同行关切公平对双渠道供应链决策的影响研究
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摘要
公平偏好如何影响双渠道供应链决策?现有文献侧重研究自我关切公平对双渠道供应链决策的影响,尚未探索同行关切公平对双渠道供应链决策的作用机制。鉴于此,笔者依据公平中性情形下双渠道供应链成员的获利情况,将同行关切公平引入双渠道供应链决策框架,构建了网络零售商具有同行关切公平的双渠道供应链定价决策模型。在此基础上,运用Betrand、Stackelberg混合博弈理论对模型进行分析和求解;利用数值算例,对模型中的关键参数进行敏感性分析、对不同情形下的供应链决策进行比较分析。研究结果表明:网络零售商的纵向分配公平与同行关切行为对双渠道供应链最优决策的影响存在差异;网络零售商的纵向分配公平、制造商对待网络零售商同行关切行为的态度对同行关切行为与双渠道供应链最优决策的关系具有调节作用。研究结论丰富了双渠道供应链管理研究方面的文献,有助于企业更深入地认识公平偏好对经济决策的影响作用,可供双渠道供应链高效运作参考。
How fairness preference affects the optimal decisions of dual-channel supply chain?The existing literatures mainly focus on exploring the influence of self-centred fairness concern on dual-channel supply chain decisions,but the mechanism of peer-regarding fairness on dual-channel supply chain decisions that remain unexplored.Therefore,according to the profit of dual-channel supply chain members under the fair neutral situation,the peer-regarding fairness is introduced into the decision-making framework of dual-channel supply chain,and the pricing models of dual-channel supply chain that the online retailer with peer-regarding fairness is constructed.On this basis,the pricing models is analyzed and solved by applying the game theory of Bertrand and Stackelberg;the sensitivity analysis of key parameters in the models is addressed,and the comparative analysis of the optimal decisions in different situations is studied via numerical examples.Results show that the effects of online retailer's vertical distribution fairness and peer-regarding behavior on the optimal decisions of dual-channel supply chain are different;the vertical distribution fairness of online retailer and the attitude of the manufacturer toward online retailer's peer-regarding behavior moderating the effect of peer-regarding behavior on the optimal decisions of dual-channel supply chain.The research conclusion enriches the literature on dual-channel supply chain management,helps enterprises to have a deeper understanding of the role of fairness preference on economic decision-making,and provides references for the efficient operation of dual-channel supply chain.
How fairness preference affects the optimal decisions of dual-channel supply chain?The existing literatures mainly focus on exploring the influence of self-centred fairness concern on dual-channel supply chain decisions,but the mechanism of peer-regarding fairness on dual-channel supply chain decisions that remain unexplored.Therefore,according to the profit of dual-channel supply chain members under the fair neutral situation,the peer-regarding fairness is introduced into the decision-making framework of dual-channel supply chain,and the pricing models of dual-channel supply chain that the online retailer with peer-regarding fairness is constructed.On this basis,the pricing models is analyzed and solved by applying the game theory of Bertrand and Stackelberg;the sensitivity analysis of key parameters in the models is addressed,and the comparative analysis of the optimal decisions in different situations is studied via numerical examples.Results show that the effects of online retailer's vertical distribution fairness and peer-regarding behavior on the optimal decisions of dual-channel supply chain are different;the vertical distribution fairness of online retailer and the attitude of the manufacturer toward online retailer's peer-regarding behavior moderating the effect of peer-regarding behavior on the optimal decisions of dual-channel supply chain.The research conclusion enriches the literature on dual-channel supply chain management,helps enterprises to have a deeper understanding of the role of fairness preference on economic decision-making,and provides references for the efficient operation of dual-channel supply chain.
引文
[1]Zhang P,Xiong Y,Xiong Z.Coordination of a Dual-channel Supply Chain after Demand or Production Cost Disruptions[J].International Journal of Production Research,2015,53(10):3141-3160.
[2]Soleimani F,Khamseh A A,Naderi B.Optimal Decisions in a Dual-channel Supply Chain under Simultaneous Demand and Production Cost Disruptions[J].Annals of Operations Research,2016,243(1/2):301-321.
[3]林庆,何勇.双渠道供应商的差异化定价对渠道的影响[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(4):679-684.
