农地产权安全性对农业种植结构的影响
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摘要
基于"中国劳动力动态调查"的农户数据,采用最小二乘法(OLS)、处理效应模型(TEM)和倾向得分匹配法(PSM)实证分析地权对农业种植结构的影响。研究表明:(1)相对于没有领到承包经营权证书的农户,有承包经营权证书农户其实际种植的耕地面积多约22.5%,果树种植面积多1.8%,而菜地经营面积不存在显著差异。(2)无论是否粮食主产区或者大中城市郊区,农地产权安全性的改善会诱导一般农户增加耕地经营面积,但对于种植大户则更多表现为激励水果种植;此外,地权对非粮食主产区果树的种植激励效果要强于粮食主产区。(3)农地产权对农户种植结构的影响会因灌溉条件变化而不同。因此,在小农经营依旧普遍存在的情况下,农地确权能够提升农户务农的积极性,改善农业基础设施则能够有效诱导农业种植结构呈现"趋粮化"。
Employing the methods of OLS,TEM and PSM,this paper conducted empirical study to analyze the influence of farmland ownership on agricultural planting structure based on the data from the China Labor Dynamic Survey(CLDS).The results show that:(1)Compared with farmers without the contractual management right certificate,those granted this certificate factually claim approximately 22.5% of the farmland to grow grain and 1.8%for fruit trees.Yet the area for vege-table planting makes no obvious difference to the two groups of farmers.(2)In the major grain-producing area or outskirts of large or medium-sized cities,farmers are generally expected to increase their farmland due to the improvement of the security of farmland owenership.The large growers tend to plant fruits.And the incentive effect of farmland ownership on fruit trees planting in the non-food main producing areas outweighs that in the main grain producing areas.(3)The irrigation condition is another contributive factor to the effect of farmland ownership on agricultural planting structure.Accordingly,farmers could be motivated for farm work if granted the farmland ownership and the grain-oriented planting structure could be built due to the improvement of agricultural infrastructure,particularly in case of the domination of small-scale peasant economy nowadays.
Employing the methods of OLS,TEM and PSM,this paper conducted empirical study to analyze the influence of farmland ownership on agricultural planting structure based on the data from the China Labor Dynamic Survey(CLDS).The results show that:(1)Compared with farmers without the contractual management right certificate,those granted this certificate factually claim approximately 22.5% of the farmland to grow grain and 1.8%for fruit trees.Yet the area for vege-table planting makes no obvious difference to the two groups of farmers.(2)In the major grain-producing area or outskirts of large or medium-sized cities,farmers are generally expected to increase their farmland due to the improvement of the security of farmland owenership.The large growers tend to plant fruits.And the incentive effect of farmland ownership on fruit trees planting in the non-food main producing areas outweighs that in the main grain producing areas.(3)The irrigation condition is another contributive factor to the effect of farmland ownership on agricultural planting structure.Accordingly,farmers could be motivated for farm work if granted the farmland ownership and the grain-oriented planting structure could be built due to the improvement of agricultural infrastructure,particularly in case of the domination of small-scale peasant economy nowadays.
引文
[1] ALCHIAN A,DEMSETZ H.Production,information costs,and economic organization[J].IEEE engineering management review,2007,3(2):21-41.
[2] FURUBOTN E G,PEJOVIC S.Property rights and economic theory:a survey of recent literature[J].Journal of economic literature,1972,10(4):1137-1162.
[3] ACEMOGLU D,JOHNSON S,ROBINSON JA.The colonial origins of comparative development:an empirical investigation[J].American economic review,2001,91(5):1369-1401.
[4] BANERJEE V,PAUL J,GERTLER,et al.Empowerment and efficiency:tenancy reform in West Bengal[J].Journal of political economy,2002,110(2):239-280.
[5] JANVRY AD,GONZALEZ-NAVARRO M,SADOULET E.Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky?Electoral outcomes of Mexico’s certification program[J].Journal of development economics,2014(110):216-225.
