):409-419.
[33]SHIBANI O,FUENTES D C. The Differences and the Similarities between Corporate Governance Principles in Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks[J]. Research in International Business and Finance,2017(42):1005-1010.
[34]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1989(94):461-488.
[35]TONG S,JUNARSIN E,DAVIDSON W N. A Comparison of Chinese State-Owned Enterprise Firm’s Boards and Private Firm’s Boards[J].Annals of Economics&Finance,2015,16(2):291-314.
[36]WEN M. Foreign Direct Investment,Regional Market Conditions and Regional Development:A Panel Study on China[J]. Economics of Transition,2007,15(1):125-151.
[37]YERMACK D. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with A Small Board of Directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(2):185-212.
[38]ZHUANGXIONG YU,JIE LI,JIAN YANG. Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries? Evidence from China[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2017(43):238-255.
(1)《中国市场化指数》仅到2014年;财政数据和各地区的生产总值数据仅到2015年。
(2)本文收集7天的事件窗口以及评估期为210天的日股票回报数据(评估期为事件窗口7天之前的210天)得到的结论一致。
(3)由上文分析得知,企业治理可以分成企业内部治理和企业外部治理,本文探讨的企业治理指企业内部治理。
(4)GMI将64个属性分为6个类别,本文将股东权利和控制市场这两个类别组合在一起,因为属于该属性的示例太少了,且这样划分不影响结果。
(1)本文报告的实证结果的被解释变量为基于事件窗口(-1,1)计算的标准累积超额收益TSAR11。笔者采用事件窗口(-3,+3)计算所得的标准超额累积收益分析得到了一致的结论。
(1)依据CRMAR数据库中关于《企业关系人性质分类标准》:如果企业的实际控制人代码为1100、2000、2100、2120,则判定其为国有企业,否则定义为民营企业。
[2]王怀明,宿金香.董事会特征与企业自愿信息披露[J].审计与经济研究,2007,22(3):73-76.
[3]AGUILERA R V,FILATOTCHEV L,GOSPEL H. An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance:Costs,Contingencies,and Complementarities[J]. Organization Science 2008,19(3):475-492.
[4]AMIHUD Y,BARUCH L. Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1981(12):605-618.
[5]AMMANN M,OESCH D,SCHMID M. Product Market Competition,Corporate Governance,and Firm Value:Evidence from the EU Area[J]. European Financial Management,2013,19(3):452-469.
[6]ARARAT M,BLACK B S,YURTOGLU B B. The Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Value and Profitability:Time-series Evidence from Turkey,Emerging Markets Review,2017(30):113-132.
[7]ARMOUR J,SIMON D,SARKAR P,SIEMS M,SINGH A. Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development:An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis[J]. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies,2009,6(2):343-380.
[8]BAI C E,LIU Q,LU J Z,SONG F M,ZHANG J. Corporate Governance and Firm Valuations in China[J]. J.Comp. Econ,2004(32):599-616.
[9]BEBCHUK L,FRIED J. Pay without Performance:The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation[M]. Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2004:10-20.
[10]BERTRAND O,BETSCHINGER M. Performance of Domestic and Cross-border Acquisitions:Empirical Evidence from Russian Acquires[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2012,40(3):413-437.
[11]CHO H,AHN H S. Research Article Full Text Access Stock Payment and The Effects of Institutional and Cultural Differences:A Study of Shareholder Value Creation in Cross-border M&As[J]. International Business Review,2017,26(3):461-475
[12]DEMSETZ H,LEHN K. The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[13]DUNNE K,NDUBIZU G. International Acquisition Accounting Method and Corporate Multinationalism:Evidence from Foreign Acquisition[J]. Journal of International Business Studies,1995(26):361-377.
[14]DYCK A. Privatization and Corporate Governance:Principles,Evidence,And Future Challenges[J]. The World Bank Research Observer,2001,16(1):59-84.
