管理层权力、公司治理与盈余预测质量关系研究
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摘要
本文以2012～2017年发布盈余预测公告的A股上市公司为样本,探讨了管理层权力、公司治理与盈余预测质量的关系。研究发现:管理层权力强度越大,上市公司盈余预测偏离程度越大,相应预测质量就越低;公司治理质量越高的上市公司,其盈余预测质量会越高,且公司治理能够抑制管理层权力强度对于盈余预测质量的负面影响;国有产权性质不会对盈余预测质量产生显著的负面影响,但产权性质强化了管理层权力强度对于盈余预测质量的负面影响。
Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2017 in China, this paper discusses the correlation between managerial power, the quality of corporate governance and the quality of performance forecast.The study finds that the higher the level of managerial power, the greater the deviation from the performance forecasting, corresponding the lower the quality of the performance forecasting. The higher the quality of corporate governance, the higher the quality of the performance forecasting.And corporate governance can effectively suppress the negative impact of corporate governance on the quality of performance forecasting. The nature of property right has no significant negative impact on the quality of performance forecasting, but reinforces the negative impact of excessive corporate governance on the quality of performance forecasting.
Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2017 in China, this paper discusses the correlation between managerial power, the quality of corporate governance and the quality of performance forecast.The study finds that the higher the level of managerial power, the greater the deviation from the performance forecasting, corresponding the lower the quality of the performance forecasting. The higher the quality of corporate governance, the higher the quality of the performance forecasting.And corporate governance can effectively suppress the negative impact of corporate governance on the quality of performance forecasting. The nature of property right has no significant negative impact on the quality of performance forecasting, but reinforces the negative impact of excessive corporate governance on the quality of performance forecasting.
引文
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[10]Langer, E. J. The Illusion of Control[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32(02): 311-328.
[11]Simon, G., Odean, T. Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting[J]. Journal of Finance, 2011, 66(05):1735–1777.
[12]伊闽南,陈国辉.CEO过度自信、公司治理与盈余预测质量[J].改革,2018,(08):149-159.
[13]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲. 中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,(02):81-91.
[14]王烨,叶玲,盛明泉.管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计[J].会计研究,2012,(10):35-41.
[15]Fang, L., Yasuda, A. The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Mechanism in Sell-Side Research[J].Review of Financial Studies, 2009, 22(09):3735-3777.
[2]黎文靖.股东和管理层的权力博弈与会计信息质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J]. 暨南学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,(06):114-123.
[3]袁振超,岳衡,谈文峰.代理成本、所有权性质与业绩预告精确度[J].南开管理评论,2014,(03):49-61.
[4]Matsumoto, D. A. Management’s Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises[J]. Accounting Review, 2002, 77(03): 483-514.
[5]Baginski, S. Kimbrough, M. The Effect of Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts Issued in U. S. and Canadian Markets[J].The Accounting Review,2002,77(01):25-50.
[6]Barber, B. M. Odean, T. Boys Will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116(01): 261-292.
[7]Bertrand, M.,A. Schoar. Managing with Style: The Effects of Managers on Firm Policies[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, 118(04) : 1169-1208.
[8] Jensen, M., W. Meckling. Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(04): 305-360.
[9] Nagar, V., D. Nanda, P. Wysocki. Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-Based Incentives[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2003, 34(01): 283-309.
[10]Langer, E. J. The Illusion of Control[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32(02): 311-328.
[11]Simon, G., Odean, T. Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting[J]. Journal of Finance, 2011, 66(05):1735–1777.
[12]伊闽南,陈国辉.CEO过度自信、公司治理与盈余预测质量[J].改革,2018,(08):149-159.
[13]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲. 中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,(02):81-91.
[14]王烨,叶玲,盛明泉.管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计[J].会计研究,2012,(10):35-41.
[15]Fang, L., Yasuda, A. The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Mechanism in Sell-Side Research[J].Review of Financial Studies, 2009, 22(09):3735-3777.