[6]盖庆恩,朱喜,程名望,等.土地资源配置不当与劳动生产率[J].经济研究,2017(5):119-132.
[7]陈锡文.中国农村制度变迁60年[M].北京:人民出版社,2009.
[8]刘玥汐,许恒周.农地确权对农村土地流转的影响研究——基于农民分化的视角[J].干旱区资源与环境,2016,30(5):25-29.
[9]胡新艳,罗必良.新一轮农地确权与促进流转:粤赣证据[J].改革,2016(4):85-94.
[10]程令国,张晔,刘志彪.农地确权促进了中国农村土地的流转吗?[J].管理世界,2016(1):88-98.
[11]姚洋.土地、制度和农业发展[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[12]LI G,ROZELLE S,BRANDT L.Tenure,land rights,and farmer investment incentives in China[J].Agricultural economics,1998,19(1-2):63-71.
[13]刘晓宇,张林秀.农村土地产权安全性与劳动力转移关系分析[J].中国农村经济,2008(2):29-39.
[14]仇童伟,罗必良.农地调整会抑制农村劳动力非农转移吗?[J].中国农村观察,2017(4):57-71.
[15]林坚,李德洗.非农就业与粮食生产:替代抑或互补——基于粮食主产区农户视角的分析[J].中国农村经济,2013(9):54-62.
[16]罗必良,仇童伟.中国农业种植结构调整:“非粮化”抑或“趋粮化”[J].社会科学战线,2018(2):39-51.
[17]GERMAN G,AKINNIFESI F K,EDRISS A K,et al.Influence of property rights on farmers’willingness to plant indigenous fruit trees in Malawi and Zambia[J].African journal of agricultural research,2013,4(5):427-437.
[18]BRASSELLE A S,GASPART F,PLATTEAU J P,et al.Land tenure security and investment incentives:puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso[J].Journal of development economics,2002,67(2):373-418.
[19]罗必良,仇童伟,张露,等.种粮的逻辑[J].北京:中国农业出版社,2018.
[20]李尚蒲,罗必良.农地调整的内在机理及其影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2015(3):18-33.
[21]付江涛,纪月清,胡浩.新一轮承包地确权登记颁证是否促进了农户的土地流转——来自江苏省3县(市、区)的经验证据[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016(1):105-113.
[22]KUNG K S,LIU S.Farmers’preferences regarding ownership and land tenure in post-Mao China:unexpected evidence from eight countries[J].China journal,1997(38):33-63.
[23]张红宇.中国农地调整与使用权流转:几点评论[J].管理世界,2002(5):76-87.
[24]林文声.新一轮农地确权何以影响农地流转?——来自中国健康与养老追踪调查的证据[J].中国农村经济,2017(7):29-43.
[25]BESLEY T.Property rights and investment incentives:theory and evidence from Ghana[J].Journal of political economy,1995,103(5):903-937.
[26]姚洋.农地制度与农业绩效的实证研究[J].中国农村观察,1998(6):35-36.
[27]LI G,ROZELLE S,BRANDT L.Tenure,land rights,and farmer investment incentives in China[J].Agricultural economics,1998,19(1-2):63-71.
[28]马贤磊.农地产权安全性对农业绩效影响:投资激励效应和资源配置效应——来自丘陵地区三个村庄的初步证据[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2010,10(4):72-79.
[29]GAO L,SUN D,HUANG J.Impact of land tenure policy on agricultural investments in China:evidence from a panel data study[J].China economic review,2017(45):244-252.
[30]YANG DT.China’s land arrangements and rural labor mobility[J].China economic review,2004,8(2):101-115.
[31]MULLAN K,GROSJEAN P,KONTOLEON A.Land tenure arrangements and rural-urban migration in China[J].World development,2011,39(1):123-133.
[32]MAELYS DLR,DENG Q,LI S,et al.Land rights insecurity and temporary migration in rural China[R/OL].I.Z.A discussion paper No.4668,2009.https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/izaizadps/dp4668.htm.
