生物安全三级实验室生物安全风险点的识别与控制?
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摘要
BSL-3实验室须经国家生物安全认可和严格的实验活动审批才能开展相应活动,是国家(地区)开展高致病性病原微生物实验活动的重要技术支撑平台。实验室生物安全风险点易发生在样本及菌毒种的接收、传递和保存,动物实验,污水以及固体废弃物处理等环节,而实验室的意外事件(电力故障、火灾、积水等)与生物安保漏洞也会造成重大的生物安全事故。提示应准确地识别风险并通过人员日常监管、标准操作规程、两级屏障设施和个人防护装备等系列措施对生物安全风险点予以严格控制。
As an important technical support platform for the national(regional)activities related to highly pathogenic microorganisms,bio-safety level 3 laboratories(BSL-3 laboratories)must carry out such activities subject to the accreditation of bio-safety and rigorous approval by the state. Bio-safety risk points would be likely to appear in the processes consisting of receiving,transferring and preserving samples and bacterial & viral strains,animal experiments,disposal of sewage and solid waste,while major bio-safety accidents may also be caused by contingency(power failure,fire,water accumulation,etc.)and bio-security leaks. Therefore,it was suggested that risks should be identified accurately and bio-safety risk points should be strictly controlled through a series of measures,including strengthening daily supervision by personnel,standardizing operating procedures,setting two-level barrier facilities and improving personal protective equipment.
As an important technical support platform for the national(regional)activities related to highly pathogenic microorganisms,bio-safety level 3 laboratories(BSL-3 laboratories)must carry out such activities subject to the accreditation of bio-safety and rigorous approval by the state. Bio-safety risk points would be likely to appear in the processes consisting of receiving,transferring and preserving samples and bacterial & viral strains,animal experiments,disposal of sewage and solid waste,while major bio-safety accidents may also be caused by contingency(power failure,fire,water accumulation,etc.)and bio-security leaks. Therefore,it was suggested that risks should be identified accurately and bio-safety risk points should be strictly controlled through a series of measures,including strengthening daily supervision by personnel,standardizing operating procedures,setting two-level barrier facilities and improving personal protective equipment.
引文
[1]中国合格评定国家认可中心.生物安全实验室认可与管理基础知识风险评估技术指南[M].北京:中国质检出版社中国标准出版社,2012.
[2]中华人民共和国卫生部.可感染人类的高致病性病原微生物菌(毒)种或样本运输管理规定:第45号[A/OL].(2005-12-28)[2018-10-25].http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohzcfgs/s3577/200804/27546.shtml.
[3]GRENOBLE R. Guanarito virus vial missing from galves-ton national laboratory's secure facility[EB/OL].(2013-03-25)[2018-10-25].https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/25/guanarito-virus-missing-galveston-lab_n_2949271.html.
[4]李京京,靳晓军,程洪亮,等.高等级生物安全实验室风险案例分析和思考[J].生物技术通讯, 2018,29(2):271-276.
[5]赵俊杰,张莹辉,姚文生,等.动物生物安全三级实验室解剖设施配置与管理[J].黑龙江畜牧兽医,2018(23):210-211.
[6]蒋晋生,张义,张扬,等.生物安全三级实验室活毒废水处理系统探讨[J].中国卫生工程学, 2013,12(4):324-325.
[7]孙志平,韩文东,丁悦娜,等.三级生物安全实验室感染性废弃物处理相关问题的探讨[J].微生物与感染,2011,6(1):59-62.
[2]中华人民共和国卫生部.可感染人类的高致病性病原微生物菌(毒)种或样本运输管理规定:第45号[A/OL].(2005-12-28)[2018-10-25].http://www.moh.gov.cn/mohzcfgs/s3577/200804/27546.shtml.
[3]GRENOBLE R. Guanarito virus vial missing from galves-ton national laboratory's secure facility[EB/OL].(2013-03-25)[2018-10-25].https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/25/guanarito-virus-missing-galveston-lab_n_2949271.html.
[4]李京京,靳晓军,程洪亮,等.高等级生物安全实验室风险案例分析和思考[J].生物技术通讯, 2018,29(2):271-276.
[5]赵俊杰,张莹辉,姚文生,等.动物生物安全三级实验室解剖设施配置与管理[J].黑龙江畜牧兽医,2018(23):210-211.
[6]蒋晋生,张义,张扬,等.生物安全三级实验室活毒废水处理系统探讨[J].中国卫生工程学, 2013,12(4):324-325.
[7]孙志平,韩文东,丁悦娜,等.三级生物安全实验室感染性废弃物处理相关问题的探讨[J].微生物与感染,2011,6(1):59-62.