基层维稳实践中的“规范化”形态与非正式治理——以信访专项救助资金的运作实践为例
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摘要
当代中国经济发展与社会变迁过程中出现的各类矛盾使社会稳定成为愈发重要的议题。具体到基层治理过程中,维护稳定的政策目标通常被具体化为"降低信访总量"的核心要求。基层政府在定量考核压力之下,时常以物质补偿作为上访人停止上访的交换条件,即"物质安抚"的维稳策略。论文以此类物质安抚策略作为切入点,讨论其如何被"信访专项救助资金"及附带的各类规范文件与审批流程加以巩固,在外观上呈现更为科层化、规范化与标准化的特征,并通过实证案例分析发现,上述规范化特征对于基层政府治理行为而言,仅限于形式上的变化,并未在实质上使基层政府行为转向科层理性。在信访专项救助资金运行过程中,规则或制度存在的意义并非约束裁量权,反而在于减少基层维稳过程中自由裁量的成本与风险,其中体现了基层政府具体手段的调整而非治理观念的变革。
Grievances and conflicts have made social stability a critical issue in contemporary China,and local governments,especially grassroots local governments are facing increasingly serious bureaucracy pressure of"maintaining social stability",which means to keep protesters or petitioners from reaching out to higher authorities. As dealing with petitioning becomes part of daily routine,a flexible,informal strategy of"material pacification"is widely used by local governments,that is,to negotiate with petitioners,encouraging them to trade off legal rights or claims for economic interests.Empirical analysis shows that the government enjoys much flexibility and unchecked discretion during this material pacification process. In recent years,however,a special fund to"help petitioners in economic difficulties"has been developed and widely adopted,as a more"institutionalized"way to pacify petitioners with material interests.This special fund comes with a certain set of rules,documents and procedures,andexhibits some features of bureaucracy rationality,while case studies in this paper reveals that these"standardization"or"bureaucratic"inclinations turn out to be little more than exterior changes. Looking at the larger picture,it is easy to discover that informal practices have gradually been replaced with institutional,bureaucratic setups in transitional China's policy process. The special fund discussed above,like many similar policy designs,does reflect some kind of instrumentalist rationality on the one hand but fails to curve local discretion on the other,and both flexible,informal practices and those with bureaucratic features serve as adaptive policy instruments in China's policy process.
Grievances and conflicts have made social stability a critical issue in contemporary China,and local governments,especially grassroots local governments are facing increasingly serious bureaucracy pressure of"maintaining social stability",which means to keep protesters or petitioners from reaching out to higher authorities. As dealing with petitioning becomes part of daily routine,a flexible,informal strategy of"material pacification"is widely used by local governments,that is,to negotiate with petitioners,encouraging them to trade off legal rights or claims for economic interests.Empirical analysis shows that the government enjoys much flexibility and unchecked discretion during this material pacification process. In recent years,however,a special fund to"help petitioners in economic difficulties"has been developed and widely adopted,as a more"institutionalized"way to pacify petitioners with material interests.This special fund comes with a certain set of rules,documents and procedures,andexhibits some features of bureaucracy rationality,while case studies in this paper reveals that these"standardization"or"bureaucratic"inclinations turn out to be little more than exterior changes. Looking at the larger picture,it is easy to discover that informal practices have gradually been replaced with institutional,bureaucratic setups in transitional China's policy process. The special fund discussed above,like many similar policy designs,does reflect some kind of instrumentalist rationality on the one hand but fails to curve local discretion on the other,and both flexible,informal practices and those with bureaucratic features serve as adaptive policy instruments in China's policy process.
引文
蔡禾(2012).国家治理的有效性和合法性———对周雪光、冯仕政二文的再思考.开放时代,(2):135-143.
陈柏峰(2013).群体性涉法闹访及其法治.法制与社会发展,(4):17-28.
冯仕政(2013).当代中国的社会治理与政治秩序.北京:中国人民大学出版社.
冯仕政(2012).国家政权建设与新中国信访制度的形成及演变.社会学研究,(4):25-47.
冯仕政(2011).中国国家运动的形成与变异:基于政体的整体性解释.开放时代,(1):73-97.
何艳玲(2005).后单位制时期街区集体抗争的产生及其逻辑———对一次街区集体抗争事件的实证分析.公共管理学报,(3):36-41.
