农地流转运行机制、绩效与逻辑研究——一个新的理论分析框架
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摘要
针对农地流转问题,本文建构了一个新的理论分析框架——布罗代尔钟罩效应,政府元场域发出的政策信息波,在乡村场域会遇到"政策变通",从而形成"基波耦合,谐波屏蔽"效应,可尝试用此框架解读当前的中国经验。通过实地走访广东江门各乡镇"三资"平台,采访出租方、承租方、村委会等利益相关方,勾勒出一幅农地流转的"全景图像",发现其生成结构与乡村场域是同构的,功能也异化为"场外交易,场内交割"。作为另外一种尝试,课题组自建农地流转电商平台并投入运作,发现当前的农地流转无法真正市场化。其内在缘由是,受制于农地制度的初始安排,流转须借助第三方(村委会)实施,而处于双重代理关系中的村委会受到科层、乡村和政府等多重制度逻辑影响,以致农地流转无法发展成统一的市场,而是演化出一个个分散的"布罗代尔钟罩",市场竞争机制则屏蔽于钟罩之外。鉴于农地流转问题的复杂性,本文从社会学视角重新加以审视,当前的农地流转是"嵌入"到乡村社区关系之中的礼俗式流转。如果按政府偏好强行实施规模化流转,布罗代尔钟罩将会变形破裂,乡村社区面临"脱嵌"危机,这就涉及正义问题。最后,本文尝试用罗尔斯正义原则检视我国农地流转的逻辑起点,指出必须首先关注弱势群体的利益,而不能从效率角度片面追求规模化,从而为今后的政策制订奠定切入点。
In view of the problem of rural land transferring,this paper constructs a new theoretical analysis framework——Braudel Bell Jar effect. The policy information wave from the government meta-field will produce "policy flexibility" in the rural field,forming "fundamental wave coupling,harmonic shielding" effect,which can interpret the current experience of China. We surveyed the "Three Capital" platform of villages and towns,and interviewed the interested parties such as the lessor,the lessee,the village committee and so on.Then,we can outline a panoramic image of the rural land transferring. It is found that its generating structure is isomorphic with the rural field,and its functions are also alienated into "over-the-counter dealing,counter delivering". As another attempt,the research group built our own commercialized the rural land transferring platform and put it into operation. It is found that the current rural land transferring can not be truly marketization. The intrinsic reason is that the initial arrangement of the farmland system restricts the circulation of farmland,which must be implemented by the third party of the village committee. The village committee,which is in the dual agency relationship,will reflect the multi-institutional logic of the bureaucracy,the countryside and the government in consideration of the problem of the rural land transferring. Under the combined action of multi-institutional logic,the rural land transferring can not develop into a unified market,but evolved a scattered "Braudel Bell Jar",and the market competition mechanism is shielded from the bell jar. In view of the complexity of the agricultural land circulation,this paper reexamines from the perspective of sociology. The transferring of farmland is the ritual and popular circulation "embedded" into the rural community relations,and the rural community is a good preface society that follows the moral rationality. If we enforce the large-scale transferring according to the government preference,Brodale bell jar will break down,and the rural community will face the crisis of "disembedding". The land transferring itself is a justice problem. Finally,this paper tries to examine the logical starting point of the rural land transferring with Rawls' s Justice Principle,and points out that the land transferring must first pay attention to the interests of the disadvantagedgroups,and lay an archimedes point for future policy formulation.
