隐性的秩序:董事会非正式层级研究述评及展望
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摘要
董事会非正式层级是董事会中因成员能力和影响力不同而形成的非正式结构,对成员互动产生影响。该领域研究对于揭示董事会治理效应的中间路径具有重要意义。不过,现有研究对其内涵的界定并不清晰,对其作用机制的理解也存在差异。通过评述相关文献,本研究首先从形成因素、层级秩序、结构特点三方面界定董事会非正式层级内涵,对其产生过程加以梳理。随后将非正式层级的作用机制归纳为权力距离观和关系契约观,并且比较二者在个体层面的差异性和群体层面的一致性,总结非正式层级正反两方面作用效果并构建理论框架。在此基础上,根据情境因素的特点区分外源性、内源性两类因素,并针对现有研究的不足进行展望。通过剖析隐性秩序对决策互动过程的深刻影响,进一步拓展了董事会研究由静态结构向动态过程深入的相关理论。
Board informal hierarchy, as an informal structure in the boardroom, reflects the status of directors in board based on their competence and influence, and this informal structure affects the interaction of boardroom members. Unlike the formal structure in board, informal hierarchy doesn't have formal contracts which guarantee directors' authority. Informal hierarchy usually develops from social norms and group consensus. Relative studies are based on the decision-making process in boardroom, focusing on the hidden order among group members and exploring its influence on group performance, which plays an important role in uncovering the path between the board structure and the governance effect. Studies in this field provide a new way to open the black box of the board. However,the boundary and mechanism of board informal hierarchy still need to be clarified. Relative studies still lack a systematic and unified theory to demonstrate the shaping process of informal hierarchy and its governance effects.This research reviews relative studies systematically to clarify the definition of board informal hierarchy from the contribution factors, hierarchy order and structure, which helps to explicit the main subject and clear boundary of board informal hierarchy research. Then the shaping process of board informal hierarchy is analyzed to show that the informal hierarchy structure is the result of combined effects of social norms and group consensus. In the process of constructing the theoretical framework,this study summarizes the background, mechanism and governance effects of board informal hierarchy.As the board is built with the flat organization structure, the limit of directors' energy, group conflicts and complexity of decision-making result in a decline of board effectiveness, which in return provides space for the coordinating role of board informal hierarchy. The mechanism is reviewed from the power distance perspective and the relational contract perspective with current literature, which reveals the difference of theories on the individual level and the consensus on the group level of informal hierarchy's influence. And in this way the theoretical explanation of dual governance effects of informal hierarchy is developed. In order to make a comprehensive understanding of its influence on board members and corporate performance, context variables of board informal hierarchy are sorted into external variables and internal variables. The main characteristics of these context variables are discussed and their impacts on the hidden order of board informal hierarchy are analyzed. In the end, the inadequacies of previous studies are pointed out and the prospects of future research in this field are made.Based on board informal hierarchy, this study intends to elaborate the deep impacts on the board decision-making process caused by the hidden order among directors. An integrative view of the progress and frontier theories of board informal hierarchy is developed, which also accelerates the transition of board studies from the traditional static view of the board structure to the dynamic view of board involvement. With the method of literature review and theoretical comparison, we establish an integrated framework of board informal hierarchy. This not only enriches the board research, but also provides inspiration for improving corporate governance in companies.
