董事会非正式层级的绩效效应及其影响机制研究
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摘要
董事会非正式层级是影响董事会治理效率和公司绩效的关键因素。以2010年至2012年沪、深A股1 226家上市公司为研究对象,运用STATA 13.0软件和分组回归分析方法,系统分析董事会非正式层级强度与公司绩效间的关系及其影响机制,分别考察不同最高层级董事身份和控股股东性质对董事会非正式层级强度与公司绩效关系的影响。研究结果表明,董事会内部非正式层级强度与公司绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系,这种正相关关系只有在董事会最高层级董事不兼任总经理职务条件下才成立;业绩压力和股权集中度对董事会非正式层级强度与公司绩效间的关系具有显著的正向调节效应;相对于民营控股上市公司,国有控股上市公司董事会非正式层级强度对绩效的正向效应更强,主要体现在地方政府控股上市公司中,业绩压力对董事会非正式层级强度与绩效间的正向调节效应在国有控股上市公司中不显著。研究结果证实董事会内部非正式层级的实践价值,印证了两职分离和董事会团队互补的积极效应,为优化董事会治理等提供理论支持。
Board informal hierarchy is the key factor that will affect the board governance efficiency and then the firm performance. Based on the relevant data of 1 226 listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China from the year 2010 to2012,using the software of STATA 13. 0 and grouping regression method after measuring the board informal hierarchy Strength with gini index,the paper examines the effect of board informal hierarchy Strength on firm performance and its affecting mechanisms. The paper also divides the listed firms into different groups to study the effect based on the different identities of the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy and the different nature of firm' s ultimate controlling shareholder. The empirical study showed that: 1There exists a significant positive relationship between board informal hierarchy strength and firm performance,and this relationship doesn't exist when CEO has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy. When there exists certain level of hierarchy,board will have multiple virtues of democracy and efficiency which will support utilizing the advantages of collective decision function and democratic centralism,and thus high quality decisions can be made quickly and efficiently. Further research finds that the positive effect is of high strength when a chairman has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy. Secondly is other directors and independent directors. The relationship doesn't exist when CEO director has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy. The implication of the results is that when CEO has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy,both the board' s independence of decision-making and validity of supervision will be decreased. 2 Performance pressure and ownership concentration significantly and positively moderate the relationship between board informal hierarchy strength and firm performance. The prominent advantages of the board informal hierarchy exists in decision efficiency,and when the firms face strong performance pressure and thus there has stronger demand for efficiency of decision making,accordingly,the positive effect of informal hierarchy strength on performance will become stronger. 3 State-owned firms' board informal hierarchy strength has a stronger effect on improving the financial performance,whereas mainly in the local government-owned firms; Performance pressure doesn't have a significant effect on the relationship between board informal hierarchy strength and firm performance in stateowned firms. Thus,the results confirmed the positive effects between board informal hierarchy and firm performance and also verified the significance of separation of CEO and chairman of the board and complementarities in the board. Hence these findings can contribute theoretically on how to optimize board governance.
Board informal hierarchy is the key factor that will affect the board governance efficiency and then the firm performance. Based on the relevant data of 1 226 listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China from the year 2010 to2012,using the software of STATA 13. 0 and grouping regression method after measuring the board informal hierarchy Strength with gini index,the paper examines the effect of board informal hierarchy Strength on firm performance and its affecting mechanisms. The paper also divides the listed firms into different groups to study the effect based on the different identities of the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy and the different nature of firm' s ultimate controlling shareholder. The empirical study showed that: 1There exists a significant positive relationship between board informal hierarchy strength and firm performance,and this relationship doesn't exist when CEO has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy. When there exists certain level of hierarchy,board will have multiple virtues of democracy and efficiency which will support utilizing the advantages of collective decision function and democratic centralism,and thus high quality decisions can be made quickly and efficiently. Further research finds that the positive effect is of high strength when a chairman has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy. Secondly is other directors and independent directors. The relationship doesn't exist when CEO director has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy. The implication of the results is that when CEO has the highest rank in the board informal hierarchy,both the board' s independence of decision-making and validity of supervision will be decreased. 2 Performance pressure and ownership concentration significantly and positively moderate the relationship between board informal hierarchy strength and firm performance. The prominent advantages of the board informal hierarchy exists in decision efficiency,and when the firms face strong performance pressure and thus there has stronger demand for efficiency of decision making,accordingly,the positive effect of informal hierarchy strength on performance will become stronger. 3 State-owned firms' board informal hierarchy strength has a stronger effect on improving the financial performance,whereas mainly in the local government-owned firms; Performance pressure doesn't have a significant effect on the relationship between board informal hierarchy strength and firm performance in stateowned firms. Thus,the results confirmed the positive effects between board informal hierarchy and firm performance and also verified the significance of separation of CEO and chairman of the board and complementarities in the board. Hence these findings can contribute theoretically on how to optimize board governance.