In view of the problem of rural land transferring,this paper constructs a new theoretical analysis framework——Braudel Bell Jar effect. The policy information wave from the government meta-field will produce "policy flexibility" in the rural field,forming "fundamental wave coupling,harmonic shielding" effect,which can interpret the current experience of China. We surveyed the "Three Capital" platform of villages and towns,and interviewed the interested parties such as the lessor,the lessee,the village committee and so on.Then,we can outline a panoramic image of the rural land transferring. It is found that its generating structure is isomorphic with the rural field,and its functions are also alienated into "over-the-counter dealing,counter delivering". As another attempt,the research group built our own commercialized the rural land transferring platform and put it into operation. It is found that the current rural land transferring can not be truly marketization. The intrinsic reason is that the initial arrangement of the farmland system restricts the circulation of farmland,which must be implemented by the third party of the village committee. The village committee,which is in the dual agency relationship,will reflect the multi-institutional logic of the bureaucracy,the countryside and the government in consideration of the problem of the rural land transferring. Under the combined action of multi-institutional logic,the rural land transferring can not develop into a unified market,but evolved a scattered "Braudel Bell Jar",and the market competition mechanism is shielded from the bell jar. In view of the complexity of the agricultural land circulation,this paper reexamines from the perspective of sociology. The transferring of farmland is the ritual and popular circulation "embedded" into the rural community relations,and the rural community is a good preface society that follows the moral rationality. If we enforce the large-scale transferring according to the government preference,Brodale bell jar will break down,and the rural community will face the crisis of "disembedding". The land transferring itself is a justice problem. Finally,this paper tries to examine the logical starting point of the rural land transferring with Rawls' s Justice Principle,and points out that the land transferring must first pay attention to the interests of the disadvantagedgroups,and lay an archimedes point for future policy formulation.
引文
[1]陈飞,翟伟娟.农户行为视角下农地流转诱因及其福利效应研究[J].经济研究,2015(10):163-177.
[2]黄忠华,杜雪君,虞晓芬.地权诉求、宅基地流转与农村劳动力转移[J].公共管理学报,2016(3):51-59.
[3]冀县卿,钱忠好.如何有针对性地促进农地经营权流转?——基于苏、桂、鄂、黑四省(区)99村、896户农户调查数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2018(3):87-97.
[4]王常伟,顾海英.城镇住房、农地依赖与农户承包权退出[J].管理世界,2016(9):55-69.
[5]张建,冯淑怡,诸培新.政府干预农地流转市场会加剧农村内部收入差距吗?——基于江苏省四个县的调研[J].公共管理学报,2017(1):104-116.
[6]王振坡,梅林,詹卉.产权、市场及其绩效:我国农村土地制度变革探讨[J].农业经济问题,2015(4):44-50.
[7]李宁,陈利根,龙开胜.农村宅基地产权制度研究——不完全产权与主体行为关系的分析视角[J].公共管理学报,2014(1):39-54.
[8]罗必良.科斯定理:反思与拓展——兼论中国农地流转制度改革与选择[J].经济研究,2017(11):178-193.
[9]吴一恒,徐砾,马贤磊.农地“三权分置”制度实施潜在风险与完善措施——基于产权配置与产权公共域视角[J].中国农村经济,2018(8):46-63.
[10]段力,傅鸿源.地票模式与农村集体建设用地流转制度的案例研究[J].公共管理学报,2011(2):86-92.
[11]周靖祥,陆铭.内地农村土地流转何去何从?——重庆实践的启示[J].公共管理学报,2011(4):85-95.
[12]翁士洪.农村土地流转政策的执行偏差——对小岗村的实证分析[J].公共管理学报,2012(1):17-24.
[13]黄忠怀,邱佳敏.政府干预土地集中流转:条件、策略与风险[J].中国农村观察,2016(2):34-44.
[14]黄增付.土地经营权流转与乡村秩序整合[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2018(1):94-105.
[15]马流辉.“脱嵌”的土地流转——实现机制与社会效应[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版),2015(5):159-165.
[16]张建雷,王会.土地的道义经济:农村土地流转问题再认识——基于安徽省L村的实证调查[J].学术论坛,2014(5):108-113.
[17]贺雪峰.论农地经营的规模——以安徽繁昌调研为基础的讨论[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2011(6):6-14.
[18]贺雪峰.农业问题还是农民问题?[J].社会科学,2015(6):64-77.
[19]道格拉斯·C·诺斯.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海:上海三联出版社,2008.
[20]思拉恩·埃格特森.经济行为与制度[M].北京:商务印书馆,1996.