黄振辉(2011).表演式抗争:景观、挑战与发生机理———基于珠江三角洲典型案例研究.开放时代,(2):71-84.
景天魁(2009).底线公平:和谐社会的基础.北京:北京师范大学出版社.
李静君、张永宏(2012).制造同意:基层政府怎样吸纳民众的抗争.开放时代,(7):5-25.
吕德文(2012).媒介动员、钉子户与抗争政治:宜黄事件再分析.社会,(3):129-170.
欧阳静(2011).策略主义:桔镇运作的逻辑.北京:中国政法大学出版社.
秦小建(2011).压力型体制与基层信访的困境.经济社会体制比较,(6):147-153.
渠敬东(2012).项目制:一种新的国家治理体制.中国社会科学,(5):113-130.
渠敬东、周飞舟、应星(2009).从总体支配到技术治理———基于中国30年改革经验的社会学分析.中国社会科学,(6):104-127.
孙立平、晋军、应星(2010).以利益表达制度化实现社会长治久安.领导者,(33).
孙立平、郭于华(2000).“软硬兼施”:正式权力非正式运作的过程分析———华北B镇收粮的个案研究.清华社会学评论特辑.
谭琮(2013).农民维权活动的理法抗争及其理论解释:两起征地案例的启示.社会,(6):93-121.
田先红(2012).治理基层中国:桥镇信访博弈的叙事,1995-2009.北京:社会科学文献出版社.
肖唐镖(2014).信访政治的变迁及其改革.经济社会体制比较,(1):127-136.
应星(2012).信访救济:一种特殊的行政救济.载汪庆华、应星主编《中国基层行政争议解决机制的经验研究》.上海:上海三联书店.
应星(2011).“气”与抗争政治:当代中国乡村社会稳定问题研究.北京:社会科学文献出版社.
郑广怀(2010).劳工权益与安抚型国家:以珠江三角洲农民工为例.开放时代,(5):27-38.
折晓叶、陈婴婴(2011).项目制的分级运作机制和治理逻辑———对“项目进村”案例的社会学分析.中国社会科学,(4):126-148.
周黎安(2007).中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究.经济研究,(7):36-50.
Cai,Y.(2008).Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China.The ChinaQuarterly,193:24-42.
Cai,Y.(2006).State and Laid-off Workers in Refrom China:The Silence and Collective Action of theRetrenched.New York:Routledge.
Cai,Y.(2005).China's Moderate Middle Class:The Case of Homeowners'Resistance.Asian Survey,45(5):777-799.
Chen,X.(2008).Collective Petitioning and Institutional Conversion.In O'Brien,K.Ed.PopularProtest in China.Cambridge,Mass:Harvard University Press.
Geertz,C.(1983).Local Knowledge:Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology.Basic Books:167-234.
Heilman,S.&Perry,E.(2011).Mao's Invisible Hand:The Political Foundations of AdaptiveGovernance in China.MA:Harvard University Press.
Landry,P.(2008).Decentralized Authoritarianism in China:The Communist Party's Control of LocalElites in the Post-Mao Era.New York:Cambridge University Press.
Lee,C.K.(2007).Against the Law:Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt.Berkely:Universityof California Press.
Li,L.(2001).Support For Anti-corruption Campaigns in Rural China.Journal of ContemporaryChina,10(29):573-586.
Liebman,B.(2011a).A Return to Populist Legality?In Heilman,S.&Perry,E.Eds.Mao's InvisibleHand:The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China.MA:Harvard University Press.
Liebman,B.(2011b).A Populist Threat to China's Courts?In Woo,M.&Gallagher,M.Eds.ChineseJustice:Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China.
Lubman,S.(2002).A Bird in a Cage:Legal Reform in China after Mao.NJ:Stanford University Press.
Minzner,C.(2011).China's Turn Against Law.The American Journal of Comparative Law,59:935-984.
Minzner,C.(2006).Xinfang:Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions.Stanford Journal ofInternational Law:103-179.
Nathan,A.(2003).Authoritarian Resilience.Journal of Democracy,14(1):6-17.
O'Brien,K.&Li,L.(2006).Rightful Resistance in Rural China.New York:Cambridge UniversityPress.
O'Brien,K.&Li,L.(1999).Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China.Comparative Politics,31(2):167-186.
Pei,M.(2008).China's Trapped Transition:The Limits of Developmental Autocracy.Mass:HarvardUniversity Press.