[33]MA X,NICO HEERINNKA,EKKO C,et al.Land tenure insecurity and rural-urban migration in rural China[J].Papers in regional science,2014,95(2):383-406.
[34]洪炜杰,罗必良.地权稳定能促进农户对农地的长期投资吗?[J].学术研究,2018(9):78-86.
[35]黄季焜,冀县卿.农地使用权确权与农户对农地的长期投资[J].管理世界,2012(9):76-81.
[36]仇童伟,罗必良.农地调整会抑制农村劳动力非农转移吗?[J].中国农村观察,2017(4):57-71.
[37]罗琦,唐超,罗明忠.村治能人推进农村集体产权改革:逻辑分析与案例解剖——基于安徽省夏刘寨村的调查[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2018(6):86-92
[38]CONG R,DRUKKER D M.Treatment effects model[J].Stata technical bulletin,2001,10(55):25-33.
[39]陈强.高级计量经济学及Stata应用(第二版)[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2014.
(1)对两个系数T检验发现卡方值为59.77(p<0.0000),故这种比较在统计上是有意义的。
(2)我国粮食主产区包括辽宁、河北、山东、吉林、内蒙古、江西、湖南、四川、河南、湖北、江苏、安徽、黑龙江等十三个省份或自治区。
(1)第三次全国农业普查主要数据公报(第一号),本文界定为南方50亩以上,北方100亩以上。网址:www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/nypcgb/qgnypcgb/201712/t20171214_1562740.html。
(2)问卷询问农户村庄是否有统一提供灌溉设施,有则赋值为1,否则赋值为0。
[2] FURUBOTN E G,PEJOVIC S.Property rights and economic theory:a survey of recent literature[J].Journal of economic literature,1972,10(4):1137-1162.
[3] ACEMOGLU D,JOHNSON S,ROBINSON JA.The colonial origins of comparative development:an empirical investigation[J].American economic review,2001,91(5):1369-1401.
[4] BANERJEE V,PAUL J,GERTLER,et al.Empowerment and efficiency:tenancy reform in West Bengal[J].Journal of political economy,2002,110(2):239-280.
[5] JANVRY AD,GONZALEZ-NAVARRO M,SADOULET E.Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky?Electoral outcomes of Mexico’s certification program[J].Journal of development economics,2014(110):216-225.
[6]盖庆恩,朱喜,程名望,等.土地资源配置不当与劳动生产率[J].经济研究,2017(5):119-132.
[7]陈锡文.中国农村制度变迁60年[M].北京:人民出版社,2009.
[8]刘玥汐,许恒周.农地确权对农村土地流转的影响研究——基于农民分化的视角[J].干旱区资源与环境,2016,30(5):25-29.
[9]胡新艳,罗必良.新一轮农地确权与促进流转:粤赣证据[J].改革,2016(4):85-94.
[10]程令国,张晔,刘志彪.农地确权促进了中国农村土地的流转吗?[J].管理世界,2016(1):88-98.
[11]姚洋.土地、制度和农业发展[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[12]LI G,ROZELLE S,BRANDT L.Tenure,land rights,and farmer investment incentives in China[J].Agricultural economics,1998,19(1-2):63-71.
[13]刘晓宇,张林秀.农村土地产权安全性与劳动力转移关系分析[J].中国农村经济,2008(2):29-39.
[14]仇童伟,罗必良.农地调整会抑制农村劳动力非农转移吗?[J].中国农村观察,2017(4):57-71.
[15]林坚,李德洗.非农就业与粮食生产:替代抑或互补——基于粮食主产区农户视角的分析[J].中国农村经济,2013(9):54-62.
[16]罗必良,仇童伟.中国农业种植结构调整:“非粮化”抑或“趋粮化”[J].社会科学战线,2018(2):39-51.
[17]GERMAN G,AKINNIFESI F K,EDRISS A K,et al.Influence of property rights on farmers’willingness to plant indigenous fruit trees in Malawi and Zambia[J].African journal of agricultural research,2013,4(5):427-437.
