建设项目承包人履约行为的结构维度与测量研究——基于契约参照点理论
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摘要
契约参照点理论以合同为参照点给出解释承包人履约行为选择的新逻辑,但受到合同参照点效应影响的承包人履约行为的类型及表现形式尚不明确,亟需厘清承包人履约行为的结构维度并进行量化。首先,借鉴已有的承包人履约行为的测量题项,并对相似概念的测量题项进行情境化处理构建承包人履约行为测量的初始维度和量表。然后,通过273份问卷调查数据定量分析确定了承包人履约行为的最终构成维度和量表。研究表明,建设项目承包人履约行为的构念是由字面履约行为、尽善履约行为和机会主义行为等三维二阶因子构成。其中,字面履约行为是最常见的形式,其次是尽善履约行为;字面履约行为维度包含正确履行、充分完成及达到绩效目标等三个因子;尽善履约行为体现在自愿利他、主动控制风险、协同互助和弥补合同漏洞等四个方面;而机会主义行为由隐瞒信息、未完成承诺、逃避非正式协议和利用合同漏洞等四个子维度构成。该量表开发后,可为建设项目承包人履约行为的研究提供完整分析框架并对建设项目履约管理研究提供技术支持。
The theory of contract reference point can give a new logic of explaining the selection of contractors' performance behavior by taking the contract as the point of reference. However, the existing types and forms of the contractors' performance behavior subjected to the effect of the contract reference point are not clear, so it is urgent to clarify and quantify the structural dimensions. Firstly, based on mirroring the available measurement items of contractors' performance behavior and making a concrete treatment of the measurement items of similar concepts including appropriate modifications and supplements, the measurement dimension and item of contractors' performance behavior are constructed. Secondly, through quantitative analysis of 273 questionnaires, the final structure dimensions and measurement scale of the contractors' performance behavior are determined. The research results show that the contractors' performance behavior has three-dimensional second-order factor structure under the influence of contract reference point. The three dimensions are the perfunctory performance behavior, the consummate performance behavior and the opportunism performance behavior, respectively. The contractors' perfunctory performance behavior is composed of three factors, i.e., properly implementation, full completion and reach expectations. The contractors' consummate performance behavior is composed of four dimensions, i.e., voluntary altruism, risk control automatically, mutual collaboration and making-up the loopholes of the contract. Similarly, the contractors' opportunism performance behavior is also composed of four dimensions, including information hiding, unfinished commitments, avoidance of informal agreements and utilizing contract loopholes. The developed scale can provide a complete analytical framework for the study of the contractors' performance behavior and provide technical support for the related research.
The theory of contract reference point can give a new logic of explaining the selection of contractors' performance behavior by taking the contract as the point of reference. However, the existing types and forms of the contractors' performance behavior subjected to the effect of the contract reference point are not clear, so it is urgent to clarify and quantify the structural dimensions. Firstly, based on mirroring the available measurement items of contractors' performance behavior and making a concrete treatment of the measurement items of similar concepts including appropriate modifications and supplements, the measurement dimension and item of contractors' performance behavior are constructed. Secondly, through quantitative analysis of 273 questionnaires, the final structure dimensions and measurement scale of the contractors' performance behavior are determined. The research results show that the contractors' performance behavior has three-dimensional second-order factor structure under the influence of contract reference point. The three dimensions are the perfunctory performance behavior, the consummate performance behavior and the opportunism performance behavior, respectively. The contractors' perfunctory performance behavior is composed of three factors, i.e., properly implementation, full completion and reach expectations. The contractors' consummate performance behavior is composed of four dimensions, i.e., voluntary altruism, risk control automatically, mutual collaboration and making-up the loopholes of the contract. Similarly, the contractors' opportunism performance behavior is also composed of four dimensions, including information hiding, unfinished commitments, avoidance of informal agreements and utilizing contract loopholes. The developed scale can provide a complete analytical framework for the study of the contractors' performance behavior and provide technical support for the related research.
