财务独立董事能否抑制高管的价值损毁行为?——基于我国A股上市公司并购的经验证据
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摘要
基于我国发生并购行为的沪深A股上市公司2010—2013年的数据,研究财务独立董事对管理层私利、高管过度自信和企业并购绩效的影响,结果表明:财务独立董事对企业并购绩效有显著的正向影响;管理层私利与高管过度自信均会造成企业并购后绩效的下降;财务独立董事通过抑制管理层私利和高管过度自信可改善企业并购绩效,同时,财务独立董事的年龄、学术背景将会对其改善并购绩效起到显著的推动作用。
Based on the A-share listed companies of China in M&A from 2010 to 2013,this paper empirically investigates the impacts of financial independent directors on executive personal benefits,executive overconfidence and M&A performance.The results show that financial independent directors have a significant positive impact on M&A performance of firms. Both executive personal benefits and executive overconfidence will result in a decrease in the performance of firms after M&A. Financial independent directors can improve M&A performance of firms through restraining executive personal benefits and executive overconfidence. Meanwhile,the age,academic background of the financial independent directors will play a significant role in improving M&A performance.
Based on the A-share listed companies of China in M&A from 2010 to 2013,this paper empirically investigates the impacts of financial independent directors on executive personal benefits,executive overconfidence and M&A performance.The results show that financial independent directors have a significant positive impact on M&A performance of firms. Both executive personal benefits and executive overconfidence will result in a decrease in the performance of firms after M&A. Financial independent directors can improve M&A performance of firms through restraining executive personal benefits and executive overconfidence. Meanwhile,the age,academic background of the financial independent directors will play a significant role in improving M&A performance.
引文
[1]王兵.独立董事监督了吗?---基于中国上市公司盈余质量的视角[J].金融研究,2007(1):109-121.
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[8]施继坤,刘淑莲,张广宝.管理层缘何频繁发起并购:过度自信抑或私利[J].华东经济管理,2014(12):84-90.
[9]李善民,朱滔.管理者动机与并购绩效关系研究[J].经济管理,2005(4):4-12.
[10]Malmendier U,Tate G.Who makes acquisitions?CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(1):20-43.
[11]李维安,徐建.董事会独立性、总经理继任与战略变化幅度---独立董事有效性的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2014(1):4-13.
[12]Fama E F,Jensen M C.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[13]Francis B,Hasan I,Qiang W.Professors in the boardroom and their impact on corporate governance and firm performance[J].Financial Management,2015,44(3):547-581.
[14]魏志华,吴育辉,李常青.家族控制、双重委托代理冲突与现金股利政策---基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].金融研究,2012(7):168-181.
[15]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞,等.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009(1):131-143.
[16]高明华,马守莉.独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析---兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境[J].南开经济研究,2002(2):64-68.
[17]李善民,毛雅娟,赵晶晶.高管持股、高管的私有收益与公司的并购行为[J].管理科学,2009(6):2-12.
[18]郝颖,刘星,林朝南.我国上市公司高管人员过度自信与投资决策的实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2005(5):142-148.
[2]唐雪松,申慧,杜军.独立董事监督中的动机---基于独立意见的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010(9):138-149.
[3]叶康涛,祝继高,陆正飞,等.独立董事的独立性:基于董事会投票的证据[J].经济研究,2011(1):126-139.
[4]Haleblian J,Devers C E,McNamara G,et al.Taking stock of what we know about mergers and acquisitions:A review and research agenda[J].Journal of Management,2009,35(3):469-502.
[5]Byrd J,Hickman K.The case for independent outside directors[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1992,5(3):78-82.
[6]郑立东,程小可,姚立杰.独立董事背景特征与企业投资效率---“帮助之手”抑或“抑制之手”[J].经济与管理研究,2013(8):5-14.
[7]李云鹤.公司过度投资源于管理者代理还是过度自信[J].世界经济,2014(12):95-117.
[8]施继坤,刘淑莲,张广宝.管理层缘何频繁发起并购:过度自信抑或私利[J].华东经济管理,2014(12):84-90.
[9]李善民,朱滔.管理者动机与并购绩效关系研究[J].经济管理,2005(4):4-12.
[10]Malmendier U,Tate G.Who makes acquisitions?CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(1):20-43.
[11]李维安,徐建.董事会独立性、总经理继任与战略变化幅度---独立董事有效性的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2014(1):4-13.
[12]Fama E F,Jensen M C.Separation of ownership and control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(2):301-325.
[13]Francis B,Hasan I,Qiang W.Professors in the boardroom and their impact on corporate governance and firm performance[J].Financial Management,2015,44(3):547-581.
[14]魏志华,吴育辉,李常青.家族控制、双重委托代理冲突与现金股利政策---基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].金融研究,2012(7):168-181.
[15]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞,等.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009(1):131-143.
[16]高明华,马守莉.独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析---兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境[J].南开经济研究,2002(2):64-68.
[17]李善民,毛雅娟,赵晶晶.高管持股、高管的私有收益与公司的并购行为[J].管理科学,2009(6):2-12.
[18]郝颖,刘星,林朝南.我国上市公司高管人员过度自信与投资决策的实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2005(5):142-148.