石油资源租国际分配博弈策略及影响分析
|
摘要
广义石油资源租由消费者剩余性质的潜在资源租和厂商剩余性质的市场资源租构成,国际油价及其决定的石油资源租国际分配,是世界及石油生产国和消费国社会经济发展的重要因素。理论模型表明,主要石油生产国集团通过产量控制、石油消费国集团通过石油消费税等策略争夺国际石油定价权,影响石油资源租的国际分配。为此,本文定量测算了1973年石油危机以来OPEC产量控制策略和欧盟石油消费税政策对石油资源租国际分配的影响。结果表明,1974~2012年石油资源租国际分配主要受OPEC产量控制影响,欧盟石油消费税政策对1986~2012年石油资源租国际分配也有重要作用。中国已是第一大石油净进口国,应以多功能石油消费税补偿石油消费外部性成本并分享更多国际石油资源租。
The generalized Petroleum resource rent is constituted by potential resource rent, namely consumer surplus, and market resource rent, namely producer surplus. International oil price and its decision on the international distribution of petroleum resource rent are important factors of social and economic development of oil-producing countries and oil consuming countries. Market equilibrium theory shows that main oil-producing countries and oil consuming countries struggle for the international oil market pricing power using output control strategy and oil consumption tax policy respectively and affect the international distribution of petroleum resource rent.Therefore, we measure the impact of the OPEC production control strategy and the European Union oil consumption tax policy on the international distribution of petroleum resource rent since the oil crisis of 1973. The results show that: The international distribution of petroleum resource rent was mainly influenced by OPEC output control strategy from 1974 to 2012, and it was also influenced by European Union oil consumption tax policy from 1986 to 2012. As the biggest oil net-importing country, China should adopt multi-functional oil consumption tax policy to compensate externality cost of oil consumption, and gain more international oil resource rent.
The generalized Petroleum resource rent is constituted by potential resource rent, namely consumer surplus, and market resource rent, namely producer surplus. International oil price and its decision on the international distribution of petroleum resource rent are important factors of social and economic development of oil-producing countries and oil consuming countries. Market equilibrium theory shows that main oil-producing countries and oil consuming countries struggle for the international oil market pricing power using output control strategy and oil consumption tax policy respectively and affect the international distribution of petroleum resource rent.Therefore, we measure the impact of the OPEC production control strategy and the European Union oil consumption tax policy on the international distribution of petroleum resource rent since the oil crisis of 1973. The results show that: The international distribution of petroleum resource rent was mainly influenced by OPEC output control strategy from 1974 to 2012, and it was also influenced by European Union oil consumption tax policy from 1986 to 2012. As the biggest oil net-importing country, China should adopt multi-functional oil consumption tax policy to compensate externality cost of oil consumption, and gain more international oil resource rent.
引文
[1]托马斯·皮凯蒂.21世纪资本论[M].巴署松,陈剑,余江等译.北京:中信出版社,2014.P473-475.
[2]李国平,李恒炜.基于矿产资源租的国内外矿产资源有偿使用制度比较[J].中国人口、资源与环境,2011,21(2):153-159.
[3]林伯强,何晓萍.中国油气资源耗减成本及政策选择的宏观经济影响[J].经济研究,2008(5):94-104.
[4]蒲志仲.石油武器的故事[J].西安石油学院学报(社会科学版),2001,10(1):92-96.
[5]蒲志仲.国际油价波动长周期现象探讨[J].国际石油经济,2006(6):21-26.
[6]蒲志仲.石油资源租与燃油税的分配效应[J].税务研究,2009(1):100-105.
[7]蒲志仲.可持续发展视角下的矿产资源税费制度[J].西安石油大学学报(社会科学版),2010,19(03):5-14.
[8]孙泽生,宋玉华.中国的燃油税改革:意义、措施与前景——兼论《能源法(征求意见稿)》的若干问题[C].中国法学会能源法研究会.会议论文资料集.北京,2008:113-119.
[9]孙泽生,宋玉华,林治乾.国际石油价格与最优国内税率:基于“寡头”市场结构的分析[J].世界经济,2008(1):36-46.
[10]王萌.国外资源租与税制度经验借鉴[J].改革与战略,2011,27(4):184-186.
[11]Brander,J.,S.Djajic,1993,Rent Extracting Tariffs and the Management of Exhaustible Resources,Canadian Journal of Economics16,pp.288-298.
[12]Eirik S.Amundsen,Ronnie Sch觟b.,1999,Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources,European Journal of Political Economy,15,pp.311-329.
[13]Hotelling H.,1931,The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.39,137-175.
[14]Jon Strand.,2008,Importer and producer petroleum taxation:a geo-political model,IMF Working Paper No.08/35.
[15]Liski,M.and O.Tahvonen.,2002,Can Carbon Tax Eat OPEC’s Rents,Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,47,pp.1-12.
[16]Rubio,S.J.,2005,Optimal Tariffs and Non-Renewable Resources International Monopolies,Fifth International Society of Dynamic Games Workshop,Sergovia,21-25 September 2005.
[17]Rubio,Santiago J.,Luisa Escriche,2001,Strategic Pigouvian Taxation,Stock Externalities and Polluting Non-renewable Resources,Journal of Public Economics,79,pp.297-313.
[18]Stephen Jui,Hsien Chou,Ngo Van Long.Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources in the Presence of Cartel Behavior[J].Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting&Economics 16(2009)239-254.
[19]Theodore C.Bergstrom.,1982,On capturing oil rents with a national excise tax,Economic Review,72,pp.194-201.
[20]Yan Dong,John Whalley,2009,A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes:transferring OPEC monopoly rent,CESIFO Working Paper No.2741.