引文
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[12]Bacha E,Walker S.The relationship between transformational leadership and followers’perceptions of fairness[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2013,116(3):667-680
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[15]乐云,刘敏,李永奎.政府投资建设项目业主的“隧道行为”及监管博弈[J].土木工程学报,2012,45(增2):236-240(Le Yun,Liu Min,Li Yongkui.The tunneling behavior and regulatory game of the owners of government investment projects[J].Journal of Civil Engineering,2012,45(增2):236-240(in Chinese))
[16]Ning Y,Ling F Y Y.Boosting public construction project outcomes through relational transactions[J].Journal of Construction Engineering&Management,2013,140(1):46-52
[17]尹贻林,徐志超.信任?合作与工程项目管理绩效关系研究——来自承发包双方独立数据的证据[J].工业工程与管理,2014,19(4):81-91(Yin Yilin,Xu Zhichao.Research on the relationship between trust,cooperation and project management performance.Evidence from independent data of contractors[J].Industrial Engineering and Management,2014,19(4):81-91(in Chinese))
[18]Cao Z,Lumineau F.Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance:a qualitative and meta-analytic investigation[J].Journal of Operations Management 2015,33/34:15-42
[19]Katz D,Kahn R.The social psychology of organizations[M].2nd edition.New York:John Wiley,1978
[20]张水波,陈俊颖,胡振宇.工程合同对承包方合作行为的影响研究:信任的中介作用[J].工程管理学报,2015,4:6-11(Zhang Shuibo,Chen Junying,Hu Zhenyu.Study on the influence of engineering contract on contractor's cooperative behavior:the mediating role of trust[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2015,4:6-11(in Chinese))
[21]姜新宽,唐吟秋,陈勇强.合约控制功能对承包商合作行为影响研究:业主权力的调节作用[J].工程管理学报,2016,30(4):1-6(Jiang Xinkuan,Tang Yinqiu,Chen Yongqiang.Research on the influence of contract control function on contractor cooperative behavior:the moderating role of owner power[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2016,30(4):1-6(in Chinese))
[22]Lim B T H,Loosemore M.The effect of inter-organizational justice perceptions on organizational citizenship behaviors in construction projects[J].International Journal of Project Management,2017,35(2):95-106
[23]何清华,陈震,李永奎.基于项目组织公民行为的重大基础设施工程项目成功评价体系研究——以无锡太湖国际科技园区开发为例[J].科技进步与对策,2014,31(11):62-66(He Qinghua,Chen Zhen,Li Yongkui.Research on the successful evaluation system of major infrastructure projects based on project organizational citizenship behavior—take the development of Taihu Wuxi international science and Technology Park as an example[J].Scientific and Technological Progress and Countermeasures,2014,31(11):62-66(in Chinese))
[24]杜亚灵,李会玲,柯洪.工程项目中业主初始信任对合作的影响研究:承包商公平感知的中介作用[J].管理学报,2014,11(10):1542-1551(Du Yaling,Li Huiling,Ke Hong.Study on the influence of initial trust on cooperation in construction projects:the mediating role of contractors'perceived fairness[J].Chinese Journal of Management,2014,11(10):1542-1551(in Chinese))
[25]Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C.How do informal agreements and revision shape contractual reference points[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2015,13(1):1-28
[26]Williams L J,Anderson S E.Job satisfaction and organizational commitment as predictors of organizational citizenship and in-role behaviors[J].Journal of Management:Official Journal of the Southern Management Association,1991,17(3):601-617
[27]Janssen O,van Yperen N W.Employees'goal orientations,the quality of leader-member exchange,and the outcomes of job performance and job satisfaction[J].Academy of Management Journal,2004,47(3):368-384
[28]Anvuur A M,Kumaraswamy M M.Measurement and antecedents of cooperation in construction[J].Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2011,138(7):797-810
[29]Dyne L V,Graham J W,Dienesch R M.Organizational citizenship behavior:construct redefinition,measurement,and validation[J].Academy of Management Journal,1994,37(4):765-802