Pieke,F.(2012).The Communist Party and Social Management in China.China Information,26(2):149-165.
Potter,P.(1999).The Chinese Legal System:Continuing Commitment to the Primacy of State Power.The China Quarterly,159:673-683.
Shambaugh,D.(2008).China's Communist Party:Atrophy and Adaptation.CA:University ofCalifornia Press.
Solinger,D.(1999).Contesting Citizenship in Urban China.Berkeley:University of California Press.
Weber,M.(1978).Economy and Society:An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.Berkeley:University ofCalifornia Press.
Zhou,X.(2010).The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China.ModernChina,36(1):47-78.
1例如,2012年12月的中共中央政治局会议强调“要下大决心改进作风,切实解决群众反映强烈的问题,始终保持同人民群众的血肉联系”。
1 例如,笔者调研的东部某省《信访专项救助资金使用规定》中明确规定资金使用在原则上应“个案化解,避免引起攀比”。
2 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
3 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
1 东部某省S县访谈记录,2012年7月。
2 东部某省S县访谈记录,2012年7月。
1例如《海口市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理暂行办法》《江苏省解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理办法》(苏财行[2010]4号)与《兰州市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理使用暂行办法》中的相关规定。
1 例如《海口市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理暂行办法》与《杭州市司法救助专项资金使用管理办法》。
2 在相关讨论中,财政转移支付的专项化趋势被认为与国家部门管理与治理目标的“项目化”过程密切相关。
3 例如《拉萨市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理实施细则》。
4 例如《陕西省省级解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理暂行办法》。
1 S县访谈记录,2013年1月。
2 S县访谈记录,2013年1月。
1 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
2 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
1 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
1 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
1可参见2014年中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发的《关于创新群众工作方法解决信访突出问题的意见》。
陈柏峰(2013).群体性涉法闹访及其法治.法制与社会发展,(4):17-28.
冯仕政(2013).当代中国的社会治理与政治秩序.北京:中国人民大学出版社.
冯仕政(2012).国家政权建设与新中国信访制度的形成及演变.社会学研究,(4):25-47.
冯仕政(2011).中国国家运动的形成与变异:基于政体的整体性解释.开放时代,(1):73-97.
何艳玲(2005).后单位制时期街区集体抗争的产生及其逻辑———对一次街区集体抗争事件的实证分析.公共管理学报,(3):36-41.
黄振辉(2011).表演式抗争:景观、挑战与发生机理———基于珠江三角洲典型案例研究.开放时代,(2):71-84.
景天魁(2009).底线公平:和谐社会的基础.北京:北京师范大学出版社.
李静君、张永宏(2012).制造同意:基层政府怎样吸纳民众的抗争.开放时代,(7):5-25.
吕德文(2012).媒介动员、钉子户与抗争政治:宜黄事件再分析.社会,(3):129-170.
欧阳静(2011).策略主义:桔镇运作的逻辑.北京:中国政法大学出版社.
秦小建(2011).压力型体制与基层信访的困境.经济社会体制比较,(6):147-153.
渠敬东(2012).项目制:一种新的国家治理体制.中国社会科学,(5):113-130.
渠敬东、周飞舟、应星(2009).从总体支配到技术治理———基于中国30年改革经验的社会学分析.中国社会科学,(6):104-127.
孙立平、晋军、应星(2010).以利益表达制度化实现社会长治久安.领导者,(33).
孙立平、郭于华(2000).“软硬兼施”:正式权力非正式运作的过程分析———华北B镇收粮的个案研究.清华社会学评论特辑.
谭琮(2013).农民维权活动的理法抗争及其理论解释:两起征地案例的启示.社会,(6):93-121.
田先红(2012).治理基层中国:桥镇信访博弈的叙事,1995-2009.北京:社会科学文献出版社.
肖唐镖(2014).信访政治的变迁及其改革.经济社会体制比较,(1):127-136.
应星(2012).信访救济:一种特殊的行政救济.载汪庆华、应星主编《中国基层行政争议解决机制的经验研究》.上海:上海三联书店.
应星(2011).“气”与抗争政治:当代中国乡村社会稳定问题研究.北京:社会科学文献出版社.
郑广怀(2010).劳工权益与安抚型国家:以珠江三角洲农民工为例.开放时代,(5):27-38.