Board informal hierarchy, as an informal structure in the boardroom, reflects the status of directors in board based on their competence and influence, and this informal structure affects the interaction of boardroom members. Unlike the formal structure in board, informal hierarchy doesn't have formal contracts which guarantee directors' authority. Informal hierarchy usually develops from social norms and group consensus. Relative studies are based on the decision-making process in boardroom, focusing on the hidden order among group members and exploring its influence on group performance, which plays an important role in uncovering the path between the board structure and the governance effect. Studies in this field provide a new way to open the black box of the board. However,the boundary and mechanism of board informal hierarchy still need to be clarified. Relative studies still lack a systematic and unified theory to demonstrate the shaping process of informal hierarchy and its governance effects.This research reviews relative studies systematically to clarify the definition of board informal hierarchy from the contribution factors, hierarchy order and structure, which helps to explicit the main subject and clear boundary of board informal hierarchy research. Then the shaping process of board informal hierarchy is analyzed to show that the informal hierarchy structure is the result of combined effects of social norms and group consensus. In the process of constructing the theoretical framework,this study summarizes the background, mechanism and governance effects of board informal hierarchy.As the board is built with the flat organization structure, the limit of directors' energy, group conflicts and complexity of decision-making result in a decline of board effectiveness, which in return provides space for the coordinating role of board informal hierarchy. The mechanism is reviewed from the power distance perspective and the relational contract perspective with current literature, which reveals the difference of theories on the individual level and the consensus on the group level of informal hierarchy's influence. And in this way the theoretical explanation of dual governance effects of informal hierarchy is developed. In order to make a comprehensive understanding of its influence on board members and corporate performance, context variables of board informal hierarchy are sorted into external variables and internal variables. The main characteristics of these context variables are discussed and their impacts on the hidden order of board informal hierarchy are analyzed. In the end, the inadequacies of previous studies are pointed out and the prospects of future research in this field are made.Based on board informal hierarchy, this study intends to elaborate the deep impacts on the board decision-making process caused by the hidden order among directors. An integrative view of the progress and frontier theories of board informal hierarchy is developed, which also accelerates the transition of board studies from the traditional static view of the board structure to the dynamic view of board involvement. With the method of literature review and theoretical comparison, we establish an integrated framework of board informal hierarchy. This not only enriches the board research, but also provides inspiration for improving corporate governance in companies.
引文
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[2]陈睿,王治,段从清.独立董事“逆淘汰”效应研究——基于独立意见的经验证据[J].中国工业经济,2015,(8):145-160.
[3]单红梅,胡恩华,鲍静静,等.非国有企业员工组织地位感知水平对离职倾向的影响研究[J].管理学报,2015,(8):1144-1153.
[4]杜兴强,殷敬伟,赖少娟.论资排辈、CEO任期与独立董事的异议行为[J].中国工业经济,2017,(12):151-169.
[5]高凤莲,王志强.独立董事个人社会资本异质性的治理效应研究[J].中国工业经济,2016,(3):146-160.
[6]韩庆祥.社会层级结构理论——面向“中国问题”的政治哲学[J].中国社会科学,2009,(1):31-40.
[7]李长娥,谢永珍.董事会权力层级、创新战略与民营企业成长[J].外国经济与管理,2017,(12):70-83.
[8]刘智强,李超,廖建桥,等.组织中地位、地位赋予方式与员工创造性产出——来自国有企事业单位的实证研究[J].管理世界,2015,(3):86-101.
[9]马连福,张燕,高塬.董事会断裂带与公司创新战略决策——基于技术密集型上市公司的经验数据[J].预测,2018,(2):37-43.
[10]王是业,杜国臣.战略管理研究中的组织地位:内涵、演进和影响[J].外国经济与管理,2015,(5):65-74.
[11]武立东,江津,王凯.董事会成员地位差异、环境不确定性与企业投资行为[J].管理科学,2016,(2):52-65.
[12]谢永珍,张雅萌,吴龙吟,等.董事地位差异、决策行为强度对民营上市公司财务绩效的影响研究[J].管理学报,2017,(12):1767-1776.
[13]谢永珍,张雅萌,张慧,等.董事会正式、非正式结构对董事会会议频率的影响——非正式沟通对董事会行为强度的调节作用[J].外国经济与管理,2015,(4):15-28.
[14]杨玉龙,潘飞,张川.差序格局视角下的中国企业业绩评价[J].会计研究,2014,(10):66-73.
[15]叶玲,管亚梅.董事会隐性层级、公司投资行为及效率——基于我国A股上市公司的实证检验[J].财经理论与实践,2016,(5):43-49.
[16]曾江洪,何苹.国有上市公司董事会非正式层级与财务绩效关系的研究[J].财务与金融,2014,(6):78-82, 94.
[17]曾江洪,肖涛.董事会非正式层级、技术董事与技术创新绩效[J].科技与经济,2015,(3):1-5, 19.
[18]张建君,张闫龙.董事长—总经理的异质性、权力差距和融洽关系与组织绩效——来自上市公司的证据[J].管理世界,2016,(1):110-120.
[19]张维今,李凯,王淑梅. CEO权力的调节作用下董事会资本对公司创新的内在机制影响研究[J].管理评论,2018,(4):70-82.
[20]张耀伟,陈世山,李维安.董事会非正式层级的绩效效应及其影响机制研究[J].管理科学,2015,(1):1-17.
