政治关联与企业环保治污——来自中国私营企业调查的证据
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摘要
经济增长伴随环境污染的产生似乎不可避免,企业在环保治污方面能否有所作为引人关注。基于2008年和2010年中国私营企业调查数据,实证分析私营企业的政治关联对其环保治污行为的影响发现,私营企业的政治关联对环保投入和排污费具有显著的正向影响,也就是说,具有政治关联的企业环保投入较高,缴纳的排污费也更多。在考虑了环保治污反向影响企业政治关联的内生性问题后结论依然稳健。分行业考察表明,政治关联对环保治污的正向作用仅在重污染企业中显著,在轻污染企业中不显著。进一步检验发现,政治关联对环保治污主要存在一正一反的两个影响机制:政治关联通过影响企业的社会责任正向促进环保治污,即具有政治关联的企业履行更多的社会责任,企业加大对环保治污的投入;政治关联还通过影响企业的寻租动机反向抑制环保治污,即企业会利用政治关联进行寻租,减少在环保治污上的投入。此外,私营企业的政治关联程度较低时,政治关联显著促进环保治污,政治关联程度较高时对环保治污呈现显著的负向影响。研究揭示了政治关联对企业环保治污的实际影响和内在机制,有助于政府采取措施合理引导企业清洁生产、保护环境。
Economic growth seems inevitably accompanied by pollution, and the devotion of enterprises to environmental protection has received much attention. This paper is based on the sample survey on the private enterprises in 2008 and 2010 to study the impact of their political connections on pollution control expenditure. The result shows that the political connections have a significant positive effect on environmental protection and sewage charges. In other words, companies with political connections have higher inputs and pay more for sewage charges. The previous conclusion remains solid after considering the endogeneity problem of political connections. Sub-industry survey shows that political connections on the promotion of environmental pollution control may have a significant effect only on enterprises of heavy polluting and insignificant in those of light pollution. Further test reveals positive and negative impact mechanisms. On one hand, political connections promote pollution control through its impact on corporate social responsibility. The political relationship of enterprises brings more social responsibility, which leads to investment increase in environmental protection and pollution control. In addition, political connections inhibit the pollution control through its impact on the enterprise's rent-seeking motivation. Enterprises use their political connections in rent-seeking to reduce their investment in environmental protection and pollution control. We also find that when the political connection level of private enterprises is low, it significantly promotes expenditure, but when the level is high, it has a significant negative effect on environmental pollution control. This study reveals the impact and inner mechanism of political connections on the environmental pollution control of private enterprises, and has theoretical and practical significance for actively guiding enterprises to fulfill their responsibility in environmental friendly production.
Economic growth seems inevitably accompanied by pollution, and the devotion of enterprises to environmental protection has received much attention. This paper is based on the sample survey on the private enterprises in 2008 and 2010 to study the impact of their political connections on pollution control expenditure. The result shows that the political connections have a significant positive effect on environmental protection and sewage charges. In other words, companies with political connections have higher inputs and pay more for sewage charges. The previous conclusion remains solid after considering the endogeneity problem of political connections. Sub-industry survey shows that political connections on the promotion of environmental pollution control may have a significant effect only on enterprises of heavy polluting and insignificant in those of light pollution. Further test reveals positive and negative impact mechanisms. On one hand, political connections promote pollution control through its impact on corporate social responsibility. The political relationship of enterprises brings more social responsibility, which leads to investment increase in environmental protection and pollution control. In addition, political connections inhibit the pollution control through its impact on the enterprise's rent-seeking motivation. Enterprises use their political connections in rent-seeking to reduce their investment in environmental protection and pollution control. We also find that when the political connection level of private enterprises is low, it significantly promotes expenditure, but when the level is high, it has a significant negative effect on environmental pollution control. This study reveals the impact and inner mechanism of political connections on the environmental pollution control of private enterprises, and has theoretical and practical significance for actively guiding enterprises to fulfill their responsibility in environmental friendly production.
