高管背景与企业债务期限结构——基于高管激励的调节作用
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摘要
高管背景与债务期限结构的关系一直是学术界的热点,有效的激励制度会对高管行为产生影响,从而影响企业债务融资的能力和决策。本文结合高阶理论、债务契约理论和激励理论,选取2012-2016年我国A股上市公司的数据,引入高管激励作为调节变量,实证检验了我国企业高管背景与债务期限结构的关系。结果表明,高管教育背景和政府背景与债务期限结构存在显著正相关,高管学术背景则与债务期限结构呈负相关,且这种相关关系在不同的激励制度和不同的产权性质下存在异质性。研究结论为企业如何优化高管团队提供了新思路。
the relationship between senior executives' background and debt maturity structure has been a hot topic in the academic circle. Effective incentive system will affect senior executives' behaviors, thus affecting the ability and decision-making of corporate debt financing. This paper combines the higher-order theory, debt contract theory and incentive theory, selects the data of China's a-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016,introduces executive incentive as the moderating variable, and empirically tests the relationship between the background of senior executives and debt maturity structure of China's enterprises. The results show that executive education background and government background are significantly positively correlated with debt maturity structure, while executive academic background is negatively correlated with debt maturity structure,and the correlation is heterogeneous under different incentive systems and different property rights. The conclusion provides a new way for enterprises to optimize the executive team.
the relationship between senior executives' background and debt maturity structure has been a hot topic in the academic circle. Effective incentive system will affect senior executives' behaviors, thus affecting the ability and decision-making of corporate debt financing. This paper combines the higher-order theory, debt contract theory and incentive theory, selects the data of China's a-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016,introduces executive incentive as the moderating variable, and empirically tests the relationship between the background of senior executives and debt maturity structure of China's enterprises. The results show that executive education background and government background are significantly positively correlated with debt maturity structure, while executive academic background is negatively correlated with debt maturity structure,and the correlation is heterogeneous under different incentive systems and different property rights. The conclusion provides a new way for enterprises to optimize the executive team.
引文
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[9]卢馨,张乐乐,李慧敏,等.高管团队背景特征与投资效率——基于高管激励的调节效应研究[J].审计与经济研究,2017(2):66-77.
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[2]葛永波,陈磊,刘立安.管理者风格:企业主动选择还是管理者随性施予?——基于中国上市公司投融资决策的证据[J].金融研究,2016(4):190-206.
[3]王福胜,程富.管理防御视角下的CFO与会计政策选择——来自资产减值计提的经验证据[J].会计研究,2014(12):32-38.
[4]余明桂,王娟.高管的银行背景、所有权性质与会计稳健性[J].财务研究,2015(2):68-77.
[5]Hart O D. Firm,Contracts,and Financial Structure[J]. Oup Catalogue,1995(3):446-452.
[6]魏刚.回归创投的“新”人——访启明创投董事总经理甘剑平[J].中国投资,2007(3):75-77.
[7]周楷唐,麻志明,吴联生.高管学术经历与公司债务融资成本[J].经济研究,2017(7).
[8]李胜楠,刘一璇,陈靖涵.基金在中国上市公司中发挥治理作用了吗——基于影响高管非自愿变更与业绩之间敏感性的分析[J].南开管理评论,2015(2):4-14.
[9]卢馨,张乐乐,李慧敏,等.高管团队背景特征与投资效率——基于高管激励的调节效应研究[J].审计与经济研究,2017(2):66-77.
[10]肖作平.中国上市公司债务期限结构特征的实证检验[J].证券市场导报,2006(2):51-57.