企业研发投入影响高管薪酬契约设计研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
通过选取2009—2016年深沪两市A股上市公司的混合截面数据作为研究样本,基于2SLS与OLS回归,解决内生性问题、进行均值差异T检验等稳健性测试。实证得到:研发初期的薪酬激励可以促进高管进行研发投入,而在国有企业里这种影响更大;企业研发投入的加大,增强了高管薪酬—业绩敏感性,这种效果在民营企业、国有非高新技术产业与民营高新技术产业的企业里更为显著。
This paper chose the mixed cross-section data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2009 to 2016 as research samples,applied 2 SLS and OLS regression,solved the endogeneity problems,did the mean difference T-test and other robustness tests. The empirical results showed that: in the early stage of R&D,compensation incentives can promote executives to invest in R&D,and in the state-owned enterprises,it had greater impact. The increase of R&D investment has enhanced executive compensation-performance sensitivity; this effect was more pronounced in private-owned enterprises,state-owned non-hi-tech industries and private high-tech industries.
This paper chose the mixed cross-section data of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2009 to 2016 as research samples,applied 2 SLS and OLS regression,solved the endogeneity problems,did the mean difference T-test and other robustness tests. The empirical results showed that: in the early stage of R&D,compensation incentives can promote executives to invest in R&D,and in the state-owned enterprises,it had greater impact. The increase of R&D investment has enhanced executive compensation-performance sensitivity; this effect was more pronounced in private-owned enterprises,state-owned non-hi-tech industries and private high-tech industries.
引文
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[2]卢锐.企业创新投资与高管薪酬业绩敏感性[J].会计研究,2014,10:36-42.
[3]BENNETT B,BETTIS C,GOPALAN R,et al.Costs of including accounting performance goals in executive compensation[R].Working Paper,2015.
[4]方军雄.我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗?[J].经济研究,2009(3):110-124.
[5]谌新民,刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构性差异的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(8):55-63.
[6]JENSEN M C,MURPHY K J.Performance pay and top-management incentives[J].Journal of political economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[7]FAMA E F,JENSEN M C.Agency problems and residual claims[J].The Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):327-349.
[8]林毅夫,李志赟.政策性负担,道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004(02):17-27.
[9]孙早,肖利平.产业特征,公司治理与企业研发投入——来自中国战略性新兴产业A股上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2015(8):23-34.