[21] ALFORD R,FRIEDLAND R. Powers of Theory:Capitalism,the State and Democracy[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1985.
[22] FRIEDLAND R,ALFORD R. Bringing Society Back In:Symbols,Practices and Institutional Contradictions[M]. Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1991.
[23]周雪光,艾云.多重逻辑下的制度变迁:一个分析框架[J].中国社会科学,2010(4):132-150.
[24]谭海波,赵雪娇.“回应式创新”:多重制度逻辑下的政府组织变迁——以广东省J市行政服务中心的创建过程为例[J].公共管理学报,2016,13(4):16-29.
[25]波兰尼.大转型:我们时代的政治与经济起源[M].杭州:浙江人民出版社,2007.
[26]斯科特.农民的道义经济学[M].南京:译林出版社,2013.
[27]费孝通.乡土中国[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006.
[28]孙立平.“关系”、社会关系与社会结构[J].社会学研究,1996(5):20-30.
[29]刘圣中,王晨.浮动的保障线:农村低保政策的变通执行[J].农村经济,2016(9):84-90.
[30]刘鹏,刘志鹏.街头官僚政策变通执行的类型及其解释——基于对H县食品安全监管执法的案例研[J].中国行政管理,2014(5):101-105.
[31]周雪光.从“黄宗羲定律”到帝国的逻辑:中国国家治理逻辑的历史线索[J].开放时代,2014(4):108-132.
[32]钟兴菊.地方性知识与政策执行成效——环境政策地方实践的双重话语分析[J].公共管理学报,2017(1):38-48.
[33]斐迪南·滕尼斯.共同体与社会[M].北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[34]贺雪峰.农业问题还是农民问题?[J].社会科学,2015(6):64-77.
[35]罗必良.农地经营规模的效率决定[J].中国农村观察,2000(5):18-24.
[36]毛丹.村落共同体的当代命运:四个观察维度社会学研究[J]. 2010(1):1-32.
[37]贺雪峰.政府不应该支持资本和大户去打败小农[EB/OL].(2013-05-17)[2017-03-15]http://news.wugu.com.cn/article/52525_3.html.
[38]陈锡文.发展家庭农场不能硬赶农民走[J].当代农机,2013(7):9.
[39]约翰·罗尔斯.正义论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1988.
(1)法国历史学家布罗代尔在研究商业发展史时,发现初期的资本主义制度好像生活在与世隔绝的“钟罩”里,无法扩张到整个社会。其后,秘鲁经济学家德·索托将这种市场经济被种种社会因素所阻断的制度安排称之为“布罗代尔钟罩”。本文取其形,而赋其全新的理论内核。
[2]黄忠华,杜雪君,虞晓芬.地权诉求、宅基地流转与农村劳动力转移[J].公共管理学报,2016(3):51-59.
[3]冀县卿,钱忠好.如何有针对性地促进农地经营权流转?——基于苏、桂、鄂、黑四省(区)99村、896户农户调查数据的实证分析[J].管理世界,2018(3):87-97.
[4]王常伟,顾海英.城镇住房、农地依赖与农户承包权退出[J].管理世界,2016(9):55-69.
[5]张建,冯淑怡,诸培新.政府干预农地流转市场会加剧农村内部收入差距吗?——基于江苏省四个县的调研[J].公共管理学报,2017(1):104-116.
[6]王振坡,梅林,詹卉.产权、市场及其绩效:我国农村土地制度变革探讨[J].农业经济问题,2015(4):44-50.
[7]李宁,陈利根,龙开胜.农村宅基地产权制度研究——不完全产权与主体行为关系的分析视角[J].公共管理学报,2014(1):39-54.
[8]罗必良.科斯定理:反思与拓展——兼论中国农地流转制度改革与选择[J].经济研究,2017(11):178-193.
[9]吴一恒,徐砾,马贤磊.农地“三权分置”制度实施潜在风险与完善措施——基于产权配置与产权公共域视角[J].中国农村经济,2018(8):46-63.