[30]Organ D W.Organizational citizenship behavior:the good soldier syndrome[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1988,41(6):692-703
[31]Lim B T H,Loosemore M.The effect of inter-organizational justice perceptions on organizational citizenship behaviors in construction projects[J].International Journal of Project Management,2017,35(2):95-106
[32]陈震,何清华,李永奎,等.中国大型公共项目公民行为界定及量表开发[J].华东经济管理,2016,30(2):107-113(Chen Zhen,He Qinghua,Li Yongkui,et al.Citizenship behavior definition of large-scale public projects and scale development in China[J].East China Economic Management,2016,30(2):107-113(in Chinese))
[33]刘燕.“机会主义行为”内容与表现形式的理论解析[J].经济问题探索,2006,5:122-125(Liu Yan.Theoretical analysis of the content and form of opportunism behavior[J].Economic Problem Exploration,2006,5:122-125(in Chinese))
[34]Anderson E.Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1988,9(3):247-264
[35]Heide J B,Wathne K H,Rokkan A I.Interfirm monitoring,social contracts,and relationship outcomes[J].Journal of Marketing Research,2007,44(3):425-433
[36]Wuyts S,Geyskens I.The formation of buyer-supplier relationships:detailed contract drafting and close partner selection[J].Journal of Marketing,2013,69(4):103-117
[37]Luo Y.Opportunism in inter-firm exchanges in emerging markets[J].Management and Organization Review,2006,2(1):121-147
[38]吴志平,陈福添.中国文化情境下团队心理安全气氛的量表开发[J].管理学报,2011,8(1):73-80(Wu Zhiping,Chen Futian.The scale development of team psychological safety climate in Chinese cultural context[J].Chinese Journal of Management,2011,8(1):73-80(in Chinese))
[39]Lusch R F,Brown J R.Interdependency,contracting,and relational behavior in marketing channels[J].Journal of Marketing,1996,60(4):19-38
[40]Ling F Y Y,Shi Y O,Ke Y,et al.Drivers and barriers to adopting relational contracting practices in public projects:comparative study of Beijing and Sydney[J].International Journal of Project Management,2014,32(2):275-285
[41]石磊,孙晓丽.BOT项目风险转移的悖论——以日本-BOT失败项目为研究对象[J].管理案例研究与评论,2011,4(4):248-256(Shi Lei,Sun Xiaoli.The paradox of risk transfer in BOT project—a failure project of Japanese BOT case[J].Management Case Studies and Reviews,2011,4(4):248-256(in Chinese))
[42]Sha K.Secondary exploration into the puzzle of scale-performance:why is china's construction industry large but not robust[J].Construction Economy,2009,30(8):9-11
[43]Mills A.A systematic approach to risk management for construction[J].Structural Survey,2001,19(5):245-252
[44]Anderson E.Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1988,9(3):247-264
[45]李真,孟庆峰,盛昭瀚,等.工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(3):112-121(Li Zhen,Meng Qingfeng,Sheng Zhaohan,et al.The evolution analysis of contractor group incentive efficiency in project quality optimization[J].China Management Science,2012,20(3):112-121(in Chinese))
[2]Hart O,Moore J.Contracts as reference points[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,123(1):1-48
[3]奥利弗·E威廉姆斯.市场与层级制——分析与反托拉斯含义[M].蔡晓月,孟俭,译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2011(Williams O E.Market and hierarchy:analysis and antitrust implications[M].Cai Xiaoyue,Meng Jian,translate.Shanghai:Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press,2011(in Chinese))
[4]Borman W C.Expanding the criterion domain to include elements of contextual performance[M]//Personnel selection in organizations.New York:Wiley,1993
[5]蒋士成,费方域.从事前效率问题到事后效率问题——不完全合同理论的几类经典模型比较[J].经济研究,2008(8):145-156(Jiang Shicheng,Fei Fangyu.Pre-efficiency problem to ex post efficiency—comparison of several classical models of incomplete contract theory[J].Economic Research,2008(8):145-156(in Chinese))
[6]Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C.Contracts as reference points-experimental evidence[J].American Economic Review,2011,101(2):493-525
[7]浦徐进,金德龙.公平偏好?参照点效应和三级供应链的运作[J].控制与决策,2015,30(5):859-864(Pu Xujin,Jin Delong.Fair preference,reference point effect and operation of three echelon supply chain[J].Control and Decision,2015,30(5):859-864(in Chinese))
