我国多次诉讼专利的基本特征与审判结果
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摘要
随着中国知识产权保护水平的提升,我国专利诉讼进入快速增长阶段,大量出现借助同一专利反复发起诉讼的情况。基于2000-2014年我国专利民事侵权诉讼数据,本文识别出发生过多次诉讼的专利,并进一步对其基本特征及诉讼结果进行了考察。研究表明:第一,与美国进入庭审阶段的多次诉讼发起人多为败诉不同,我国多次诉讼专利原告在进入庭审阶段后通常胜诉,尽管停止侵权诉求(取得市场禁令)更容易获得法院支持,但损害赔偿金额却未与多次诉讼产生显著的正相关性(表现为负相关)。第二,我国专利诉讼案件中大量使用了外观设计和实用新型专利,但在控制年度、产业、地区等变量后,发明专利被用于多次诉讼的倾向显著更高,这与总体诉讼样本中涉及发明的比重不高形成了鲜明反差。第三,多次诉讼专利具有地区和行业集中特征,东部出现多次诉讼专利的概率较小,制药、化学和生物技术领域产生多次诉讼专利的概率显著低于传统制造与机械行业。本文的实践应用价值和政策指向在于,通过对多次诉讼专利的分析为解决我国本土重复侵权、策略性商业维权以及可能的专利滥诉和司法逆向选择问题提供经验证据。
With the improvement of the intellectual property protection environment and the enhancement of entities' capacity in using the intellectual property system,the number of patent litigations in China continues to increase. Accompanying the surge of patent litigation,the issues of slack patent protection,high cost for rights protection as well as low cost of infringement are highlighted. Based on the first-instance data of patent civil litigation from 2000 to 2014,this paper defines the repeated litigated patent from the use of the same patent to initiate two (and above) litigations and eight (and above) litigations,respectively. Focusing on the impact of repeated litigated patents on the probability of winning for the plaintiff,the main conclusions are as followings.First,the improvement of China 's intellectual property protection intensity,especially the revision of the damage awards standard in the Patent Law,has pushed up the number of patent litigations and further led to significant growth in repeated litigated patents.Second,although a large number of design and utility models have been used in patent litigations,there are still invention patents experiencing repeated litigations. Furthermore,the repeated litigated patents appear more in case of invention patent when the year,industry as well as region fixed effects are controlled,which is totally different from the case of overall litigated patents.Third,at present,China's repeated litigated patents mainly occur between domestic entities,and are concentrated in the traditional manufacturing industries. The pharmaceutical,chemical,and semiconductor industries with frequent patent litigation internationally have not produced a large number of repeated litigatedpatents in China. The phenomenon that repeated litigated patents concentrating in software industry and business methods domain in United States are also not obvious in China. Meanwhile,China has not yet been affected by repeated malicious litigations issued by overseas entities.Fourth,compare to the case in the United State in which the plaintiff always lose for the repeated litigated patent trials,the plaintiff with the repeated litigated patent is more likely to win the trial in China,especially for the injunction trial. Possible infringements in the market can be suppressed,but the amount of damages has not been positively correlated with the repeated litigated status.Fifth,the probability of plaintiff's winning has significant regularity. The invention patent and the handling time have a negative correlation with the plaintiff's winning rate; the more the plaintiff initiated the lawsuit,the plaintiff is the enterprise,and the defendant is the non-enterprise,the plaintiff has a relatively higher winning rate. In addition,affected by the forum shopping effects,the plaintiff's winning rate is also closely related to the choice of the trial court.This paper holds that the phenomena of repeated litigated patents are likely to be the strategic commercial behavior of domestic innovative companies to protect their own market,via targeting at retailers (or batch counterfeiters). On the one hand,it is related to collective infringement and repeated infringement in the production and sales sections in the traditional manufacturing industry in China. On the other hand,it also reflects the inefficiency in the judicial litigation system caused by repeated litigated patents. A well-functioning system design relies on high-quality patent output,a complete patent objection and infringement monitoring system,and a judicial compensation amount that can generate sufficient deterrent effect. Among them,the high patent quality raises the threshold for infringers to imitate patented technology,the high litigation costs and high compensation amounts can deter potential infringements,while also preventing unrestricted patent litigation. However,the repeated litigated patent litigations have undermined the formation of these mechanisms.The high-sue rate cases for the same patent frequently initiated in the Chinese patent civil litigation field indicate that the dispute itself is not ambiguous,and even no special procedures,techniques and knowledge are needed to judge the fault and breach of contract liability. In theory,the plaintiff will resort to the court only if he or she has a greater degree of confidence in his or her victory; when there is insufficient confidence in the judicial process,or the execution cost is too high,the plaintiff often does not resort to the court,and thus forms the adverse selection in the process of judicial case trial. When the adverse selection effect occurs,the plaintiff