[10]段力,傅鸿源.地票模式与农村集体建设用地流转制度的案例研究[J].公共管理学报,2011(2):86-92.
[11]周靖祥,陆铭.内地农村土地流转何去何从?——重庆实践的启示[J].公共管理学报,2011(4):85-95.
[12]翁士洪.农村土地流转政策的执行偏差——对小岗村的实证分析[J].公共管理学报,2012(1):17-24.
[13]黄忠怀,邱佳敏.政府干预土地集中流转:条件、策略与风险[J].中国农村观察,2016(2):34-44.
[14]黄增付.土地经营权流转与乡村秩序整合[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2018(1):94-105.
[15]马流辉.“脱嵌”的土地流转——实现机制与社会效应[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版),2015(5):159-165.
[16]张建雷,王会.土地的道义经济:农村土地流转问题再认识——基于安徽省L村的实证调查[J].学术论坛,2014(5):108-113.
[17]贺雪峰.论农地经营的规模——以安徽繁昌调研为基础的讨论[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2011(6):6-14.
[18]贺雪峰.农业问题还是农民问题?[J].社会科学,2015(6):64-77.
[19]道格拉斯·C·诺斯.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海:上海三联出版社,2008.
[20]思拉恩·埃格特森.经济行为与制度[M].北京:商务印书馆,1996.
[21] ALFORD R,FRIEDLAND R. Powers of Theory:Capitalism,the State and Democracy[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1985.
[22] FRIEDLAND R,ALFORD R. Bringing Society Back In:Symbols,Practices and Institutional Contradictions[M]. Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1991.
[23]周雪光,艾云.多重逻辑下的制度变迁:一个分析框架[J].中国社会科学,2010(4):132-150.
[24]谭海波,赵雪娇.“回应式创新”:多重制度逻辑下的政府组织变迁——以广东省J市行政服务中心的创建过程为例[J].公共管理学报,2016,13(4):16-29.
[25]波兰尼.大转型:我们时代的政治与经济起源[M].杭州:浙江人民出版社,2007.
[26]斯科特.农民的道义经济学[M].南京:译林出版社,2013.
[27]费孝通.乡土中国[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2006.
[28]孙立平.“关系”、社会关系与社会结构[J].社会学研究,1996(5):20-30.
[29]刘圣中,王晨.浮动的保障线:农村低保政策的变通执行[J].农村经济,2016(9):84-90.
[30]刘鹏,刘志鹏.街头官僚政策变通执行的类型及其解释——基于对H县食品安全监管执法的案例研[J].中国行政管理,2014(5):101-105.
[31]周雪光.从“黄宗羲定律”到帝国的逻辑:中国国家治理逻辑的历史线索[J].开放时代,2014(4):108-132.
[32]钟兴菊.地方性知识与政策执行成效——环境政策地方实践的双重话语分析[J].公共管理学报,2017(1):38-48.
[33]斐迪南·滕尼斯.共同体与社会[M].北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[34]贺雪峰.农业问题还是农民问题?[J].社会科学,2015(6):64-77.
[35]罗必良.农地经营规模的效率决定[J].中国农村观察,2000(5):18-24.
[36]毛丹.村落共同体的当代命运:四个观察维度社会学研究[J]. 2010(1):1-32.
[37]贺雪峰.政府不应该支持资本和大户去打败小农[EB/OL].(2013-05-17)[2017-03-15]http://news.wugu.com.cn/article/52525_3.html.
[38]陈锡文.发展家庭农场不能硬赶农民走[J].当代农机,2013(7):9.
[39]约翰·罗尔斯.正义论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1988.
(1)法国历史学家布罗代尔在研究商业发展史时,发现初期的资本主义制度好像生活在与世隔绝的“钟罩”里,无法扩张到整个社会。其后,秘鲁经济学家德·索托将这种市场经济被种种社会因素所阻断的制度安排称之为“布罗代尔钟罩”。本文取其形,而赋其全新的理论内核。