[8]Hoppe E I,Schmitz P W.Can contracts solve the hold-up problem Experimental evidence[J].Games&Economic Behavior,2009,73(1):186-199
[9]Bartling B,Schmidt K M.Reference points,social norms,and fairness in contract renegotiations[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2015,13(1):98-129
[10]Karlsen J T.Project owner involvement for information and knowledge sharing in uncertainty management[J].International Journal of Managing Projects in Business,2010,3(4):642-660
[11]尹贻林,徐志超,邱艳.公共项目中承包商机会主义行为应对的演化博弈研究[J].土木工程学报,2014,47(6):138-144(Yin Yilin,Xu Zhichao,Qiu Yan.Study on evolutionary game of contractor's opportunistic behavior in public project[J].China Civil Engineering Journal,2014,47(6):138-144(in Chinese))
[12]Bacha E,Walker S.The relationship between transformational leadership and followers’perceptions of fairness[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2013,116(3):667-680
[13]Williamson O E.Markets and hierarchies:analysis and antitrust implications:a study in the economics of internal organization[J].Accounting Review,1975,86(343):619
[14]Lu P,Guo S,Qian L,et al.The effectiveness of contractual and relational governances in construction projects in China[J].International Journal of Project Management,2015,33(1):212-222
[15]乐云,刘敏,李永奎.政府投资建设项目业主的“隧道行为”及监管博弈[J].土木工程学报,2012,45(增2):236-240(Le Yun,Liu Min,Li Yongkui.The tunneling behavior and regulatory game of the owners of government investment projects[J].Journal of Civil Engineering,2012,45(增2):236-240(in Chinese))
[16]Ning Y,Ling F Y Y.Boosting public construction project outcomes through relational transactions[J].Journal of Construction Engineering&Management,2013,140(1):46-52
[17]尹贻林,徐志超.信任?合作与工程项目管理绩效关系研究——来自承发包双方独立数据的证据[J].工业工程与管理,2014,19(4):81-91(Yin Yilin,Xu Zhichao.Research on the relationship between trust,cooperation and project management performance.Evidence from independent data of contractors[J].Industrial Engineering and Management,2014,19(4):81-91(in Chinese))
[18]Cao Z,Lumineau F.Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance:a qualitative and meta-analytic investigation[J].Journal of Operations Management 2015,33/34:15-42
[19]Katz D,Kahn R.The social psychology of organizations[M].2nd edition.New York:John Wiley,1978
[20]张水波,陈俊颖,胡振宇.工程合同对承包方合作行为的影响研究:信任的中介作用[J].工程管理学报,2015,4:6-11(Zhang Shuibo,Chen Junying,Hu Zhenyu.Study on the influence of engineering contract on contractor's cooperative behavior:the mediating role of trust[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2015,4:6-11(in Chinese))
[21]姜新宽,唐吟秋,陈勇强.合约控制功能对承包商合作行为影响研究:业主权力的调节作用[J].工程管理学报,2016,30(4):1-6(Jiang Xinkuan,Tang Yinqiu,Chen Yongqiang.Research on the influence of contract control function on contractor cooperative behavior:the moderating role of owner power[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2016,30(4):1-6(in Chinese))
[22]Lim B T H,Loosemore M.The effect of inter-organizational justice perceptions on organizational citizenship behaviors in construction projects[J].International Journal of Project Management,2017,35(2):95-106
[23]何清华,陈震,李永奎.基于项目组织公民行为的重大基础设施工程项目成功评价体系研究——以无锡太湖国际科技园区开发为例[J].科技进步与对策,2014,31(11):62-66(He Qinghua,Chen Zhen,Li Yongkui.Research on the successful evaluation system of major infrastructure projects based on project organizational citizenship behavior—take the development of Taihu Wuxi international science and Technology Park as an example[J].Scientific and Technological Progress and Countermeasures,2014,31(11):62-66(in Chinese))
[24]杜亚灵,李会玲,柯洪.工程项目中业主初始信任对合作的影响研究:承包商公平感知的中介作用[J].管理学报,2014,11(10):1542-1551(Du Yaling,Li Huiling,Ke Hong.Study on the influence of initial trust on cooperation in construction projects:the mediating role of contractors'perceived fairness[J].Chinese Journal of Management,2014,11(10):1542-1551(in Chinese))
