基于公平偏好的工程总承包委托代理分析
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摘要
针对工程总承包中总承包商和分包商之间的双边道德风险问题,把公平偏好引入委托代理模型,研究总承包商对分包商的激励机制,分析公平偏好的影响效应.研究发现:公平偏好是决定产出分享系数和固定价格的重要因素,并会改变风险规避、努力贡献等对产出分享系数和努力水平等的影响,而风险规避和努力贡献也会改变公平偏好对产出共享系数和努力水平等的影响,三者之间具有交互影响效应.因此,总承包商应该充分考虑分包商的风险规避、公平偏好和努力贡献等三种属性,忽略其中任何一种因素都是不合理的.
Aiming at the problem of double moral hazard between the general contractor and the subcontractor in engineering procurement construction,the fairness preference is incorporated into the classical principal agent model to design the mechanism for the general contractor to urge the subcontractor,and hereby the influence of the fairness preference is analyzed.It is found that the fairness preference is an important factor deciding the coefficient of output distribution,will change the effect of the risk aversion and the effort contribution on the coefficient of output distribution,while the risk aversion and the effort contribution also change the effect of the fairness preference on the coefficient of output distribution.Therefore,they are influenced mutually.Consequently,the general contractor should carefully the fairness preference,the risk aversion and the effort contribution of the subcontractor when designing mechanism.It is unreasonable to ignore anyone of these factors.
Aiming at the problem of double moral hazard between the general contractor and the subcontractor in engineering procurement construction,the fairness preference is incorporated into the classical principal agent model to design the mechanism for the general contractor to urge the subcontractor,and hereby the influence of the fairness preference is analyzed.It is found that the fairness preference is an important factor deciding the coefficient of output distribution,will change the effect of the risk aversion and the effort contribution on the coefficient of output distribution,while the risk aversion and the effort contribution also change the effect of the fairness preference on the coefficient of output distribution.Therefore,they are influenced mutually.Consequently,the general contractor should carefully the fairness preference,the risk aversion and the effort contribution of the subcontractor when designing mechanism.It is unreasonable to ignore anyone of these factors.
引文
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[3]管百海,胡培.联合体工程总承包商的收益分配机制[J].系统工程,2008,26(11):94-98.
[4]张云,吕萍等.总承包工程建设供应链利润分配模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(4):98-104.
[5]孙蕾,孙绍荣.基于合作博弈的大型基础工程各方利益分配机制研究[J].工程管理学报,2016,30(3):88-93.
[6]严玲,王智秀,张美文.基于扎根理论的建设工程合同公平性分析[J].建筑经济,2016,37(10):109-112.
[7]魏光兴.公平偏好的博弈实验及理论模型研究综述[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006(8):152-161.
[8]吴光东,施建刚,唐代中.基于公平偏好的项目导向型供应链双向激励[J].同济大学学报,2011,39(9):1394-1400.
[9]秦伟光,李华.考虑公平偏好的项目型知识员工调度[J].世界科技研究与发展,2013,35(6):765-760.
[10]李真,孟庆峰,盛昭翰.考虑公平关切的工期优化收益共享谈判[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(1):82-91.
[11]吕俊娜,刘伟,邹庆,甘琳.考虑公平关切的工程总承包合作利益分配模型[J].系统工程,2014,32(12):62-66.
[12]施建刚,林陵娜,唐代中.考虑横向公平偏好的项目团队成员知识共享激励研究[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(6):242-250.
[13]赵丽丽,王雪青,陈超.工程监理公平心理偏好下最优风险分担与激励契约研究[J].电子科技大学学报,2016,18(2):73-79.
[14]曹启龙,盛昭瀚.公平偏好下PPP项目多任务激励问题研究[J].预测,2016,35(1):75-80.
[15]Fehr E,Schmidt K M.A theory of fairness,competition and cooperation[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1999,114(3):817-868.
[16]杜少甫,杜婵,梁棵,刘天卓.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-47.
[17]Holmstrom B,Milgrom P.Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J].Econometrica,1987,55(2):303-328.
[18]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].格致出版社,上海三联出版社,上海人民出版社,2012.
[19]拉丰,马赫蒂摩.激励理论(第一卷)委托代理模型[M].中国人民大学出版社,2002.