不同产权性质下管理层能力与企业融资约束
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  • 英文篇名:Managerial Ability and Corporate Financial Constraints Under Different Property Rights
  • 作者:倪国爱 ; 石凯学
  • 英文作者:NI Guo-ai;SHI Kai-xue;School of Accounting ,Tongling University;School of Accounting ,Anhui University of Finance & Economics;
  • 关键词:管理层能力 ; 产权性质 ; 融资约束 ; 企业融资
  • 英文关键词:managerial ability;;property rights;;financial constraints;;corporate financial
  • 中文刊名:ZZHK
  • 英文刊名:Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics
  • 机构:铜陵学院会计学院;安徽财经大学会计学院;
  • 出版日期:2018-02-26
  • 出版单位:郑州航空工业管理学院学报
  • 年:2018
  • 期:v.36;No.151
  • 基金:安徽财经大学与铜陵学院联合培养科研创新基金(2017tlxylhy04);; 安徽财经大学科研创新基金项目(ACYC2016186)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:ZZHK201801009
  • 页数:11
  • CN:01
  • ISSN:41-1200/V
  • 分类号:92-102
摘要
在现实经济活动中,企业普遍面临着融资约束问题的困扰。企业融资约束主要源于企业内外部的信息不对称和代理问题,管理层能力可以在一定程度上降低企业内外部的信息不对称,并能够减少在职消费等引起的代理问题。实证检验表明,管理层能力与企业融资约束显著负相关,管理层能力可以缓解融资约束问题;管理层能力对不同产权性质的企业融资约束的影响存在差异,具体来说,相较于国有企业,管理层能力对非国有企业融资约束的负向影响更加显著。
        Adequate capital flow is an important guarantee for enterprises to achieve different levels of objectives. However,many listed companies are confronted with narrow financing channels and single financing methods,which makes enterprises face different degree of financing constraints. Therefore,it is important to study the factors that alleviate this problem. This paper examines the impact of managerial ability on the financing constraints of A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from the year 2010 to 2015,and examines the differences in the impact of different property rights managerial ability on financing constraints. The results show that managerial ability is negatively correlated with corporate finance constraints,and managerial ability can alleviate the problem of financing constraints. There are differences in the impact of managerial ability on corporate financing constraints of different property rights. Specifically,the managerial ability has a more significant impact on the financing constraints of non-state enterprises than the state-owned enterprises.
引文
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