(1)笔者所能查寻到的国际石油数据资料以《BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013》(EXCEL版)最为全面,因此本文的分析基于该年鉴数据。该年鉴的产量等资料是从1965~2012年。
(2)换算依据是美国各年GDP折算系数(参见《美国历年GDP及增长率更新至2013年》_百度文库http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=n7isD mA amD 083tJ Gsd5bQ vR OYqaK MjazJ Q49tW gtzkO yK hnxD_E83oR yN DDpwrpA e_zZ D8nA MuC w XEVu-6jR AKahM 8D81EE_kE NhlC gY WEO)。后文的油价、租值数据均为2009年美元不变价。
(1)2014年美国北达科他州政府一份报告指出,美国Bakken页岩油成本低至40美元/桶,可视为当前条件下的国际石油生产边际成本。自由市场条件下会有更多低成本的常规石油生产出来,边际成本应该在30美元/桶左右。
(1)非OECD中的石油生产国往往对本国居民进行石油消费补贴,这种负石油消费税也是OPEC国家行使石油定价权的措施之一。
(2)西欧国家在1970年代末和1980年代初开征燃油税,其目的就在于减少石油需求以应对高油价;其后在1990年代低油价时期,燃油税被逐渐提高,并加入补偿石油消费社会成本的考虑。
(1)2039亿美元乘以2012年欧盟消费量占世界消费量比重14.7%。
[2]李国平,李恒炜.基于矿产资源租的国内外矿产资源有偿使用制度比较[J].中国人口、资源与环境,2011,21(2):153-159.
[3]林伯强,何晓萍.中国油气资源耗减成本及政策选择的宏观经济影响[J].经济研究,2008(5):94-104.
[4]蒲志仲.石油武器的故事[J].西安石油学院学报(社会科学版),2001,10(1):92-96.
[5]蒲志仲.国际油价波动长周期现象探讨[J].国际石油经济,2006(6):21-26.
[6]蒲志仲.石油资源租与燃油税的分配效应[J].税务研究,2009(1):100-105.
[7]蒲志仲.可持续发展视角下的矿产资源税费制度[J].西安石油大学学报(社会科学版),2010,19(03):5-14.
[8]孙泽生,宋玉华.中国的燃油税改革:意义、措施与前景——兼论《能源法(征求意见稿)》的若干问题[C].中国法学会能源法研究会.会议论文资料集.北京,2008:113-119.
[9]孙泽生,宋玉华,林治乾.国际石油价格与最优国内税率:基于“寡头”市场结构的分析[J].世界经济,2008(1):36-46.
[10]王萌.国外资源租与税制度经验借鉴[J].改革与战略,2011,27(4):184-186.
[11]Brander,J.,S.Djajic,1993,Rent Extracting Tariffs and the Management of Exhaustible Resources,Canadian Journal of Economics16,pp.288-298.
[12]Eirik S.Amundsen,Ronnie Sch觟b.,1999,Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources,European Journal of Political Economy,15,pp.311-329.
[13]Hotelling H.,1931,The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.39,137-175.
[14]Jon Strand.,2008,Importer and producer petroleum taxation:a geo-political model,IMF Working Paper No.08/35.
[15]Liski,M.and O.Tahvonen.,2002,Can Carbon Tax Eat OPEC’s Rents,Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,47,pp.1-12.
[16]Rubio,S.J.,2005,Optimal Tariffs and Non-Renewable Resources International Monopolies,Fifth International Society of Dynamic Games Workshop,Sergovia,21-25 September 2005.
[17]Rubio,Santiago J.,Luisa Escriche,2001,Strategic Pigouvian Taxation,Stock Externalities and Polluting Non-renewable Resources,Journal of Public Economics,79,pp.297-313.
[18]Stephen Jui,Hsien Chou,Ngo Van Long.Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources in the Presence of Cartel Behavior[J].Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting&Economics 16(2009)239-254.
[19]Theodore C.Bergstrom.,1982,On capturing oil rents with a national excise tax,Economic Review,72,pp.194-201.
[20]Yan Dong,John Whalley,2009,A third benefit of joint non-OPEC carbon taxes:transferring OPEC monopoly rent,CESIFO Working Paper No.2741.
(1)笔者所能查寻到的国际石油数据资料以《BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013》(EXCEL版)最为全面,因此本文的分析基于该年鉴数据。该年鉴的产量等资料是从1965~2012年。
(2)换算依据是美国各年GDP折算系数(参见《美国历年GDP及增长率更新至2013年》_百度文库http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=n7isD mA amD 083tJ Gsd5bQ vR OYqaK MjazJ Q49tW gtzkO yK hnxD_E83oR yN DDpwrpA e_zZ D8nA MuC w XEVu-6jR AKahM 8D81EE_kE NhlC gY WEO)。后文的油价、租值数据均为2009年美元不变价。
(1)2014年美国北达科他州政府一份报告指出,美国Bakken页岩油成本低至40美元/桶,可视为当前条件下的国际石油生产边际成本。自由市场条件下会有更多低成本的常规石油生产出来,边际成本应该在30美元/桶左右。
(1)非OECD中的石油生产国往往对本国居民进行石油消费补贴,这种负石油消费税也是OPEC国家行使石油定价权的措施之一。
(2)西欧国家在1970年代末和1980年代初开征燃油税,其目的就在于减少石油需求以应对高油价;其后在1990年代低油价时期,燃油税被逐渐提高,并加入补偿石油消费社会成本的考虑。
(1)2039亿美元乘以2012年欧盟消费量占世界消费量比重14.7%。