in some dispute cases may lose the trust for the national judicial system,and further promotes the strategic"knock-and-roll"behavior (the local strategic litigation behavior in China shows the feature of lower requirements for damages and using low-quality patents to exercise blackmail). Undoubtedly,this will also cause manufacturing companies to be affected by infringement charging,which in turn affects normal production and operation activities.Based on those empirical evidences,this paper proposes to strengthen the investigation and analysis of repeated litigation behaviors,and prevent a large number of repeated litigated patent cases,especially low-quality patent cases from flooding into the national judicial system,and formulating effective countermeasures. The first is to establish a unified handling mechanism for repeated litigated patent cases,improve the efficiency of handling similar cases,improve the trial jurisdiction system of professional intellectual property courts,and enhance the consistency of trial results. The second is to strengthen the effective connection between judicial and administrative patent enforcement,avoid the emergence of judicial adverse selection,actively adopt administrative means to effectively combat repeated infringement and malicious infringement,and steadily improve the actual amount of damages. The third is to vigorously cultivate professional market rights protection institutions,improve the arbitration mediation system,and build a four-in-one intellectual property dispute resolution mechanism including the judiciary,government,market as well as society,and create an institutional environment and market environment that is more comprehensive and more conducive to promote innovation.
With the improvement of the intellectual property protection environment and the enhancement of entities' capacity in using the intellectual property system,the number of patent litigations in China continues to increase. Accompanying the surge of patent litigation,the issues of slack patent protection,high cost for rights protection as well as low cost of infringement are highlighted. Based on the first-instance data of patent civil litigation from 2000 to 2014,this paper defines the repeated litigated patent from the use of the same patent to initiate two (and above) litigations and eight (and above) litigations,respectively. Focusing on the impact of repeated litigated patents on the probability of winning for the plaintiff,the main conclusions are as followings.First,the improvement of China 's intellectual property protection intensity,especially the revision of the damage awards standard in the Patent Law,has pushed up the number of patent litigations and further led to significant growth in repeated litigated patents.Second,although a large number of design and utility models have been used in patent litigations,there are still invention patents experiencing repeated litigations. Furthermore,the repeated litigated patents appear more in case of invention patent when the year,industry as well as region fixed effects are controlled,which is totally different from the case of overall litigated patents.Third,at present,China's repeated litigated patents mainly occur between domestic entities,and are concentrated in the traditional manufacturing industries. The pharmaceutical,chemical,and semiconductor industries with frequent patent litigation internationally have not produced a large number of repeated litigatedpatents in China. The phenomenon that repeated litigated patents concentrating in software industry and business methods domain in United States are also not obvious in China. Meanwhile,China has not yet been affected by repeated malicious litigations issued by overseas entities.Fourth,compare to the case in the United State in which the plaintiff always lose for the repeated litigated patent trials,the plaintiff with the repeated litigated patent is more likely to win the trial in China,especially for the injunction trial. Possible infringements in the market can be suppressed,but the amount of damages has not been positively correlated with the repeated litigated status.Fifth,the probability of plaintiff's winning has significant regularity. The invention patent and the handling time have a negative correlation with the plaintiff's winning rate; the more the plaintiff initiated the lawsuit,the plaintiff is the enterprise,and the defendant is the non-enterprise,the plaintiff has a relatively higher winning rate. In addition,affected by the forum shopping effects,the plaintiff's winning rate is also closely related to the choice of the trial court.This paper holds that the phenomena of repeated litigated patents are likely to be the strategic commercial behavior of domestic innovative companies to protect their own market,via targeting at retailers (or batch counterfeiters). On the one hand,it is related to collective infringement and repeated infringement in the production and sales sections in the traditional manufacturing industry in China. On the other hand,it also reflects the inefficiency in the judicial litigation system caused by repeated litigated patents. A well-functioning system