引文
邓德军、肖文娟,2011:《消费者可以影响企业的环保行为吗?》,《经济评论》第6期。
杜兴强、郭剑花、雷宇,2009:《政治联系方式与民营上市公司业绩:“政府干预”抑或“关系”?》,《金融研究》第11期。
胡旭阳,2006:《私营企业家的政治身份与私营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例》,《管理世界》第5期。
李善民、朱滔,2006:《多元化并购能给股东创造价值吗?——兼论影响多元化并购长期绩效的因素》,《管理世界》第3期。
李维安、徐业坤,2013:《政治身份的避税效应》,《金融研究》第3期。
梁建、陈爽英、盖庆恩,2010:《私营企业的政治参与、治理结构与慈善捐赠》,《管理世界》第7期。
罗党论、刘晓龙,2009:《政治关联、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第5期。
罗党论、甄丽明,2008:《民营控制、政治关联与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《金融研究》第12期。
宋马林、王舒鸿,2013:《环境规制、技术进步与经济增长》,《经济研究》第3期。
唐国平、李龙会、吴德军,2013:《环境管制、行业属性与企业环保投资》,《会计研究》第6期。
唐松、孙铮,2014:《政治关联、高管薪酬与企业未来经营绩效》,《管理世界》第5期。
田利辉、张伟,2013:《政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应》,《经济研究》第11期。
魏下海、董志强、金钊,2015:《腐败与企业生命力:寻租和抽租影响开工率的经验研究》,《世界经济》第1期。
吴文锋、吴冲锋、刘晓薇,2008:《中国民营上市企业高管的政府背景与企业价值》,《经济研究》第7期。
余明桂、回雅甫、潘红波,2010:《政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性》,《经济研究》第10期。
张成、陆旸、郭路、于同申,2011:《环境规制强度和生产技术进步》,《经济研究》第2期。
张建君、张志学,2005:《中国私营企业家的政治战略》,《管理世界》第7期。
张敏、张胜、申慧慧、王成方,2010:《政治关联与信贷资源配置效率——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第11期。
郑建明、刘琳、刘一凡,2014:《政治关联的结构特征、多元化驱动与公司价值》,《金融研究》第2期。
Adhikari,A.,C.Derashid and H.Zhang,2006,“Public Policy,Political Connections,and Effective Tax Rates:Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia”,Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,25(5):74-595.
Faccio,M.,2006,“Politically Connected Firms”,American Economic Review,96(1):369-386.
Faccio,M.,R.W.Masulis and J.J.Mcconnell,2006,“Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts”,Journal of Finance,61(6):2597-2635.
Fisman,R.,2001,“Estimating the Value of Political Connections”,American Economic Review,91(4):1095-1102.
Harymawan,I.and J.E.Nowland,2016,“Political Connections and Earnings Quality:How do Connected Firms Respond to Changes in Political Stability and Government Effectiveness?”,International Journal of Accounting & Information Management,24(4):339-356.
Hong,Z.,2004,“Mapping the Evolution and Transformation of the New Private Entrepreneurs in China”,Journal of Chinese Political Science,9(1):23-42.
Krueger,A.O.,1974,“The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”,American Economic Review,64(3):291-303.
Min,M.,C.Wilson and X.Tang,2016,“Political Connections and Industrial Pollution:Evidence Based on State Ownership and Environmental Levies in China”,Journal of Business Ethics,138(4):1-11.
Murphy,K.M.,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny,1993,“Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?”,American Economic Review,83(2):409-414.
Pfeffer,J.and G.R.Salancik,1978,“The External Control of Organizations:A Resource Dependence Perspective”,Social Science Electronic Publishing,23(2):123-133.
Prechel,H.and L.Zheng,2012,“Corporate Characteristics,Political Embeddedness and Environmental Pollution by Large U.S.Corporations”,Social Forces,90(3):947-970.
Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny,1994,“Politician and Firms”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,109(4):995-1025.
Wang,Y.,2016,“Political Connections and Tax-induced Earnings Management:Evidence from China”,The European Journal of Finance,22(4-6):1-19.
Xin,K.R.and J.Pearce,1996,“Guanxi:Connections as Substitutional Support”,Academy of Management Journal,39(6):1641-1658.
(1)Bertrand,M.,2004,“Politically Connected CEOs and Corporate Outcomes:Evidence from France”,Unpublished Manuscript.