[15]FAMA E F,JENSEN M C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1983(26):301-325.
[16]FILATOTCHEV I,GREGORY JACKSON,CHIZU NAKAJIMA. Corporate Governance and National Institutions:A Review and Emerging Research Agenda[J]. Asia Pac Manag,2013(30):965-986.
[17]GIROUD X,MUELLER H M. Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and Equity Prices[J].Journal of Finance,2011(66):563-600.
[18]HOLDERNESS C G,SHEEHAN D P. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):317-346.
[19]HUANG Z,XINZHONG XU,YUE Y. The Analysis on Board Structure of Chinese Listed Firms[J]. Management World,2006(11):128-134.
[20]JENSEN M C,MECKLING W H. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3):305-360.
[21]JENSEN M C. The Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit,and The Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]. The Journal of Finance,1993(48):831-880.
[22]JENSEN M C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance and Takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986(76):323-329.
[23]KING L P. The Basic Features of Post Communist Capitalist,In Eastern Europe:Firms in Hungary,The Czech Republic,and Slovakia. Westport,CT:Praeger,2001.
[24]KLAPPER L,LOVE I. Corporate Governance,Investor Protection,and Performance in Emerging Markets[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004(10):703-728.
[25]LA PORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1998(106):1113-1155.
[26]MOELLER S B,FREDERIK P S,STULZ R M. Firm Size and The Gains from Acquisitions[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2004(73):201-228.
[27]MORCK R,SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W. Do Managerial Incentives Drive Bad Acquisitions?[J]. Journal of Finance,1990(45):31-48.
[28]NORTH D C. Institutions,Institutional Change and Economic Performance,Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1990.
[29]OSCASIO W. Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance:The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1999(44):384-416.
[30]PENG M W. Business Strategies in Transition Economies,Thousand Oaks,CA:Sage,2000.
[31]ROLL R. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers[J]. Journal of Business,1986(59):197-216.
[32]SERVAES,HENRI. Tobin's q and the Gains from Takeover[J]. Journal of Finance,1991(46):409-419.
[33]SHIBANI O,FUENTES D C. The Differences and the Similarities between Corporate Governance Principles in Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks[J]. Research in International Business and Finance,2017(42):1005-1010.
[34]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1989(94):461-488.
[35]TONG S,JUNARSIN E,DAVIDSON W N. A Comparison of Chinese State-Owned Enterprise Firm’s Boards and Private Firm’s Boards[J].Annals of Economics&Finance,2015,16(2):291-314.
[36]WEN M. Foreign Direct Investment,Regional Market Conditions and Regional Development:A Panel Study on China[J]. Economics of Transition,2007,15(1):125-151.
[37]YERMACK D. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with A Small Board of Directors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(2):185-212.
[38]ZHUANGXIONG YU,JIE LI,JIAN YANG. Does Corporate Governance Matter in Competitive Industries? Evidence from China[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2017(43):238-255.
(1)《中国市场化指数》仅到2014年;财政数据和各地区的生产总值数据仅到2015年。
(2)本文收集7天的事件窗口以及评估期为210天的日股票回报数据(评估期为事件窗口7天之前的210天)得到的结论一致。
(3)由上文分析得知,企业治理可以分成企业内部治理和企业外部治理,本文探讨的企业治理指企业内部治理。
(4)GMI将64个属性分为6个类别,本文将股东权利和控制市场这两个类别组合在一起,因为属于该属性的示例太少了,且这样划分不影响结果。
(1)本文报告的实证结果的被解释变量为基于事件窗口(-1,1)计算的标准累积超额收益TSAR11。笔者采用事件窗口(-3,+3)计算所得的标准超额累积收益分析得到了一致的结论。
(1)依据CRMAR数据库中关于《企业关系人性质分类标准》:如果企业的实际控制人代码为1100、2000、2100、2120,则判定其为国有企业,否则定义为民营企业。