管理层能力与产能过剩行业并购绩效关系研究
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摘要
本文以2010年—2017年A股产能过剩上市公司为样本,考察了管理层能力与产能过剩行业并购绩效之间的关系。研究结果表明:企业并购能够提升企业绩效,并购是解决产能过剩问题的有效途径;管理层能力是提高产能过剩行业并购绩效的关键因素,管理层能力越强,并购绩效越高。为通过并购化解企业面临的产能危机,企业应不断选拔聘任优质的管理人员来开展企业并购活动。
The relationship between the management ability and the M&A performance of the overcapacity industry was investigated in the sample of the listed companies with excess capacity from 2010 to 2017. The results show that m&a can improve enterprise performance,and m&a is an effective way to solve the problem of excess capacity. Management ability is the key factor to improve the m&a performance of the industry with excess capacity. The stronger the management ability,the higher the m&a performance. In order to solve the capacity crisis that the enterprises face through mergers and acquisitions,the enterprises should constantly select and employ high-quality managers to conduct mergers and acquisitions.
The relationship between the management ability and the M&A performance of the overcapacity industry was investigated in the sample of the listed companies with excess capacity from 2010 to 2017. The results show that m&a can improve enterprise performance,and m&a is an effective way to solve the problem of excess capacity. Management ability is the key factor to improve the m&a performance of the industry with excess capacity. The stronger the management ability,the higher the m&a performance. In order to solve the capacity crisis that the enterprises face through mergers and acquisitions,the enterprises should constantly select and employ high-quality managers to conduct mergers and acquisitions.
引文
[1]杨帅羽,何洪金,戴志祥.政府补贴、国企国有化系数与中国企业的产能过剩[J].经济数学,2015(2):70-75.
[2]张晓明,宫巨宏.我国上市公司并购绩效影响因素综述[J].财经问题研究,2016(6):3-5.
[3]Roll R..The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers[J].The Journal of Businese,1986,59(2):197-216.
[4]赵息,张西栓.内部控制、高管权力与并购绩效---来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2013(2):75-81.
[5]Demerjian P.R.,Lev B.,Mc Vay S..Quantifying Managerial Ability:A New Measure and Validation Tests[J].Managerial Science,2012,58(7):109-147.
[6]谢建,唐国平,项雨柔.管理层能力、产权性质与企业避税[J].江西财经大学学报,2016(2):42-59.
[7]Kamien M.I.,Schwartz N.L..Uncertain Entry and Excess Capacity[J].American Economic Review,1972,62(5):918-927.
[8]余东华,吕逸楠.政府不当干预与战略性新兴产业产能过剩---以中国光伏为例[J].中国工业经济,2015(10):53-68.
[9]徐虹,林钟高,芮晨.产品市场竞争、资产专用性与上市公司横向并购[J].南开管理评论,2015(3):48-59.
[10]刘笑萍,黄晓薇,郭红玉.产业周期、并购类型与并购绩效的实证研究[J].金融研究,2009(3):135-153.
[11]古家军,胡蓓.企业高层管理团队特征异质性对战略决策的影响---基于中国民营企业的实证研究[J].管理工程学报,2008,22(3):30-35.
[12]王艳,阚铄.企业文化与并购绩效[J].管理世界,2014,30(11):146-157,163.
[13]安然.并购绩效与信息不对称---基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2015,30(6):86-95.
(1)刘笑萍、黄晓薇和郭红玉选取-240天和-41天;王艳和阚铄选取-150天到-30天;安然选取-60天到-10天。
(2)刘笑萍、黄晓薇和郭红玉选取-25天和20天;王艳和阚铄选取-1天到1天;安然选取-5天到5天。
[2]张晓明,宫巨宏.我国上市公司并购绩效影响因素综述[J].财经问题研究,2016(6):3-5.
[3]Roll R..The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers[J].The Journal of Businese,1986,59(2):197-216.
[4]赵息,张西栓.内部控制、高管权力与并购绩效---来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2013(2):75-81.
[5]Demerjian P.R.,Lev B.,Mc Vay S..Quantifying Managerial Ability:A New Measure and Validation Tests[J].Managerial Science,2012,58(7):109-147.
[6]谢建,唐国平,项雨柔.管理层能力、产权性质与企业避税[J].江西财经大学学报,2016(2):42-59.
[7]Kamien M.I.,Schwartz N.L..Uncertain Entry and Excess Capacity[J].American Economic Review,1972,62(5):918-927.
[8]余东华,吕逸楠.政府不当干预与战略性新兴产业产能过剩---以中国光伏为例[J].中国工业经济,2015(10):53-68.
[9]徐虹,林钟高,芮晨.产品市场竞争、资产专用性与上市公司横向并购[J].南开管理评论,2015(3):48-59.
[10]刘笑萍,黄晓薇,郭红玉.产业周期、并购类型与并购绩效的实证研究[J].金融研究,2009(3):135-153.
[11]古家军,胡蓓.企业高层管理团队特征异质性对战略决策的影响---基于中国民营企业的实证研究[J].管理工程学报,2008,22(3):30-35.
[12]王艳,阚铄.企业文化与并购绩效[J].管理世界,2014,30(11):146-157,163.
[13]安然.并购绩效与信息不对称---基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2015,30(6):86-95.
(1)刘笑萍、黄晓薇和郭红玉选取-240天和-41天;王艳和阚铄选取-150天到-30天;安然选取-60天到-10天。
(2)刘笑萍、黄晓薇和郭红玉选取-25天和20天;王艳和阚铄选取-1天到1天;安然选取-5天到5天。