(2)考虑到部分企业环保投入为0,故原投入为0的数据仍保留0值,原数据在0-1之间,加上1取对数,大于1的直接取对数。
(3)处理方法同环保投入。
(4)根据2010年9月14日环保部公布的《上市公司环境信息披露指南》(征求意见稿),再结合私营企业自身特点,将采矿业、制造业、电力煤气水业、建筑业、交通运输业这五大行业记为重污染行业,其余行业记为轻污染行业。
(5)处理方法同环保投入。
(6)2008年数据的回归结果同样稳健,限于篇幅原因,不再列出,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
(7)限于篇幅原因,此处不再列出具体的稳健性检验结果,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
(8)限于篇幅原因,此处不再列出考虑污染罚款的回归结果,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
杜兴强、郭剑花、雷宇,2009:《政治联系方式与民营上市公司业绩:“政府干预”抑或“关系”?》,《金融研究》第11期。
胡旭阳,2006:《私营企业家的政治身份与私营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例》,《管理世界》第5期。
李善民、朱滔,2006:《多元化并购能给股东创造价值吗?——兼论影响多元化并购长期绩效的因素》,《管理世界》第3期。
李维安、徐业坤,2013:《政治身份的避税效应》,《金融研究》第3期。
梁建、陈爽英、盖庆恩,2010:《私营企业的政治参与、治理结构与慈善捐赠》,《管理世界》第7期。
罗党论、刘晓龙,2009:《政治关联、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第5期。
罗党论、甄丽明,2008:《民营控制、政治关联与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《金融研究》第12期。
宋马林、王舒鸿,2013:《环境规制、技术进步与经济增长》,《经济研究》第3期。
唐国平、李龙会、吴德军,2013:《环境管制、行业属性与企业环保投资》,《会计研究》第6期。
唐松、孙铮,2014:《政治关联、高管薪酬与企业未来经营绩效》,《管理世界》第5期。
田利辉、张伟,2013:《政治关联影响我国上市公司长期绩效的三大效应》,《经济研究》第11期。
魏下海、董志强、金钊,2015:《腐败与企业生命力:寻租和抽租影响开工率的经验研究》,《世界经济》第1期。
吴文锋、吴冲锋、刘晓薇,2008:《中国民营上市企业高管的政府背景与企业价值》,《经济研究》第7期。
余明桂、回雅甫、潘红波,2010:《政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性》,《经济研究》第10期。
张成、陆旸、郭路、于同申,2011:《环境规制强度和生产技术进步》,《经济研究》第2期。
张建君、张志学,2005:《中国私营企业家的政治战略》,《管理世界》第7期。
张敏、张胜、申慧慧、王成方,2010:《政治关联与信贷资源配置效率——来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据》,《管理世界》第11期。
郑建明、刘琳、刘一凡,2014:《政治关联的结构特征、多元化驱动与公司价值》,《金融研究》第2期。
Adhikari,A.,C.Derashid and H.Zhang,2006,“Public Policy,Political Connections,and Effective Tax Rates:Longitudinal Evidence from Malaysia”,Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,25(5):74-595.
Faccio,M.,2006,“Politically Connected Firms”,American Economic Review,96(1):369-386.
Faccio,M.,R.W.Masulis and J.J.Mcconnell,2006,“Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts”,Journal of Finance,61(6):2597-2635.
Fisman,R.,2001,“Estimating the Value of Political Connections”,American Economic Review,91(4):1095-1102.
Harymawan,I.and J.E.Nowland,2016,“Political Connections and Earnings Quality:How do Connected Firms Respond to Changes in Political Stability and Government Effectiveness?”,International Journal of Accounting & Information Management,24(4):339-356.
Hong,Z.,2004,“Mapping the Evolution and Transformation of the New Private Entrepreneurs in China”,Journal of Chinese Political Science,9(1):23-42.
Krueger,A.O.,1974,“The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”,American Economic Review,64(3):291-303.
Min,M.,C.Wilson and X.Tang,2016,“Political Connections and Industrial Pollution:Evidence Based on State Ownership and Environmental Levies in China”,Journal of Business Ethics,138(4):1-11.
Murphy,K.M.,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny,1993,“Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?”,American Economic Review,83(2):409-414.
Pfeffer,J.and G.R.Salancik,1978,“The External Control of Organizations:A Resource Dependence Perspective”,Social Science Electronic Publishing,23(2):123-133.
Prechel,H.and L.Zheng,2012,“Corporate Characteristics,Political Embeddedness and Environmental Pollution by Large U.S.Corporations”,Social Forces,90(3):947-970.
Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny,1994,“Politician and Firms”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,109(4):995-1025.
Wang,Y.,2016,“Political Connections and Tax-induced Earnings Management:Evidence from China”,The European Journal of Finance,22(4-6):1-19.
Xin,K.R.and J.Pearce,1996,“Guanxi:Connections as Substitutional Support”,Academy of Management Journal,39(6):1641-1658.
(1)Bertrand,M.,2004,“Politically Connected CEOs and Corporate Outcomes:Evidence from France”,Unpublished Manuscript.
(2)考虑到部分企业环保投入为0,故原投入为0的数据仍保留0值,原数据在0-1之间,加上1取对数,大于1的直接取对数。
(3)处理方法同环保投入。
(4)根据2010年9月14日环保部公布的《上市公司环境信息披露指南》(征求意见稿),再结合私营企业自身特点,将采矿业、制造业、电力煤气水业、建筑业、交通运输业这五大行业记为重污染行业,其余行业记为轻污染行业。
(5)处理方法同环保投入。
(6)2008年数据的回归结果同样稳健,限于篇幅原因,不再列出,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
(7)限于篇幅原因,此处不再列出具体的稳健性检验结果,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。
(8)限于篇幅原因,此处不再列出考虑污染罚款的回归结果,有兴趣的读者可向作者索取。