[21]郑志刚,阚铄,黄继承.独立董事兼职:是能者多劳还是疲于奔命[J].世界经济,2017,(2):153-178.
[22]周建涛,廖建桥.权力距离导向与员工建言:组织地位感知的影响[J].管理科学,2012,(1):35-44.
[23]Agarwal S, Qian W L, Reeb D M, et al. Playing the boys game:Golf buddies and board diversity[J]. American Economic Review,2016, 106(5):272-276.
[24]Anderson C, Brown C E. The functions and dysfunctions of hierarchy[J]. Research in Organizational Behavior,2010, 30:55-89.
[25]Boivie S, Bednar M K, Aguilera R V, et al. Are boards designed to fail? The implausibility of effective board monitoring[J].The Academy of Management Annals,2016, 10(1):319-407.
[26]Bunderson J S. Recognizing and utilizing expertise in work groups:A status characteristics perspective[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2003, 48(4):557-591.
[27]Bunderson J S, Van Der Vegt G S, Cantimur Y, et al. Different views of hierarchy and why they matter:Hierarchy as inequality or as cascading influence[J]. The Academy of Management Journal,2016, 59(4):1265-1289.
[28]Dalton D R, Hitt M A, Certo S T, et al. The fundamental agency problem and its mitigation:Independence, equity, and the market for corporate control[J]. The Academy of Management Annals,2007, 1(1):1-64.
[29]Diefenbach T, Sillince J A A. Formal and informal hierarchy in different types of organization[J]. Organization Studies,2011,32(11):1515-1537.
[30]Etzioni A. Authority structure and organizational effectiveness[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1959, 4(1):43-67.
[31]Fich E M, Shivdasani A. Are busy boards effective monitors?[J]. The Journal of Finance,2006, 61(2):689-724.
[32]Forbes D P, Milliken F J. Cognition and corporate governance:Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups[J]. Academy of Management Review,1999, 24(3):489-505.
[33]Gabrielsson J, Huse M, Minichilli A. Understanding the leadership role of the board chairperson through a team production approach[J]. International Journal of Leadership Studies,2007, 3(1):21-39.
[34]Garg S, Li Q, Shaw J D. Undervaluation of directors in the board hierarchy:Impact on turnover of directors(and CEOs)in newly public firms[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2018, 39(2):429-457.
[35]Gleibs I H, Haslam S A. Do we want a fighter? The influence of group status and the stability of intergroup relations on leader prototypicality and endorsement[J]. The Leadership Quarterly,2016, 27(4):557-573.
[36]Gore A K, Matsunaga S, Yeung P E. The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure:Evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2011, 32(7):771-786.
[37]Groysberg B, Polzer J T, Elfenbein H A. Too many cooks spoil the broth:How high-status individuals decrease group effectiveness[J]. Organization Science,2011, 22(3):722-737.
[38]Hauser R. Busy directors and firm performance:Evidence from mergers[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2018, 128(1):16-37.
[39]He J Y, Huang Z. Board informal hierarchy and firm financial performance:Exploring a tacit structure guiding boardroom interactions[J]. The Academy of Management Journal,2011, 54(6):1119-1139.
[40]Hogg M A. A social identity theory of leadership[J]. Personality and Social Psychology Review,2001, 5(3):184-200.
[41]Khanna P, Jones C D, Boivie S. Director human capital, information processing demands, and board effectiveness[J]. Journal of Management,2014, 40(2):557-585.
[42]Kilduff G J, Willer R, Anderson C. Hierarchy and its discontents:Status disagreement leads to withdrawal of contribution and lower group performance[J]. Organization Science,2016, 27(2):373-390.
[43]Krause R, Semadeni M, Withers M C. That special someone:When the board views its chair as a resource[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2016, 37(9):1990-2002.
[44]Lara P J. Status in management and organizations[J]. Management Decision,2011, 49(6):1024-1028.
[45]Levy O, Reiche B S. The politics of cultural capital:Social hierarchy and organizational architecture in the multinational corporation[J]. Human Relations,2017, 71(6):867-894.
[46]Magee J C, Galinsky A D. Social hierarchy:The self‐reinforcing nature of power and status[J]. The Academy of Management Annals,2008, 2(1):351-398.
[47]Peng M W, Luo Y D. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy:The nature of a micro-macro link[J]. The Academy of Management Journal,2000, 43(3):486-501.
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