管理层能力、产权性质与创新投入——基于高技术上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
管理层人力资本的创新性和创造性是高技术企业可持续发展的重要支撑。基于管理者异质性视角,本文以2011～2017年沪深A股高技术上市公司为样本,研究了管理层能力对企业创新投入的影响,同时考察了产权性质差异下内外部治理因素对管理层能力与创新投入关系的调节作用。结果表明:管理层能力与创新投入负相关,在国有企业这种抑制作用更为突出;市场竞争可以有效缓解民营企业高能力管理者的风险规避行为,在国有企业影响则恰恰相反;薪酬激励在不同产权性质下均起到正向调节作用,股权激励效果并不明显;根据以上结论,给出相应对策建议。
The innovation and creativity of management are important supports for the sustainable development of high-tech enterprises. Based on the perspective of managerial heterogeneity,the high-tech listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Shares from 2011 to 2017 are sampled to study the influence of managerial ability on the company's innovation investment. This paper also examines the regulatory effects of internal and external governance factors on the relationship between managerial ability and innovation investment under the differences in property rights. The results show that the managerial ability inhibits the R&D investment of the enterprise,and the negative effect of the state-owned enterprise is more prominent; market competition can effectively mitigate the risk aversion behavior of the high-capacity managers of private enterprises,and the impact in state-owned enterprises is just the opposite; salary incentives plays a positive regulatory role under different property rights,but the effect of equity incentive is not obvious. Based on the above conclusions,corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are given.
The innovation and creativity of management are important supports for the sustainable development of high-tech enterprises. Based on the perspective of managerial heterogeneity,the high-tech listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-Shares from 2011 to 2017 are sampled to study the influence of managerial ability on the company's innovation investment. This paper also examines the regulatory effects of internal and external governance factors on the relationship between managerial ability and innovation investment under the differences in property rights. The results show that the managerial ability inhibits the R&D investment of the enterprise,and the negative effect of the state-owned enterprise is more prominent; market competition can effectively mitigate the risk aversion behavior of the high-capacity managers of private enterprises,and the impact in state-owned enterprises is just the opposite; salary incentives plays a positive regulatory role under different property rights,but the effect of equity incentive is not obvious. Based on the above conclusions,corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are given.
引文
[1]张钟文,叶银丹,许宪春.高技术产业发展对经济增长和促进就业的作用研究[J].统计研究,2017,34(7):37~48.
[2] Holmstrom B. Agency Cost and Innovation[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1989,12(3):305~327.
[3]杨风,李卿云.股权结构与研发投资——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016,37(2):123~135.
[4]毛其淋,许家云.政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响——基于补贴强度“适度区间”的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015,(6):94~107.
[5]简泽,谭利萍,吕大国,等.市场竞争的创造性、破坏性与技术升级[J].中国工业经济,2017,(5):16~34.
[6] Hambrick D C,Mason P A. Upper Echelons:The Organization As a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,1984,9(2):193~206.
[7]曾萍,邬绮虹.女性高管参与对企业技术创新的影响——基于创业板企业的实证研究[J].科学学研究,2012,(5):135~143.
[8]雷怀英,乔睿蕾.企业高管团队特征及其交互效应对技术创新的影响研究[J].软科学,2015,(1):60~64.
[9]何威风,刘巍,黄凯莉.管理者能力与企业风险承担[J].中国软科学,2016,(5):107~118.
[10]何威风,刘巍.企业管理者能力与审计收费[J].会计研究,2015,(1):82~89.
[11]李海涛.管理层能力对企业投资的影响及作用机制研究[D].北京:北京科技大学,2017.
[12]董晓庆,赵坚,袁朋伟.国有企业创新效率损失研究[J].中国工业经济,2014,(2):97~108.
[13]徐伟,张荣荣,周文梅.国有控股方治理机制、竞争环境与R&D投入[J].中国软科学,2017,(10):184~192.
[14] Chen L Y,Chen Y F,Yang S Y. Managerial Incentives and R&D Investments:The Moderating Effect of the Directors and Officers Liability Insurance[J]. North American Journal of Economics&Finance,2017,39:210~222.
[15] Demerjian P,Mcvay S. Quantifying Managerial Ability:A New Measure and Validity Tests[J]. Management Science,2012,58(7):1229~1248.
[16]邢立全,陈汉文.产品市场竞争、竞争地位与审计收费——基于代理成本与经营风险的双重考量[J].审计研究,2013,(3):50~58.
[2] Holmstrom B. Agency Cost and Innovation[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1989,12(3):305~327.
[3]杨风,李卿云.股权结构与研发投资——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016,37(2):123~135.
[4]毛其淋,许家云.政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响——基于补贴强度“适度区间”的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015,(6):94~107.
[5]简泽,谭利萍,吕大国,等.市场竞争的创造性、破坏性与技术升级[J].中国工业经济,2017,(5):16~34.
[6] Hambrick D C,Mason P A. Upper Echelons:The Organization As a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,1984,9(2):193~206.
[7]曾萍,邬绮虹.女性高管参与对企业技术创新的影响——基于创业板企业的实证研究[J].科学学研究,2012,(5):135~143.
[8]雷怀英,乔睿蕾.企业高管团队特征及其交互效应对技术创新的影响研究[J].软科学,2015,(1):60~64.
[9]何威风,刘巍,黄凯莉.管理者能力与企业风险承担[J].中国软科学,2016,(5):107~118.
[10]何威风,刘巍.企业管理者能力与审计收费[J].会计研究,2015,(1):82~89.
[11]李海涛.管理层能力对企业投资的影响及作用机制研究[D].北京:北京科技大学,2017.
[12]董晓庆,赵坚,袁朋伟.国有企业创新效率损失研究[J].中国工业经济,2014,(2):97~108.
[13]徐伟,张荣荣,周文梅.国有控股方治理机制、竞争环境与R&D投入[J].中国软科学,2017,(10):184~192.
[14] Chen L Y,Chen Y F,Yang S Y. Managerial Incentives and R&D Investments:The Moderating Effect of the Directors and Officers Liability Insurance[J]. North American Journal of Economics&Finance,2017,39:210~222.
[15] Demerjian P,Mcvay S. Quantifying Managerial Ability:A New Measure and Validity Tests[J]. Management Science,2012,58(7):1229~1248.
[16]邢立全,陈汉文.产品市场竞争、竞争地位与审计收费——基于代理成本与经营风险的双重考量[J].审计研究,2013,(3):50~58.