“三微一端”政务信息服务的动态激励机制研究——基于声誉效应
|
摘要
[目的/意义]良好的声誉是政府服务新时代的独特资源,也是督促政府加快提升政务信息服务质量的重要动力。[方法/过程]本文拟基于声誉理论,构建上下级政府显性激励与隐性激励相结合的最优动态激励模型,并以"三微一端"为例,探索声誉效应在政务信息服务质量优化中的作用机制。[结果/结论]研究发现,声誉效应通过内部性效应及外部性效应,对上下级政府行为产生了积极影响,相较于单一的显性激励机制,考虑声誉后的动态激励机制可以有效减轻上级政府的激励压力,同时提升下级政府的努力程度。
[Purpose/Significance] In the new era of micro-government,good reputation is a unique resource for the government service,It is also an important driving force to urge the government to improve the quality of government information service. [Method/Process] Based on the reputation theory,this paper constructs the optimal dynamic incentive mechanism of the superior and subordinate governments,which is made up of the explicit incentive and the implicit incentive. And this paper take the " micro-government" as an example,to explore the role of reputation effects in government information service quality optimization. [Result/Conclusion] The research found that the reputation has a positive effect on the behavior of the governments through the internal effect and the external effect. Compared with the single explicit incentive mechanism,the dynamic incentive mechanism that considers the theory of reputation can effectively reduce the incentive pressure of the superior governments,and promote the efforts of the subordinate governments.
[Purpose/Significance] In the new era of micro-government,good reputation is a unique resource for the government service,It is also an important driving force to urge the government to improve the quality of government information service. [Method/Process] Based on the reputation theory,this paper constructs the optimal dynamic incentive mechanism of the superior and subordinate governments,which is made up of the explicit incentive and the implicit incentive. And this paper take the " micro-government" as an example,to explore the role of reputation effects in government information service quality optimization. [Result/Conclusion] The research found that the reputation has a positive effect on the behavior of the governments through the internal effect and the external effect. Compared with the single explicit incentive mechanism,the dynamic incentive mechanism that considers the theory of reputation can effectively reduce the incentive pressure of the superior governments,and promote the efforts of the subordinate governments.
引文
[1]黄璜.微政务:一种嵌入式的治理初探[J].行政论坛,2016,23(6):42-46.
[2]嵇晨诗.地方政府公共政策短视之成因及其对策[D].金华:浙江师范大学,2016.
[3]朱晓峰,崔露方,陆敬筠.国内外政府信息公开研究的脉络、流派与趋势---基于WOS与CNKI期刊论文的计量与可视化[J].现代情报,2016,36(10):141-148.
[4]张琳,倪超,朱晓峰.基于计量与可视化的国内外微政务对比研究[J].现代情报,2017,37(12):138-143.
[5]宋之杰,巫翠玉,石蕊.政务微信公众号用户采纳研究[J].电子政务,2015,(3):18-25.
[6]Reuter C,Ludwig T,Ritzkatis M,et al.Social-QAS:Tailorable Quality Assessment Service for Social Media Content[J].2015,9083:156-170.
[7]包明林,刘蓉,邹凯等.政务微博服务质量评价指标体系研究[J].现代情报,2015,35(9):93-97.
[8]张晓娟,刘亚茹,邓福成.基于用户满意度的政务微信服务质量评价模型及其实证研究[J].图书与情报,2017,(2):41-47.
[9]夏一雪,兰月新,李昊青,等.面向突发事件的微信舆情生态治理研究[J].现代情报,2017,37(5):28-32.
[10]李军林,姚东旻.声誉可以交易吗?---一个声誉理论的新方向[J].教学与研究,2013,(2):47-54.
[11]佟健.官员激励、任期制与为官不为[J].广东财经大学学报,2017,32(6):15-20.
[12]蒋硕亮.网络环境下的政府声誉管理:理论框架与实践对策[J].江汉论坛,2014,(2):22-27.
[13]张晖.官员异质性、努力扭曲与隐性激励[J].中国经济问题,2011,(5):46-55.
[14]曹启龙,周晶,盛昭瀚.基于声誉效应的PPP项目动态激励契约模型[J].软科学,2016,30(12):20-23.
[2]嵇晨诗.地方政府公共政策短视之成因及其对策[D].金华:浙江师范大学,2016.
[3]朱晓峰,崔露方,陆敬筠.国内外政府信息公开研究的脉络、流派与趋势---基于WOS与CNKI期刊论文的计量与可视化[J].现代情报,2016,36(10):141-148.
[4]张琳,倪超,朱晓峰.基于计量与可视化的国内外微政务对比研究[J].现代情报,2017,37(12):138-143.
[5]宋之杰,巫翠玉,石蕊.政务微信公众号用户采纳研究[J].电子政务,2015,(3):18-25.
[6]Reuter C,Ludwig T,Ritzkatis M,et al.Social-QAS:Tailorable Quality Assessment Service for Social Media Content[J].2015,9083:156-170.
[7]包明林,刘蓉,邹凯等.政务微博服务质量评价指标体系研究[J].现代情报,2015,35(9):93-97.
[8]张晓娟,刘亚茹,邓福成.基于用户满意度的政务微信服务质量评价模型及其实证研究[J].图书与情报,2017,(2):41-47.
[9]夏一雪,兰月新,李昊青,等.面向突发事件的微信舆情生态治理研究[J].现代情报,2017,37(5):28-32.
[10]李军林,姚东旻.声誉可以交易吗?---一个声誉理论的新方向[J].教学与研究,2013,(2):47-54.
[11]佟健.官员激励、任期制与为官不为[J].广东财经大学学报,2017,32(6):15-20.
[12]蒋硕亮.网络环境下的政府声誉管理:理论框架与实践对策[J].江汉论坛,2014,(2):22-27.
[13]张晖.官员异质性、努力扭曲与隐性激励[J].中国经济问题,2011,(5):46-55.
[14]曹启龙,周晶,盛昭瀚.基于声誉效应的PPP项目动态激励契约模型[J].软科学,2016,30(12):20-23.