design relies on high-quality patent output,a complete patent objection and infringement monitoring system,and a judicial compensation amount that can generate sufficient deterrent effect. Among them,the high patent quality raises the threshold for infringers to imitate patented technology,the high litigation costs and high compensation amounts can deter potential infringements,while also preventing unrestricted patent litigation. However,the repeated litigated patent litigations have undermined the formation of these mechanisms.The high-sue rate cases for the same patent frequently initiated in the Chinese patent civil litigation field indicate that the dispute itself is not ambiguous,and even no special procedures,techniques and knowledge are needed to judge the fault and breach of contract liability. In theory,the plaintiff will resort to the court only if he or she has a greater degree of confidence in his or her victory; when there is insufficient confidence in the judicial process,or the execution cost is too high,the plaintiff often does not resort to the court,and thus forms the adverse selection in the process of judicial case trial. When the adverse selection effect occurs,the plaintiff in some dispute cases may lose the trust for the national judicial system,and further promotes the strategic"knock-and-roll"behavior (the local strategic litigation behavior in China shows the feature of lower requirements for damages and using low-quality patents to exercise blackmail). Undoubtedly,this will also cause manufacturing companies to be affected by infringement charging,which in turn affects normal production and operation activities.Based on those empirical evidences,this paper proposes to strengthen the investigation and analysis of repeated litigation behaviors,and prevent a large number of repeated litigated patent cases,especially low-quality patent cases from flooding into the national judicial system,and formulating effective countermeasures. The first is to establish a unified handling mechanism for repeated litigated patent cases,improve the efficiency of handling similar cases,improve the trial jurisdiction system of professional intellectual property courts,and enhance the consistency of trial results. The second is to strengthen the effective connection between judicial and administrative patent enforcement,avoid the emergence of judicial adverse selection,actively adopt administrative means to effectively combat repeated infringement and malicious infringement,and steadily improve the actual amount of damages. The third is to vigorously cultivate professional market rights protection institutions,improve the arbitration mediation system,and build a four-in-one intellectual property dispute resolution mechanism including the judiciary,government,market as well as society,and create an institutional environment and market environment that is more comprehensive and more conducive to promote innovation.
引文
[1]毛昊,尹志锋,张锦.策略性专利诉讼模式:基于非专利实施体多次诉讼的研究[J].中国工业经济,2017(2):136-153.Mao Hao,Yin Zhifeng,Zhang Jin.Strategic patent litigation model:Research based on non-practicing entities and repeated litigation[J].China Industrial Economics,2017(2):136-153.
[2]张米尔,国伟,李海鹏.专利诉讼的网络分析及主体类型研究[J].科研管理,2016,37(6):127-133.Zhang Mier,Guo Wei,Li Haipeng.Network analysis and subject type study of patent litigations[J].Science Research Management,2016,37(6):127-133.
[3]袁晓东,谢伟峰.通讯行业专利诉讼倾向研究[J].科研管理,2016,37(5):70-77.Yuan Xiaodong,Xie Weifeng.A research on the patent litigation propensity of patent holders in the telecommunication industry[J].Science Research Management,2016,37(5):70-77.
[4]贺宁馨,袁晓东.我国专利侵权损害赔偿制度有效性的实证研究[J].科研管理,2012(4):124-130.He Ningxin,Yuan Xiaodong.The effectiveness about the compesation system for the patent infringement damage in China[J].Science Research Management,2012(4):124-130.
[5]尹志锋,梁正.我国专利侵权诉讼赔偿额的影响因素分析[J].中国软科学,2015(12):12-24.Yin Zhifeng,Liang Zheng.The analysis on the determinants of patent infringement awards[J].China Soft Science,2015(12):12-24.
[6]Long C X,Wang J.Judicial local protectionism in China:An empirical study of IP cases[J].International Review of Law&Economics,2015,42:48-59.
[7]Allison J R,Lemley M A,Walker J.Extreme value or trolls on top?The characteristics of the most litigated patents[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2009,158(1):1-37.
[8]Mazzeo M J,Hillel J,Zyontz S.Explaining the“unpredictable”:An empirical analysis of U.S.patent infringement awards[J].International Review of Law&Economics,2013,35:58-72.
[9]张冬.创新视阈下知识产权运营商业化的风险控制[J].知识产权,2015(6):73-77.Zhang Dong.The risk control over intellectual property operation commercialization[J].Intellectual Property,2015(6):73-77.
[10]Lemley,M A.Rational ignorance at the patent office[J].Northwestern University Law Review,2001,95(4).
[11]Lanjouw J O,Schankerman M.Characteristics of patent litigation:A window on competition[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2001,32(1):129-51.
[12]Allison J,Lemley M,Moore K,et al.Valuable patents[J].Georgetown Law Journal,2004(92):435.
[13]Weatherall K,Webster E.Patent enforcement:A review of the literature[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,2014,28(2):312-343.