引文
[1]Beasley M S.An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud[J].The Accounting Review,1996,71(4):443-465.
[2]于东智,池国华.董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效:理论与经验分析[J].经济研究,2004,39(4):70-79.Yu Dongzhi,Chi Guohua.Number of directors,board stability and performance:Theory and experience[J].Economic Research Journal,2004,39(4):70-79.(in Chinese)
[3]谢绚丽,赵胜利.中小企业的董事会结构与战略选择:基于中国企业的实证研究[J].管理世界,2011(1):101-111.Xie Xuanli,Zhao Shengli.Between the structure of the board of directors of small-and medium-sized enterprises and the selection of strategies[J].Management World,2011(1):101-111.(in Chinese)
[4]Peng M W,Luo Y.Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy:The nature of a micromacro link[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):486-501.
[5]Li H,Zhang Y.The role of managers'political networking and functional experience in new venture performance:Evidence from China's transition economy[J].Strategic Management Journal,2007,28(8):791-804.
[6]Bjrnli E S,Gulbrandsen M.Exploring board formation and evolution of board composition in academic spin-offs[J].The Journal of Technology Transfer,2010,35(1):92-112.
[7]陈仕华,卢昌崇.企业间高管联结与并购溢价决策:基于组织间模仿理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013(5):144-156.Chen Shihua,Lu Changchong.Inter-corporate top managers'ties and the decision-making about acquisition premiuns:A case study based on the theory of the inter-organizational imitation[J].Management World,2013(5):144-156.(in Chinese)
[8]黄张凯,徐信忠,岳云霞.中国上市公司董事会结构分析[J].管理世界,2006(11):128-134.Huang Zhangkai,Xu Xinzhong,Yue Yunxia.The analysis of the structure of the board of directors of the listed company in China[J].Management World,2006(11):128-134.(in Chinese)
[9]南开大学公司治理评价课题组.中国上市公司治理状况评价研究:来自2008年1127家上市公司的数据[J].管理世界,2010(1):142-151.The Group of Study on the Special Subject of Company Governance,Nankai University.A study on the evaluation of the state of the governance of China's listed companies[J].Management World,2010(1):142-151.(in Chinese)
[10]陈立泰,林川.董事会特征与现金股利分配倾向[J].管理世界,2011(10):178-179.Chen Litai,Lin Chuan.Between the characteristics of the board of directors and the tendency to the distribution of the cash dividend[J].Management World,2011(10):178-179.(in Chinese)
[11]叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,张然.独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据[J].经济研究,2011,46(1):126-139.Ye Kangtao,Zhu Jigao,Lu Zhengfei,Zhang Ran.The independence of independent directors:Evidence from board voting behavior[J].Economic Research Journal,2011,46(1):126-139.(in Chinese)
[12]陈运森,谢德仁.董事网络、独立董事治理与高管激励[J].金融研究,2012(2):168-182.Chen Yunsen,Xie Deren.Directors network,independent directors governance and executive incentive[J].Journal of Financial Research,2012(2):168-182.(in Chinese)
[13]杨青,高铭,Besim Burcin Yurtoglu.董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司业绩:合谋还是共同激励?[J].金融研究,2009(6):111-127.Yang Qing,Gao Ming,Besim Burcin Yurtoglu.On the director compensation,CEO compensation and firm's performance[J].Journal of Financial Research,2009(6):111-127.(in Chinese)
[14]Tuggle C S,Schnatterly K,Johnson R A.Attention patterns in the boardroom:How board composition and processes affect discussion of entrepreneurial issues[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2010,53(3):550-571.
[15]Adams R B,Hermalin B E,Weisbach M S.The role of boards of directors in corporate governance:A conceptual framework and survey[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2010,48(1):58-107.