[4]Camerer C,Thaler R H.Anomalies:Ultimatums,Dictators and Manners[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(2):209-219.
[5]Fehr E,Riedl K A.Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing?An Experimental Investigation[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1993,108(2):437-459.
[6]Forsythe R,Horowitz J L,Savin N E,et al.Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1994,6(3):347-369.
[7]Kumar N,Scheer L K,Steenkamp J E.The Effects of Supplier Fairness on Vulnerable Resellers[J].Journal of Marketing Research,1995,32(1):54-65.
[8]Anderson E,Weitz B.The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain Commitment in Distribution Channels[J].Journal of Marketing Research,1992,29(1):18-34.
[9]邢伟,汪寿阳,赵秋红,等.考虑渠道公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(7):1249-1256.
[10]李波,李宜楠,侯丽婷,等.具有公平关切的零售商对双渠道供应链决策影响分析[J].控制与决策,2015,30(5):955-960.
[11]Li B,Hou P W,Li Q H.Cooperative Advertising in a Dual-channel Supply Chain with a Fairness Concern of the Manufacturer[J].IMA Journal of Management Mathematics,2017,28(2):259-277.
[12]Xu M X,Yu Y,Hu Y S.Service and Revenue Sharing Strategies in a Dual-channel Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns[J].Computer Modelling and New Technologies,2014,18(7):244-252.
[13]Wei G,Lin Q.Dual-channel Supply Chain Coordination with New Buy-back Contract Based on Fairness Preference Theory[J].Information Technology Journal,2014,13(6):1094-1101.
[14]Ho T H,Su X.Peer-induced Fairness in Games[J].American Economic Review,2009,99(5):2022-2049.
[15]浦徐进,诸葛瑞杰,范旺达.考虑横向和纵向公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程学报,2014,29(4):527-536.
[16]舒斯亮,柳键.公平关切下电子商务效率对不同权力结构双渠道博弈影响[J].软科学,2017,31(11):139-144.
[17]吴正祥,李宝库.基于不同公平偏好模型的非对称双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].中国流通经济,2018,32(10):56-70.
[18]Pavlov V,Katok E.Fairness and Coordination Failures in Supply Chain Contracts[R].Working Paper,Philadelphia:The Pennsylvania State University,2009.
[19]Engelmann D,Strobel M.An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt[R].Working Paper,Humboldt-Universit?t zu Berlin,2000.
[20]Fehr E,Fischbacher U.Third-party Punishment and Social Norms[J].Evolution and Human Behavior,2004,25(2):63-87.
[21]古晓宇.美185名CEO为苹果“说情”[N].京华时报,2016-09-20.
[22]廖丰.去哪儿遭大供应商抵制:酒店产品下架[N].京华时报,2013-04-03.
[23]Du S F,Wei L,Zhu Y G,et al.Peer-regarding Fairness in Supply Chain[J].International Journal of Production Research,2018,56(10):3384-3396.
[24]中国社科院财经战略研究院课题组,荆林波.电子商务:中国经济发展的新引擎[J].求是,2013(11):15-17.
[25]陈树桢,熊中楷,李根道,等.考虑创新补偿的双渠道供应链协调机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):45-52.
[26]单汨源,刘超,刘小红.政府创新补贴对零售商双渠道供应链的影响研究[J].华东经济管理,2016,30(9):120-124.
[27]Ho T H,Su X M,Wu Y Z.Distributional and Peer-induced Fairness in Supply Chain Contract Design[J].Production and Operations Management,2014,23(2):161-175.
[28]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[29]李宝库,吴正祥,郭婷婷.考虑零售商公平偏好的两级供应链收益共享契约机制研究[J].软科学,2016,30(5):130-135.
① 对浦徐进等(2014)[15]研究中的赋值进行归一化处理即可得到。
① 由于过大的公平偏好会给网络零售商自身利润带来负面影响,故这里仅在对网络零售商自身利润有利的公平偏好程度范围内进行了利润比较。
[2]Soleimani F,Khamseh A A,Naderi B.Optimal Decisions in a Dual-channel Supply Chain under Simultaneous Demand and Production Cost Disruptions[J].Annals of Operations Research,2016,243(1/2):301-321.