[25]Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C.How do informal agreements and revision shape contractual reference points[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2015,13(1):1-28
[26]Williams L J,Anderson S E.Job satisfaction and organizational commitment as predictors of organizational citizenship and in-role behaviors[J].Journal of Management:Official Journal of the Southern Management Association,1991,17(3):601-617
[27]Janssen O,van Yperen N W.Employees'goal orientations,the quality of leader-member exchange,and the outcomes of job performance and job satisfaction[J].Academy of Management Journal,2004,47(3):368-384
[28]Anvuur A M,Kumaraswamy M M.Measurement and antecedents of cooperation in construction[J].Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2011,138(7):797-810
[29]Dyne L V,Graham J W,Dienesch R M.Organizational citizenship behavior:construct redefinition,measurement,and validation[J].Academy of Management Journal,1994,37(4):765-802
[30]Organ D W.Organizational citizenship behavior:the good soldier syndrome[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1988,41(6):692-703
[31]Lim B T H,Loosemore M.The effect of inter-organizational justice perceptions on organizational citizenship behaviors in construction projects[J].International Journal of Project Management,2017,35(2):95-106
[32]陈震,何清华,李永奎,等.中国大型公共项目公民行为界定及量表开发[J].华东经济管理,2016,30(2):107-113(Chen Zhen,He Qinghua,Li Yongkui,et al.Citizenship behavior definition of large-scale public projects and scale development in China[J].East China Economic Management,2016,30(2):107-113(in Chinese))
[33]刘燕.“机会主义行为”内容与表现形式的理论解析[J].经济问题探索,2006,5:122-125(Liu Yan.Theoretical analysis of the content and form of opportunism behavior[J].Economic Problem Exploration,2006,5:122-125(in Chinese))
[34]Anderson E.Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1988,9(3):247-264
[35]Heide J B,Wathne K H,Rokkan A I.Interfirm monitoring,social contracts,and relationship outcomes[J].Journal of Marketing Research,2007,44(3):425-433
[36]Wuyts S,Geyskens I.The formation of buyer-supplier relationships:detailed contract drafting and close partner selection[J].Journal of Marketing,2013,69(4):103-117
[37]Luo Y.Opportunism in inter-firm exchanges in emerging markets[J].Management and Organization Review,2006,2(1):121-147
[38]吴志平,陈福添.中国文化情境下团队心理安全气氛的量表开发[J].管理学报,2011,8(1):73-80(Wu Zhiping,Chen Futian.The scale development of team psychological safety climate in Chinese cultural context[J].Chinese Journal of Management,2011,8(1):73-80(in Chinese))
[39]Lusch R F,Brown J R.Interdependency,contracting,and relational behavior in marketing channels[J].Journal of Marketing,1996,60(4):19-38
[40]Ling F Y Y,Shi Y O,Ke Y,et al.Drivers and barriers to adopting relational contracting practices in public projects:comparative study of Beijing and Sydney[J].International Journal of Project Management,2014,32(2):275-285
[41]石磊,孙晓丽.BOT项目风险转移的悖论——以日本-BOT失败项目为研究对象[J].管理案例研究与评论,2011,4(4):248-256(Shi Lei,Sun Xiaoli.The paradox of risk transfer in BOT project—a failure project of Japanese BOT case[J].Management Case Studies and Reviews,2011,4(4):248-256(in Chinese))
[42]Sha K.Secondary exploration into the puzzle of scale-performance:why is china's construction industry large but not robust[J].Construction Economy,2009,30(8):9-11
[43]Mills A.A systematic approach to risk management for construction[J].Structural Survey,2001,19(5):245-252
[44]Anderson E.Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1988,9(3):247-264
[45]李真,孟庆峰,盛昭瀚,等.工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(3):112-121(Li Zhen,Meng Qingfeng,Sheng Zhaohan,et al.The evolution analysis of contractor group incentive efficiency in project quality optimization[J].China Management Science,2012,20(3):112-121(in Chinese))