折晓叶、陈婴婴(2011).项目制的分级运作机制和治理逻辑———对“项目进村”案例的社会学分析.中国社会科学,(4):126-148.
周黎安(2007).中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究.经济研究,(7):36-50.
Cai,Y.(2008).Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China.The ChinaQuarterly,193:24-42.
Cai,Y.(2006).State and Laid-off Workers in Refrom China:The Silence and Collective Action of theRetrenched.New York:Routledge.
Cai,Y.(2005).China's Moderate Middle Class:The Case of Homeowners'Resistance.Asian Survey,45(5):777-799.
Chen,X.(2008).Collective Petitioning and Institutional Conversion.In O'Brien,K.Ed.PopularProtest in China.Cambridge,Mass:Harvard University Press.
Geertz,C.(1983).Local Knowledge:Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology.Basic Books:167-234.
Heilman,S.&Perry,E.(2011).Mao's Invisible Hand:The Political Foundations of AdaptiveGovernance in China.MA:Harvard University Press.
Landry,P.(2008).Decentralized Authoritarianism in China:The Communist Party's Control of LocalElites in the Post-Mao Era.New York:Cambridge University Press.
Lee,C.K.(2007).Against the Law:Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt.Berkely:Universityof California Press.
Li,L.(2001).Support For Anti-corruption Campaigns in Rural China.Journal of ContemporaryChina,10(29):573-586.
Liebman,B.(2011a).A Return to Populist Legality?In Heilman,S.&Perry,E.Eds.Mao's InvisibleHand:The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China.MA:Harvard University Press.
Liebman,B.(2011b).A Populist Threat to China's Courts?In Woo,M.&Gallagher,M.Eds.ChineseJustice:Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China.
Lubman,S.(2002).A Bird in a Cage:Legal Reform in China after Mao.NJ:Stanford University Press.
Minzner,C.(2011).China's Turn Against Law.The American Journal of Comparative Law,59:935-984.
Minzner,C.(2006).Xinfang:Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions.Stanford Journal ofInternational Law:103-179.
Nathan,A.(2003).Authoritarian Resilience.Journal of Democracy,14(1):6-17.
O'Brien,K.&Li,L.(2006).Rightful Resistance in Rural China.New York:Cambridge UniversityPress.
O'Brien,K.&Li,L.(1999).Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China.Comparative Politics,31(2):167-186.
Pei,M.(2008).China's Trapped Transition:The Limits of Developmental Autocracy.Mass:HarvardUniversity Press.
Pieke,F.(2012).The Communist Party and Social Management in China.China Information,26(2):149-165.
Potter,P.(1999).The Chinese Legal System:Continuing Commitment to the Primacy of State Power.The China Quarterly,159:673-683.
Shambaugh,D.(2008).China's Communist Party:Atrophy and Adaptation.CA:University ofCalifornia Press.
Solinger,D.(1999).Contesting Citizenship in Urban China.Berkeley:University of California Press.
Weber,M.(1978).Economy and Society:An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.Berkeley:University ofCalifornia Press.
Zhou,X.(2010).The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China.ModernChina,36(1):47-78.
1例如,2012年12月的中共中央政治局会议强调“要下大决心改进作风,切实解决群众反映强烈的问题,始终保持同人民群众的血肉联系”。
1 例如,笔者调研的东部某省《信访专项救助资金使用规定》中明确规定资金使用在原则上应“个案化解,避免引起攀比”。
2 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
3 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
1 东部某省S县访谈记录,2012年7月。
2 东部某省S县访谈记录,2012年7月。
1例如《海口市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理暂行办法》《江苏省解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理办法》(苏财行[2010]4号)与《兰州市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理使用暂行办法》中的相关规定。
1 例如《海口市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理暂行办法》与《杭州市司法救助专项资金使用管理办法》。
2 在相关讨论中,财政转移支付的专项化趋势被认为与国家部门管理与治理目标的“项目化”过程密切相关。
3 例如《拉萨市解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理实施细则》。
4 例如《陕西省省级解决特殊疑难信访问题专项资金管理暂行办法》。
1 S县访谈记录,2013年1月。
2 S县访谈记录,2013年1月。
1 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
2 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
1 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
1 S县信访局内部资料,作者自行整理。
1可参见2014年中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发的《关于创新群众工作方法解决信访突出问题的意见》。