管理层权力、盈余管理与薪酬差距激励效应
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摘要
以我国沪深A股上市公司2008—2016年的数据为样本,研究管理层权力作用下高管盈余管理行为对薪酬差距激励效应的影响。研究表明,盈余操纵导致的薪酬差距,即"操纵性薪酬差距",具有负面激励效应,会导致企业未来业绩的减损;而与公司真实利润相关的薪酬差距,即"非操纵性薪酬差距",具有正面激励效应,会促进企业未来业绩的提升,但这种正面激励效应呈现边际递减趋势。进一步的研究表明,薪酬差距的激励效应在不同行业存在差异。当上市公司属于竞争性行业或景气度较高的行业时,非操纵性薪酬差距的正面激励效应更加显著,而操纵性薪酬差距的负面激励效应不会因行业而发生明显改变。
Taking the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2016 as samples,this paper studies the effect of executive earnings management behavior on the incentive effect of pay gap under the influence of managerial power. It shows that"manipulative pay gap",i. e. the pay gap caused by earnings manipulation,has a negative incentive effect and harms the future performance of the company. Meanwhile,"non-manipulative pay gap",i.e.the pay gap connected with the real profits of the company,plays a positive role in promoting the company's future performance,but this positive incentive effect shows a marginal decline. Further research shows that incentive effect of pay gap varies from industry to industry. For companies in a competitive industry or in a booming industry,the positive incentive effect of non-manipulative pay gap is stronger,while the negative incentive effect of manipulative pay gap remains at a similar level regardless of different industries.
Taking the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2016 as samples,this paper studies the effect of executive earnings management behavior on the incentive effect of pay gap under the influence of managerial power. It shows that"manipulative pay gap",i. e. the pay gap caused by earnings manipulation,has a negative incentive effect and harms the future performance of the company. Meanwhile,"non-manipulative pay gap",i.e.the pay gap connected with the real profits of the company,plays a positive role in promoting the company's future performance,but this positive incentive effect shows a marginal decline. Further research shows that incentive effect of pay gap varies from industry to industry. For companies in a competitive industry or in a booming industry,the positive incentive effect of non-manipulative pay gap is stronger,while the negative incentive effect of manipulative pay gap remains at a similar level regardless of different industries.
引文
[1]佟爱琴,陈蔚.产权性质、管理层权力与薪酬差距激励效应--基于政府补助的中介作用[J].管理科学,2017(2):106-118.
[2]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理--基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7):111-119.
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[4]Lin B X,Lu R.Managerial power,compensation gap and firm performance--Evidence from Chinese public listed companies[J].Global Finance Journal,2009,20(2):153-164.
[5]Connelly B L,Tihanyi L,Crook T R,et al.Tournament theory:Thirty years of contests and competitions[J].Journal of Management,2014,40(1):16-47.
[6]Carpenter M A,Sanders W G.The effects of top management team pay and firm internationalization on MNC performance[J].Journal of Management,2004,30(4):509-528.
[7]于富生,张颖.薪酬差距与盈余管理[J].经济问题,2013(4):112-117.
[8]Lee K W,Lev B,Yeo G H H.Executive pay dispersion,corporate governance,and firm performance[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2008,30(3):315-338.
[9]Finkelstein S.Power in top management teams:Dimensions,measurement,and validation[J].Academy of Management journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[10]佟爱琴,徐晓东.人力资本的剩余索取权与资本收益的安排[J].管理科学,2005,18(6):24-29.
[11]Hagerman R L,Zmijewski M E.Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice[J].Journal of accounting and economics,1979,1(2):141-161.
[12]李延喜,包世泽,高锐,孔宪京.薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理[J].南开管理评论,2007,10(6):55-61.
[13]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究--基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109.
[14]武鹏.行业垄断对中国行业收入差距的影响[J].中国工业经济,2011(10):76-86.
[15]罗宏,曾永良,宛玲羽.薪酬攀比、盈余管理与高管薪酬操纵[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(2):19-31.
[16]薛爽.经济周期、行业景气度与亏损公司定价[J].管理世界,2008(7):145-150.
[2]王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理--基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(7):111-119.
[3]Lazear E P,Rosen S.Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J].Journal of political Economy,1981,89(5):841-864.
[4]Lin B X,Lu R.Managerial power,compensation gap and firm performance--Evidence from Chinese public listed companies[J].Global Finance Journal,2009,20(2):153-164.
[5]Connelly B L,Tihanyi L,Crook T R,et al.Tournament theory:Thirty years of contests and competitions[J].Journal of Management,2014,40(1):16-47.
[6]Carpenter M A,Sanders W G.The effects of top management team pay and firm internationalization on MNC performance[J].Journal of Management,2004,30(4):509-528.
[7]于富生,张颖.薪酬差距与盈余管理[J].经济问题,2013(4):112-117.
[8]Lee K W,Lev B,Yeo G H H.Executive pay dispersion,corporate governance,and firm performance[J].Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting,2008,30(3):315-338.
[9]Finkelstein S.Power in top management teams:Dimensions,measurement,and validation[J].Academy of Management journal,1992,35(3):505-538.
[10]佟爱琴,徐晓东.人力资本的剩余索取权与资本收益的安排[J].管理科学,2005,18(6):24-29.
[11]Hagerman R L,Zmijewski M E.Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice[J].Journal of accounting and economics,1979,1(2):141-161.
[12]李延喜,包世泽,高锐,孔宪京.薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理[J].南开管理评论,2007,10(6):55-61.
[13]吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究--基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109.
[14]武鹏.行业垄断对中国行业收入差距的影响[J].中国工业经济,2011(10):76-86.
[15]罗宏,曾永良,宛玲羽.薪酬攀比、盈余管理与高管薪酬操纵[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(2):19-31.
[16]薛爽.经济周期、行业景气度与亏损公司定价[J].管理世界,2008(7):145-150.