[14]Allison J,Lemley M,Walker J.Patent quality and settlement among repeat patent litigants[J].Georgetown Law Journal,2011,99:677-712.
[15]Moore K A.Forum shopping in patent cases:Does geographic choice affect innovation?[J].North Carolina Law Review,2001,79:889-938.
[16]Atkinson S E,Marco A C,Turner J L.The economics of a centralized judiciary:Uniformity,forum shopping,and the federal circuit[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2009,52(3):411-443.
[17]张维迎,柯荣住.诉讼过程中的逆向选择及其解释---以契约纠纷的基层法院判决书为例的经验研究[J].中国社会科学,2002(2):31-43.Zhang Weiying,Ke Rongzhu.Reverse choice in lawsuits and its explanation---An empirical study of written judgments on contract disputes by a grassroots court[J].Social Sciences in China,2002,(2):31-43.
(1)本文的胜诉是指原告所提出的包括“停止侵权”、“损害赔偿”、“赔礼道歉”、“支付合理费用”等在内的全部或部分主张获得法院支持。
(2)美国联合专利组织(Unified Patents)的数据显示,2012年以来的13,000件专利诉讼案件中,约有12%的案件在诉诸法庭的同时涉及专利的复审无效请求。
(1)由于2000-2004年收录的案件比较少,本文将这几年的案件统一归为2004年。
(2)一审数据与立案数据存在较大差距。官方统计口径的立案数据存在大量的和解案件,和解案件在程序上具有保密要求,涉案细节不予公布。
(3)本文划分产业的步骤为:第一,根据专利本身的信息,包括IPC号及专利申请文件来进行确认。专利说明文件一般会对该专利的适用范围和产品行业进行说明。第二,依据原被告的名称判断涉及的行业,以及通过原被告的官网、公司年报获得产业信息。
(4)是否支持侵权赔偿为0-1变量,只要判定被告支付赔偿,不管其是大于还是小于原告索要赔偿,统一记为1,反之为0.
(5)本文统计数据表明:2次以上的多次诉讼样本中,涉及外观设计案件1109件、实用新型案件370件、发明专利案件251件,占比分别为64.1%、21.39%和14.51%;8次以上的多次诉讼样本中,涉及外观设计案件350件、实用新型案件126件、发明专利案件57件,占比分别为65.67%、23.64%和10.69%。其中,使用单件专利发起2次以上诉讼的外观设计303件、实用新型102件、发明77件;使用单件专利发起8次以上诉讼的外观设计24件、实用新型9件、发明4件。
(1)限于篇幅考虑,表2中没有没列示年份、地区变量的回归结果。
(1)在此方面,张维迎和柯荣住[17]以北京某基层法院的契约纠纷判决书为研究对象,通过对原被告的胜诉情况、违约原因及其裁决等方面的分析,解释了司法逆向选择效应。作者发现,导致诉讼的原因一般不是因为契约的模糊性。相反,故意违约并引发诉讼成为主要的策略性选择。
(2)赔偿的理想状态是既使权利人的实际损失得到弥补,又不能使权利人额外获益。赔偿毕竟以弥补实际损失为基本目的,不能因不适当的惩罚性赔偿使权利人额外得利。过高损害赔偿而产生的额外获利同样有违公平。
[2]张米尔,国伟,李海鹏.专利诉讼的网络分析及主体类型研究[J].科研管理,2016,37(6):127-133.Zhang Mier,Guo Wei,Li Haipeng.Network analysis and subject type study of patent litigations[J].Science Research Management,2016,37(6):127-133.
[3]袁晓东,谢伟峰.通讯行业专利诉讼倾向研究[J].科研管理,2016,37(5):70-77.Yuan Xiaodong,Xie Weifeng.A research on the patent litigation propensity of patent holders in the telecommunication industry[J].Science Research Management,2016,37(5):70-77.
[4]贺宁馨,袁晓东.我国专利侵权损害赔偿制度有效性的实证研究[J].科研管理,2012(4):124-130.He Ningxin,Yuan Xiaodong.The effectiveness about the compesation system for the patent infringement damage in China[J].Science Research Management,2012(4):124-130.
[5]尹志锋,梁正.我国专利侵权诉讼赔偿额的影响因素分析[J].中国软科学,2015(12):12-24.Yin Zhifeng,Liang Zheng.The analysis on the determinants of patent infringement awards[J].China Soft Science,2015(12):12-24.
