从“宝万控制权之争”看中国上市公司反收购策略
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摘要
面对资本市场上频频发生的敌意收购,卓有成效的反收购策略是上市公司构筑反收购防线的根基所在。本文运用案例研究法,剖析了"宝万控制权之争"中万科主要采取的反收购策略及其失效的原因。研究发现:中国资本市场对稀缺绩优"壳资源"的需求和反收购相关法律制度的缺失是万科反收购策略失效的外部原因,万科过分分散的股权结构和管理层权力巨大等不完善内部治理机制是万科反收购策略失效的内部原因。根据上述研究结论,提出加强政府监管力度、健全反收购法律制度、建立双层股权结构和健全公司治理机制等政策建议。
The effective anti-acquisition strategy is the foundation to the listed companies in frequent hostile acquisition in the capital market. In this paper,we use case study method to analyze the anti-acquisition strategy and the failure reasons in Vanke's Control struggle. We found that demanding to the scarce and excellent " shell resources" in China's capital market and missing of anti-acquisition legal system is external reasons to the failure of Vanke anti-acquisition strategy,Vanke over-decentralized ownership structure and management power and other imperfect internal governance mechanism is internal reasons to Vanke anti-acquisition strategy failure. According to the above conclusions,we puts forward some policy suggestions such as strengthening the government supervision,perfecting the anti-acquisition legal system,establishing the double-stock structure and improving the corporate governance mechanism.
The effective anti-acquisition strategy is the foundation to the listed companies in frequent hostile acquisition in the capital market. In this paper,we use case study method to analyze the anti-acquisition strategy and the failure reasons in Vanke's Control struggle. We found that demanding to the scarce and excellent " shell resources" in China's capital market and missing of anti-acquisition legal system is external reasons to the failure of Vanke anti-acquisition strategy,Vanke over-decentralized ownership structure and management power and other imperfect internal governance mechanism is internal reasons to Vanke anti-acquisition strategy failure. According to the above conclusions,we puts forward some policy suggestions such as strengthening the government supervision,perfecting the anti-acquisition legal system,establishing the double-stock structure and improving the corporate governance mechanism.
引文
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[10]高闯,郭斌.创始股东控制权威与经理人职业操守——基于社会资本的“国美电器控制权争夺”研究[J].中国工业经济,2012,(7):122-133.
[11]杨晔,周成跃.全流通时代我国上市公司反并购研究[J].财政研究,2008,(12):68-70.
[2]Kaplan S,Stromberg P.Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World:An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts[J].The Review of Economic Studies,2003,(2):73-102.
[3]Fama E.,M.Jenson.Separation of Ownership and Control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,(2):79-132.
[4]杨继伟,张奕敏.中国混合所有制公司股权治理及控制权——基于万科的案例[J].财会通讯,2017,(5):97-99.
[5]黄金曦,徐丹.不完全信息下上市公司股权反收购动态博弈——基于万科与宝能系的股权之争[J].财会通讯,2016,(32):86-88.
[6]郑志刚,邹宇,崔丽.合伙人制度与创业团队控制权安排模式选择——基于阿里巴巴的案例研究[J].中国工业经济,2016,(10):126-143.
[7]梁上坤,金叶子,王宁,等.企业社会资本的断裂与重构——基于雷士照明控制权争夺案例的研究[J].中国工业经济,2015,(4):149-160.
[8]赵晶,张书博,祝丽敏,等.个人社会资本与组织社会资本契合度对企业实际控制权的影响——基于国美电器和雷士照明的对比[J].中国工业经济,2014,(3):121-133.
[9]陈玉罡,莫夏君.后股权分置时期公司控制权及其私有收益之争——基于鄂武商的案例研究[J].审计与经济研究,2013,(4):104-112.
[10]高闯,郭斌.创始股东控制权威与经理人职业操守——基于社会资本的“国美电器控制权争夺”研究[J].中国工业经济,2012,(7):122-133.
[11]杨晔,周成跃.全流通时代我国上市公司反并购研究[J].财政研究,2008,(12):68-70.