[16]陈仕华,马超.连锁董事联结与会计师事务所选择[J].审计研究,2012(2):75-81,97.Chen Shihua,Ma Chao.Interlocking directorates'ties and auditor selection[J].Auditing Research,2012(2):75-81,97.(in Chinese)
[17]徐业坤,钱先航,李维安.政治不确定性、政治关联与民营企业投资:来自市委书记更替的证据[J].管理世界,2013(5):116-130.Xu Yekun,Qian Xianhang,Li Weian.The political uncertainty,the political link and the investment of private firms[J].Management World,2013(5):116-130.(in Chinese)
[18]Johnson S,Schnatterly K,Bolton J F,Tuggle C.Antecedents of new director social capital[J].Journal of Management Studies,2011,48(8):1782-1803.
[19]Gould R V.The origins of status hierarchies:A formal theory and empirical test[J].American Journal of Sociology,2002,107(5):1143-1178.
[20]Magee J C,Galinsky A D.Social hierarchy:The selfreinforcing nature of power and status[J].Academy of Management Annals,2008,2:351-398.
[21]He J,Huang Z.Board informal hierarchy and firm financial performance:Exploring a tacit structure guiding boardroom interactions[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(6):1119-1139.
[22]Johnson P.Shared thinking and interaction in the family business boardroom[J].Corporate Governance:International Journal of Business in Society,2004,4(1):39-51.
[23]Fama E F.Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[24]Nielsen S,Huse M.The contribution of women on boards of directors:Going beyond the surface[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2010,18(2):136-148.
[25]Gore A K,Matsunaga S,Yeung P E.The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure:Evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives[J].Strategic Management Journal,2011,32(7):771-786.
[26]Finkelstein S,Mooney A C.Not the usual suspects:How to use board process to make boards better[J].The Academy of Management Executive,2003,17(2):101-113.
[27]Bhren,Strm R.Governance and politics:Regulating independence and diversity in the board room[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2010,37(9/10):1281-1308.
[28]Ridgeway C,Johnson C.What is the relationship between socioemotional behavior and status in task groups?[J].American Journal of Sociology,1990,95(5):1189-1212.
[29]Belliveau M A,O'Reilly C AⅢ,Wade J B.Social capital at the top:Effects of social similarity and status on CEO compensation[J].The Academy of Management Journal,1996,39(6):1568-1593.
[30]Ferrier W J.Navigating the competitive landscape:The drivers and consequences of competitive aggressiveness[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2001,44(4):858-877.
[31]Mace M L.Directors:Myth and reality[M].Rev.ed.Boston,Mass:Harvard Business School Press,1986:51-55.
[32]张耀伟.终极控制股东两权偏离与企业绩效:公司治理的中介作用[J].管理科学,2009,22(3):9-16.Zhang Yaowei.Rights departure of ultimate controlling and firm performance:The mediating effect of corporate governance[J].Journal of Management Science,2009,22(3):9-16.(in Chinese)
[33]Davis G F,Yoo M,Baker W E.The small world of the American corporate elite,1982-2001[J].Strategic Organization,2003,1(3):301-326.
[34]Haunschild P R.Interorganizational imitation:The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38(4):564-592.
[35]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[36]Deutsch Y.The impact of board composition on firms'critical decisions:A meta-analytic review[J].Journal of Managerment,2005,31(3):424-444.
[37]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007,42(8):110-122.Xin Qingquan,Lin Bin,Wang Yanchao.Government control,executive compensation and capital investment[J].Economic Research Journal,2007,42(8):110-122.(in Chinese)
[38]马连福,王元芳,沈小秀.国有企业党组织治理、冗余雇员与高管薪酬契约[J].管理世界,2013(5):100-115.Ma Lianfu,Wang Yuanfang,Shen Xiaoxiu.The stateowned enterprise party organization governance,redundant employees and executive compensation contract[J].Management World,2013(5):100-115.(in Chinese)
[39]夏立军,陆铭,余为政.政企纽带与跨省投资:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2011(7):128-140.Xia Lijun,Lu Ming,Yu Weizheng.The link between the government and the enterprise,and the trans-provincial investment[J].Management World,2011(7):128-140.(in Chinese)
[40]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009,44(3):110-124.Fang Junxiong.Is top management compensation of Chinese public companies sticky?[J].Economic Research Journal,2009,44(3):110-124.(in Chinese)
[41]Harris I C,Shimizu K.Too busy to serve?An examination of the influence of overboarded directors[J].Journal of Management Studies,2004,41(5):775-798.
