基于政府风险规避的公共基础设施项目激励监管模型
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摘要
针对公共基础设施建设项目中社会合作双方政府与社会主体全程参与、利益共享、风险分担的特点,研究了基于风险规避的政府激励与惩罚机制的设计问题.通过分析公共基础设施建设项目政府工作职能与任务,结合激励与监督并重的理念,提出了基于政府风险规避的委托代理激励监管模型.揭示了在信息不对称时,为获得公共基础设施建设项目效用最大化,社会主体的努力程度,成本系数,风险规避度,以及政府的监督强度等因素与激励程度的关系.
In this paper,we studies the design of the incentive and punishment based on government risk aversion with these characteristics of the government and social organizations:the whole process participation,benefit sharing and risk sharing in public infrastructure projects.By analyzing the functions and tasks of government work in public infrastructure projects,and combining with incentive and supervision,we put forward a principal-agent incentive and supervision model based on government risk aversion.The relationships are interested,including between the incentive degree and the factors,such as the maximum utility of public infrastructure projects,the effort degree of social organization,cost coefficient,risk aversion degree and the intensity of government supervision.
In this paper,we studies the design of the incentive and punishment based on government risk aversion with these characteristics of the government and social organizations:the whole process participation,benefit sharing and risk sharing in public infrastructure projects.By analyzing the functions and tasks of government work in public infrastructure projects,and combining with incentive and supervision,we put forward a principal-agent incentive and supervision model based on government risk aversion.The relationships are interested,including between the incentive degree and the factors,such as the maximum utility of public infrastructure projects,the effort degree of social organization,cost coefficient,risk aversion degree and the intensity of government supervision.
引文
[1]易欣.PPP轨道交通项目多任务委托代理监管激励机制[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2016,16(4):1-7.
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[4]陈通,全志才.PPP模式中不同理性人视角下激励监督机制研究[J].武汉理工大学学报:信息与管理工程版,2017,39(4):453-458.
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[7]陈星光.PPP项目融资模式下的委托代理博弈模型[J].科技与经济,2013,26(2):56-60.
[8]曹启龙,盛昭瀚.多任务目标视角下PPP项目激励问题与模型构建[J].软科学,2016,30(5):114-118.
[9]Cheng A P C,Chung E,Kajewski S.Factors Contributing to successful Public Private Partnership projects:Comparing Hong Kong with Australia and the United Kingdom[J].Journal of Facilities Management,2012,102(3):101-103.
[2]Liu J,Gao R,Cheah C Y J,et.al.Incentive mechanism for inhibiting investors'opportunistic behavior in PPP projects[J].International Journal of Project Management,2016,34(7):1102-1111.
[3]Li S,Cai H.Government incentive impacts on private investment behaviors under demand uncertainty[J].Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation eview,2017,101:115-129.
[4]陈通,全志才.PPP模式中不同理性人视角下激励监督机制研究[J].武汉理工大学学报:信息与管理工程版,2017,39(4):453-458.
[5]徐飞,宋波.公司合作制(PPP)项目的政府动态激励与监督机制[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(3):165-173.
[6]袁义淞,李腾.政府风险规避视角下的PPP模式委托代理模型研究[J].昆明理工大学学报,2015,42(1):118-120.
[7]陈星光.PPP项目融资模式下的委托代理博弈模型[J].科技与经济,2013,26(2):56-60.
[8]曹启龙,盛昭瀚.多任务目标视角下PPP项目激励问题与模型构建[J].软科学,2016,30(5):114-118.
[9]Cheng A P C,Chung E,Kajewski S.Factors Contributing to successful Public Private Partnership projects:Comparing Hong Kong with Australia and the United Kingdom[J].Journal of Facilities Management,2012,102(3):101-103.