中外合资企业“阴谋亏损”的警报器:媒体关注——基于中国上市公司数据的实证研究
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摘要
基于"阴谋论"背景,探讨与外企联盟的中国企业如何借助媒体这一外部监督机制,来有效识别与应对外方对中外合资企业实施"阴谋亏损"的手段。通过建立Logit回归方程,对比检验面对海量媒体信息,机构投资者、注册会计师与监管部门在中方公司防范"阴谋亏损"的过程中所发挥的作用。实证结果发现,机构投资者为维护自身利益,在媒体对企业广为关注的情况下,能有效抑制外方"阴谋亏损"的行为,而且四个主体形成的合力能显著抑制"阴谋亏损"行为。研究为与外企联盟的中国企业有效运用媒体监督以避免因信息不对称而落入"阴谋亏损"陷阱提供了理论基础与政策建议。
Based on the "conspiracy theory", this paper discusses how Chinese enterprises in the Sino-foreign joint venture(JV) can effectively identify and respond to the means of "conspiracy losses" by using the external supervision mechanism of the media. Through establishing Logit regression equation, this paper makes a contrast of the roles of institutional investors, certified public accountants and regulatory authorities in the process of preventing "conspiracy loss" by Chinese companies. The empirical results show that, in order to maintain their own interests, the institutional investors can effectively restrain the "conspiracy loss" by the media. Moreover, the resultant force formed by the four main bodies can significantly inhibit the "conspiracy loss" behavior The research provides the theoretical basis and suggestions for the effective use of media supervision for Chinese enterprises with foreign companies to avoid falling into the "conspiracy loss" trap because of information asymmetry.
Based on the "conspiracy theory", this paper discusses how Chinese enterprises in the Sino-foreign joint venture(JV) can effectively identify and respond to the means of "conspiracy losses" by using the external supervision mechanism of the media. Through establishing Logit regression equation, this paper makes a contrast of the roles of institutional investors, certified public accountants and regulatory authorities in the process of preventing "conspiracy loss" by Chinese companies. The empirical results show that, in order to maintain their own interests, the institutional investors can effectively restrain the "conspiracy loss" by the media. Moreover, the resultant force formed by the four main bodies can significantly inhibit the "conspiracy loss" behavior The research provides the theoretical basis and suggestions for the effective use of media supervision for Chinese enterprises with foreign companies to avoid falling into the "conspiracy loss" trap because of information asymmetry.
引文
[1]方刚,秦春雷,孙力.中日合资企业控制权转移防范机制研究[J].东北亚论坛,2013(06).
[2]刘婷,谢鹏鑫.中外合资企业“阴谋亏损—外资并购”风险识别与防范——基于1993—2009年上市公司数据的实证分析[J].湖南师范大学学报,2014(04).
[3]包群,谢红军,陈佳妮.文化相近、合作信任与外商合资关系的持久性[J].管理世界,2017(03).
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[5]李维安,李宝权.跨国公司在华独资倾向成因分析:基于股权结构战略的视角[J]. 管理世界,2003(01).
[6]卢昌崇,李仲广,郑文全.从控制权到收益权:合资企业的产权变动路径[J].中国工业经济,2003(11).
[7]Tetlock. All the News That’s Fit to Reprint: Do Investors React to Stale Information? [J] .Review of Financial Studies,2011(24).
[8]Bushee, Core, Guay, Hamm. The Role of Business Press as An Information Intermediary[J] .Journal of Accounting Research,2010(48).
[9]Dyck, Volchkova, Zingales. The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia[J].Journal of Finance,2008 (03).
[10]郑志刚,丁冬,汪昌云.媒体的负面报道、经理人声誉与企业业绩改善:来自我国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2011(12).
[11]熊艳,李常青,魏志华.媒体报道与IPO定价效率:基于信息不对称和行为金融视角[J] .世界经济,2014(05).
[12]吕伟,林昭呈.关联方交易、审计意见与外部监管[J] .审计研究,2007(04).
[13]戴亦一,潘越,刘思超.媒体监督、政府干预与公司治理:来自中国上市公司财务重述视角的证据[J].世界经济,2011(11).
[14]于忠泊,田高良,齐堡垒,张皓.媒体关注的公司治理机制——基于盈余管理视角的考察[J].管理世界,2011(09).
(1)数据来源于中国商务部《中国外商投资报告2016》。
(2)16年,保洁清洗三家股东实录.财经时报,2004-05-23。
(3)历时两年,天府可乐艰难拿回配方.华西都市报,2010-12-31。
(4)模塑科技1 208万出售江阴米拉克龙18%股权.证券时报网,2013-12-06。
(5)Costa决定在南方市场单干,向中国伙伴买回合资公司股份.澎湃新闻,2017-10-10。
[2]刘婷,谢鹏鑫.中外合资企业“阴谋亏损—外资并购”风险识别与防范——基于1993—2009年上市公司数据的实证分析[J].湖南师范大学学报,2014(04).
[3]包群,谢红军,陈佳妮.文化相近、合作信任与外商合资关系的持久性[J].管理世界,2017(03).
[4]李维安,吴先明.中外合资企业母公司主导型公司治理模式探析[J]. 世界政治与经济,2002(05).
[5]李维安,李宝权.跨国公司在华独资倾向成因分析:基于股权结构战略的视角[J]. 管理世界,2003(01).
[6]卢昌崇,李仲广,郑文全.从控制权到收益权:合资企业的产权变动路径[J].中国工业经济,2003(11).
[7]Tetlock. All the News That’s Fit to Reprint: Do Investors React to Stale Information? [J] .Review of Financial Studies,2011(24).
[8]Bushee, Core, Guay, Hamm. The Role of Business Press as An Information Intermediary[J] .Journal of Accounting Research,2010(48).
[9]Dyck, Volchkova, Zingales. The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia[J].Journal of Finance,2008 (03).
[10]郑志刚,丁冬,汪昌云.媒体的负面报道、经理人声誉与企业业绩改善:来自我国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2011(12).
[11]熊艳,李常青,魏志华.媒体报道与IPO定价效率:基于信息不对称和行为金融视角[J] .世界经济,2014(05).
[12]吕伟,林昭呈.关联方交易、审计意见与外部监管[J] .审计研究,2007(04).
[13]戴亦一,潘越,刘思超.媒体监督、政府干预与公司治理:来自中国上市公司财务重述视角的证据[J].世界经济,2011(11).
[14]于忠泊,田高良,齐堡垒,张皓.媒体关注的公司治理机制——基于盈余管理视角的考察[J].管理世界,2011(09).
(1)数据来源于中国商务部《中国外商投资报告2016》。
(2)16年,保洁清洗三家股东实录.财经时报,2004-05-23。
(3)历时两年,天府可乐艰难拿回配方.华西都市报,2010-12-31。
(4)模塑科技1 208万出售江阴米拉克龙18%股权.证券时报网,2013-12-06。
(5)Costa决定在南方市场单干,向中国伙伴买回合资公司股份.澎湃新闻,2017-10-10。