[2]于东智,池国华.董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效:理论与经验分析[J].经济研究,2004,39(4):70-79.Yu Dongzhi,Chi Guohua.Number of directors,board stability and performance:Theory and experience[J].Economic Research Journal,2004,39(4):70-79.(in Chinese)
[3]谢绚丽,赵胜利.中小企业的董事会结构与战略选择:基于中国企业的实证研究[J].管理世界,2011(1):101-111.Xie Xuanli,Zhao Shengli.Between the structure of the board of directors of small-and medium-sized enterprises and the selection of strategies[J].Management World,2011(1):101-111.(in Chinese)
[4]Peng M W,Luo Y.Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy:The nature of a micromacro link[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):486-501.
[5]Li H,Zhang Y.The role of managers'political networking and functional experience in new venture performance:Evidence from China's transition economy[J].Strategic Management Journal,2007,28(8):791-804.
[6]Bjrnli E S,Gulbrandsen M.Exploring board formation and evolution of board composition in academic spin-offs[J].The Journal of Technology Transfer,2010,35(1):92-112.
[7]陈仕华,卢昌崇.企业间高管联结与并购溢价决策:基于组织间模仿理论的实证研究[J].管理世界,2013(5):144-156.Chen Shihua,Lu Changchong.Inter-corporate top managers'ties and the decision-making about acquisition premiuns:A case study based on the theory of the inter-organizational imitation[J].Management World,2013(5):144-156.(in Chinese)
[8]黄张凯,徐信忠,岳云霞.中国上市公司董事会结构分析[J].管理世界,2006(11):128-134.Huang Zhangkai,Xu Xinzhong,Yue Yunxia.The analysis of the structure of the board of directors of the listed company in China[J].Management World,2006(11):128-134.(in Chinese)
[9]南开大学公司治理评价课题组.中国上市公司治理状况评价研究:来自2008年1127家上市公司的数据[J].管理世界,2010(1):142-151.The Group of Study on the Special Subject of Company Governance,Nankai University.A study on the evaluation of the state of the governance of China's listed companies[J].Management World,2010(1):142-151.(in Chinese)
[10]陈立泰,林川.董事会特征与现金股利分配倾向[J].管理世界,2011(10):178-179.Chen Litai,Lin Chuan.Between the characteristics of the board of directors and the tendency to the distribution of the cash dividend[J].Management World,2011(10):178-179.(in Chinese)
[11]叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,张然.独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据[J].经济研究,2011,46(1):126-139.Ye Kangtao,Zhu Jigao,Lu Zhengfei,Zhang Ran.The independence of independent directors:Evidence from board voting behavior[J].Economic Research Journal,2011,46(1):126-139.(in Chinese)
[12]陈运森,谢德仁.董事网络、独立董事治理与高管激励[J].金融研究,2012(2):168-182.Chen Yunsen,Xie Deren.Directors network,independent directors governance and executive incentive[J].Journal of Financial Research,2012(2):168-182.(in Chinese)
[13]杨青,高铭,Besim Burcin Yurtoglu.董事薪酬、CEO薪酬与公司业绩:合谋还是共同激励?[J].金融研究,2009(6):111-127.Yang Qing,Gao Ming,Besim Burcin Yurtoglu.On the director compensation,CEO compensation and firm's performance[J].Journal of Financial Research,2009(6):111-127.(in Chinese)
[14]Tuggle C S,Schnatterly K,Johnson R A.Attention patterns in the boardroom:How board composition and processes affect discussion of entrepreneurial issues[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2010,53(3):550-571.
[15]Adams R B,Hermalin B E,Weisbach M S.The role of boards of directors in corporate governance:A conceptual framework and survey[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2010,48(1):58-107.