[6]Long C X,Wang J.Judicial local protectionism in China:An empirical study of IP cases[J].International Review of Law&Economics,2015,42:48-59.
[7]Allison J R,Lemley M A,Walker J.Extreme value or trolls on top?The characteristics of the most litigated patents[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2009,158(1):1-37.
[8]Mazzeo M J,Hillel J,Zyontz S.Explaining the“unpredictable”:An empirical analysis of U.S.patent infringement awards[J].International Review of Law&Economics,2013,35:58-72.
[9]张冬.创新视阈下知识产权运营商业化的风险控制[J].知识产权,2015(6):73-77.Zhang Dong.The risk control over intellectual property operation commercialization[J].Intellectual Property,2015(6):73-77.
[10]Lemley,M A.Rational ignorance at the patent office[J].Northwestern University Law Review,2001,95(4).
[11]Lanjouw J O,Schankerman M.Characteristics of patent litigation:A window on competition[J].Rand Journal of Economics,2001,32(1):129-51.
[12]Allison J,Lemley M,Moore K,et al.Valuable patents[J].Georgetown Law Journal,2004(92):435.
[13]Weatherall K,Webster E.Patent enforcement:A review of the literature[J].Journal of Economic Surveys,2014,28(2):312-343.
[14]Allison J,Lemley M,Walker J.Patent quality and settlement among repeat patent litigants[J].Georgetown Law Journal,2011,99:677-712.
[15]Moore K A.Forum shopping in patent cases:Does geographic choice affect innovation?[J].North Carolina Law Review,2001,79:889-938.
[16]Atkinson S E,Marco A C,Turner J L.The economics of a centralized judiciary:Uniformity,forum shopping,and the federal circuit[J].Journal of Law and Economics,2009,52(3):411-443.
[17]张维迎,柯荣住.诉讼过程中的逆向选择及其解释---以契约纠纷的基层法院判决书为例的经验研究[J].中国社会科学,2002(2):31-43.Zhang Weiying,Ke Rongzhu.Reverse choice in lawsuits and its explanation---An empirical study of written judgments on contract disputes by a grassroots court[J].Social Sciences in China,2002,(2):31-43.
(1)本文的胜诉是指原告所提出的包括“停止侵权”、“损害赔偿”、“赔礼道歉”、“支付合理费用”等在内的全部或部分主张获得法院支持。
(2)美国联合专利组织(Unified Patents)的数据显示,2012年以来的13,000件专利诉讼案件中,约有12%的案件在诉诸法庭的同时涉及专利的复审无效请求。
(1)由于2000-2004年收录的案件比较少,本文将这几年的案件统一归为2004年。
(2)一审数据与立案数据存在较大差距。官方统计口径的立案数据存在大量的和解案件,和解案件在程序上具有保密要求,涉案细节不予公布。
(3)本文划分产业的步骤为:第一,根据专利本身的信息,包括IPC号及专利申请文件来进行确认。专利说明文件一般会对该专利的适用范围和产品行业进行说明。第二,依据原被告的名称判断涉及的行业,以及通过原被告的官网、公司年报获得产业信息。
(4)是否支持侵权赔偿为0-1变量,只要判定被告支付赔偿,不管其是大于还是小于原告索要赔偿,统一记为1,反之为0.
(5)本文统计数据表明:2次以上的多次诉讼样本中,涉及外观设计案件1109件、实用新型案件370件、发明专利案件251件,占比分别为64.1%、21.39%和14.51%;8次以上的多次诉讼样本中,涉及外观设计案件350件、实用新型案件126件、发明专利案件57件,占比分别为65.67%、23.64%和10.69%。其中,使用单件专利发起2次以上诉讼的外观设计303件、实用新型102件、发明77件;使用单件专利发起8次以上诉讼的外观设计24件、实用新型9件、发明4件。
(1)限于篇幅考虑,表2中没有没列示年份、地区变量的回归结果。
(1)在此方面,张维迎和柯荣住[17]以北京某基层法院的契约纠纷判决书为研究对象,通过对原被告的胜诉情况、违约原因及其裁决等方面的分析,解释了司法逆向选择效应。作者发现,导致诉讼的原因一般不是因为契约的模糊性。相反,故意违约并引发诉讼成为主要的策略性选择。
(2)赔偿的理想状态是既使权利人的实际损失得到弥补,又不能使权利人额外获益。赔偿毕竟以弥补实际损失为基本目的,不能因不适当的惩罚性赔偿使权利人额外得利。过高损害赔偿而产生的额外获利同样有违公平。