[18]BRASSELLE A S,GASPART F,PLATTEAU J P,et al.Land tenure security and investment incentives:puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso[J].Journal of development economics,2002,67(2):373-418.
[19]罗必良,仇童伟,张露,等.种粮的逻辑[J].北京:中国农业出版社,2018.
[20]李尚蒲,罗必良.农地调整的内在机理及其影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2015(3):18-33.
[21]付江涛,纪月清,胡浩.新一轮承包地确权登记颁证是否促进了农户的土地流转——来自江苏省3县(市、区)的经验证据[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016(1):105-113.
[22]KUNG K S,LIU S.Farmers’preferences regarding ownership and land tenure in post-Mao China:unexpected evidence from eight countries[J].China journal,1997(38):33-63.
[23]张红宇.中国农地调整与使用权流转:几点评论[J].管理世界,2002(5):76-87.
[24]林文声.新一轮农地确权何以影响农地流转?——来自中国健康与养老追踪调查的证据[J].中国农村经济,2017(7):29-43.
[25]BESLEY T.Property rights and investment incentives:theory and evidence from Ghana[J].Journal of political economy,1995,103(5):903-937.
[26]姚洋.农地制度与农业绩效的实证研究[J].中国农村观察,1998(6):35-36.
[27]LI G,ROZELLE S,BRANDT L.Tenure,land rights,and farmer investment incentives in China[J].Agricultural economics,1998,19(1-2):63-71.
[28]马贤磊.农地产权安全性对农业绩效影响:投资激励效应和资源配置效应——来自丘陵地区三个村庄的初步证据[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2010,10(4):72-79.
[29]GAO L,SUN D,HUANG J.Impact of land tenure policy on agricultural investments in China:evidence from a panel data study[J].China economic review,2017(45):244-252.
[30]YANG DT.China’s land arrangements and rural labor mobility[J].China economic review,2004,8(2):101-115.
[31]MULLAN K,GROSJEAN P,KONTOLEON A.Land tenure arrangements and rural-urban migration in China[J].World development,2011,39(1):123-133.
[32]MAELYS DLR,DENG Q,LI S,et al.Land rights insecurity and temporary migration in rural China[R/OL].I.Z.A discussion paper No.4668,2009.https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/izaizadps/dp4668.htm.
[33]MA X,NICO HEERINNKA,EKKO C,et al.Land tenure insecurity and rural-urban migration in rural China[J].Papers in regional science,2014,95(2):383-406.
[34]洪炜杰,罗必良.地权稳定能促进农户对农地的长期投资吗?[J].学术研究,2018(9):78-86.
[35]黄季焜,冀县卿.农地使用权确权与农户对农地的长期投资[J].管理世界,2012(9):76-81.
[36]仇童伟,罗必良.农地调整会抑制农村劳动力非农转移吗?[J].中国农村观察,2017(4):57-71.
[37]罗琦,唐超,罗明忠.村治能人推进农村集体产权改革:逻辑分析与案例解剖——基于安徽省夏刘寨村的调查[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版),2018(6):86-92
[38]CONG R,DRUKKER D M.Treatment effects model[J].Stata technical bulletin,2001,10(55):25-33.
[39]陈强.高级计量经济学及Stata应用(第二版)[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2014.
(1)对两个系数T检验发现卡方值为59.77(p<0.0000),故这种比较在统计上是有意义的。
(2)我国粮食主产区包括辽宁、河北、山东、吉林、内蒙古、江西、湖南、四川、河南、湖北、江苏、安徽、黑龙江等十三个省份或自治区。
(1)第三次全国农业普查主要数据公报(第一号),本文界定为南方50亩以上,北方100亩以上。网址:www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/nypcgb/qgnypcgb/201712/t20171214_1562740.html。
(2)问卷询问农户村庄是否有统一提供灌溉设施,有则赋值为1,否则赋值为0。