[16]陈仕华,马超.连锁董事联结与会计师事务所选择[J].审计研究,2012(2):75-81,97.Chen Shihua,Ma Chao.Interlocking directorates'ties and auditor selection[J].Auditing Research,2012(2):75-81,97.(in Chinese)
[17]徐业坤,钱先航,李维安.政治不确定性、政治关联与民营企业投资:来自市委书记更替的证据[J].管理世界,2013(5):116-130.Xu Yekun,Qian Xianhang,Li Weian.The political uncertainty,the political link and the investment of private firms[J].Management World,2013(5):116-130.(in Chinese)
[18]Johnson S,Schnatterly K,Bolton J F,Tuggle C.Antecedents of new director social capital[J].Journal of Management Studies,2011,48(8):1782-1803.
[19]Gould R V.The origins of status hierarchies:A formal theory and empirical test[J].American Journal of Sociology,2002,107(5):1143-1178.
[20]Magee J C,Galinsky A D.Social hierarchy:The selfreinforcing nature of power and status[J].Academy of Management Annals,2008,2:351-398.
[21]He J,Huang Z.Board informal hierarchy and firm financial performance:Exploring a tacit structure guiding boardroom interactions[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2011,54(6):1119-1139.
[22]Johnson P.Shared thinking and interaction in the family business boardroom[J].Corporate Governance:International Journal of Business in Society,2004,4(1):39-51.
[23]Fama E F.Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[24]Nielsen S,Huse M.The contribution of women on boards of directors:Going beyond the surface[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2010,18(2):136-148.
[25]Gore A K,Matsunaga S,Yeung P E.The role of technical expertise in firm governance structure:Evidence from chief financial officer contractual incentives[J].Strategic Management Journal,2011,32(7):771-786.
[26]Finkelstein S,Mooney A C.Not the usual suspects:How to use board process to make boards better[J].The Academy of Management Executive,2003,17(2):101-113.
[27]Bhren,Strm R.Governance and politics:Regulating independence and diversity in the board room[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2010,37(9/10):1281-1308.
[28]Ridgeway C,Johnson C.What is the relationship between socioemotional behavior and status in task groups?[J].American Journal of Sociology,1990,95(5):1189-1212.
[29]Belliveau M A,O'Reilly C AⅢ,Wade J B.Social capital at the top:Effects of social similarity and status on CEO compensation[J].The Academy of Management Journal,1996,39(6):1568-1593.
[30]Ferrier W J.Navigating the competitive landscape:The drivers and consequences of competitive aggressiveness[J].The Academy of Management Journal,2001,44(4):858-877.
[31]Mace M L.Directors:Myth and reality[M].Rev.ed.Boston,Mass:Harvard Business School Press,1986:51-55.
[32]张耀伟.终极控制股东两权偏离与企业绩效:公司治理的中介作用[J].管理科学,2009,22(3):9-16.Zhang Yaowei.Rights departure of ultimate controlling and firm performance:The mediating effect of corporate governance[J].Journal of Management Science,2009,22(3):9-16.(in Chinese)
[33]Davis G F,Yoo M,Baker W E.The small world of the American corporate elite,1982-2001[J].Strategic Organization,2003,1(3):301-326.
[34]Haunschild P R.Interorganizational imitation:The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38(4):564-592.
[35]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[36]Deutsch Y.The impact of board composition on firms'critical decisions:A meta-analytic review[J].Journal of Managerment,2005,31(3):424-444.
[37]辛清泉,林斌,王彦超.政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资[J].经济研究,2007,42(8):110-122.Xin Qingquan,Lin Bin,Wang Yanchao.Government control,executive compensation and capital investment[J].Economic Research Journal,2007,42(8):110-122.(in Chinese)
[38]马连福,王元芳,沈小秀.国有企业党组织治理、冗余雇员与高管薪酬契约[J].管理世界,2013(5):100-115.Ma Lianfu,Wang Yuanfang,Shen Xiaoxiu.The stateowned enterprise party organization governance,redundant employees and executive compensation contract[J].Management World,2013(5):100-115.(in Chinese)
[39]夏立军,陆铭,余为政.政企纽带与跨省投资:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2011(7):128-140.Xia Lijun,Lu Ming,Yu Weizheng.The link between the government and the enterprise,and the trans-provincial investment[J].Management World,2011(7):128-140.(in Chinese)
[40]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009,44(3):110-124.Fang Junxiong.Is top management compensation of Chinese public companies sticky?[J].Economic Research Journal,2009,44(3):110-124.(in Chinese)
[41]Harris I C,Shimizu K.Too busy to serve?An examination of the influence of overboarded directors[J].Journal of Management Studies,2004,41(5):775-798.