[3]林庆,何勇.双渠道供应商的差异化定价对渠道的影响[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(4):679-684.
[4]Camerer C,Thaler R H.Anomalies:Ultimatums,Dictators and Manners[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(2):209-219.
[5]Fehr E,Riedl K A.Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing?An Experimental Investigation[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1993,108(2):437-459.
[6]Forsythe R,Horowitz J L,Savin N E,et al.Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1994,6(3):347-369.
[7]Kumar N,Scheer L K,Steenkamp J E.The Effects of Supplier Fairness on Vulnerable Resellers[J].Journal of Marketing Research,1995,32(1):54-65.
[8]Anderson E,Weitz B.The Use of Pledges to Build and Sustain Commitment in Distribution Channels[J].Journal of Marketing Research,1992,29(1):18-34.
[9]邢伟,汪寿阳,赵秋红,等.考虑渠道公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2011,31(7):1249-1256.
[10]李波,李宜楠,侯丽婷,等.具有公平关切的零售商对双渠道供应链决策影响分析[J].控制与决策,2015,30(5):955-960.
[11]Li B,Hou P W,Li Q H.Cooperative Advertising in a Dual-channel Supply Chain with a Fairness Concern of the Manufacturer[J].IMA Journal of Management Mathematics,2017,28(2):259-277.
[12]Xu M X,Yu Y,Hu Y S.Service and Revenue Sharing Strategies in a Dual-channel Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns[J].Computer Modelling and New Technologies,2014,18(7):244-252.
[13]Wei G,Lin Q.Dual-channel Supply Chain Coordination with New Buy-back Contract Based on Fairness Preference Theory[J].Information Technology Journal,2014,13(6):1094-1101.
[14]Ho T H,Su X.Peer-induced Fairness in Games[J].American Economic Review,2009,99(5):2022-2049.
[15]浦徐进,诸葛瑞杰,范旺达.考虑横向和纵向公平的双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].系统工程学报,2014,29(4):527-536.
[16]舒斯亮,柳键.公平关切下电子商务效率对不同权力结构双渠道博弈影响[J].软科学,2017,31(11):139-144.
[17]吴正祥,李宝库.基于不同公平偏好模型的非对称双渠道供应链均衡策略[J].中国流通经济,2018,32(10):56-70.
[18]Pavlov V,Katok E.Fairness and Coordination Failures in Supply Chain Contracts[R].Working Paper,Philadelphia:The Pennsylvania State University,2009.
[19]Engelmann D,Strobel M.An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt[R].Working Paper,Humboldt-Universit?t zu Berlin,2000.
[20]Fehr E,Fischbacher U.Third-party Punishment and Social Norms[J].Evolution and Human Behavior,2004,25(2):63-87.
[21]古晓宇.美185名CEO为苹果“说情”[N].京华时报,2016-09-20.
[22]廖丰.去哪儿遭大供应商抵制:酒店产品下架[N].京华时报,2013-04-03.
[23]Du S F,Wei L,Zhu Y G,et al.Peer-regarding Fairness in Supply Chain[J].International Journal of Production Research,2018,56(10):3384-3396.
[24]中国社科院财经战略研究院课题组,荆林波.电子商务:中国经济发展的新引擎[J].求是,2013(11):15-17.
[25]陈树桢,熊中楷,李根道,等.考虑创新补偿的双渠道供应链协调机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2011,25(2):45-52.
[26]单汨源,刘超,刘小红.政府创新补贴对零售商双渠道供应链的影响研究[J].华东经济管理,2016,30(9):120-124.
[27]Ho T H,Su X M,Wu Y Z.Distributional and Peer-induced Fairness in Supply Chain Contract Design[J].Production and Operations Management,2014,23(2):161-175.
[28]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[29]李宝库,吴正祥,郭婷婷.考虑零售商公平偏好的两级供应链收益共享契约机制研究[J].软科学,2016,30(5):130-135.
① 对浦徐进等(2014)[15]研究中的赋值进行归一化处理即可得到。
① 由于过大的公平偏好会给网络零售商自身利润带来负面影响,故这里仅在对网络零售商自身利润有利的公平偏好程度范围内进行了利润比较。