财务冗余、股权集中度与企业产品创新——基于高科技上市公司的实证数据
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摘要
以2007-2014年我国高科技上市公司为研究样本,基于资源基础论和委托代理理论,实证检验不同类型财务冗余对企业产品创新的作用,并引入股权集中度,研究其如何调节不同类型财务冗余对产品创新的作用。研究发现:可利用财务冗余有利于企业产品创新的推进;而潜在财务冗余却对企业产品创新产生负向影响,即负债率越高,潜在财务冗余越低,企业越倾向于实施产品创新;且股权集中度增强了可利用财务冗余对企业产品创新的促进作用,但也放大了潜在财务冗余产生的负向影响。
Because of high uncertainty of product innovation activities, the allocations of financial resources have their specific requirements. Based on the resource-based view and the agent theory, we use the data of Chinese high-tech listed companies to examine the effect mechanism between different financial slack and firms' product innovation firstly. Then we introduce ownership concentration to study how the effect mechanism can be altered. Our results show that different types of financial slack have different influence to product innovation activities: the available financial slack can be used to promote product innovation, while potential financial slack has a negative impact on product innovation, that is, the higher the debt ratio, the lower the potential financial slack, the more obvious the product innovation activities. These relationships are affected by corporate ownership concentration, for we find that equity concentration significantly enhance the positive effect of available financial slack and the negative impact of potential financial slack on product innovation.
Because of high uncertainty of product innovation activities, the allocations of financial resources have their specific requirements. Based on the resource-based view and the agent theory, we use the data of Chinese high-tech listed companies to examine the effect mechanism between different financial slack and firms' product innovation firstly. Then we introduce ownership concentration to study how the effect mechanism can be altered. Our results show that different types of financial slack have different influence to product innovation activities: the available financial slack can be used to promote product innovation, while potential financial slack has a negative impact on product innovation, that is, the higher the debt ratio, the lower the potential financial slack, the more obvious the product innovation activities. These relationships are affected by corporate ownership concentration, for we find that equity concentration significantly enhance the positive effect of available financial slack and the negative impact of potential financial slack on product innovation.
引文
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[25] 毕晓方,翟淑萍,姜宝强.政府补贴、财务冗余对高新技术企业双元创新的影响[J].会计研究,2017 (1):46-52.
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[27] Blundell R,Bond S.Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models [J].Journal of Econometrics,1998,87(1):115-143.
[2] Bourgeois L J.On the measurement of organizational slack [J].Academy of Management Reviews,1981,6(1):29-39.
[3] Geoffrey Love E,Nohria N.Reducing slack:the performance consequences of downsizing by large industrial firms [J].Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(12):1087-1108.
[4] Liu H,Ding X H,Guo H,et al.How does slack affect product innovation in high-tech chinese firms:the contingent value of entrepreneurial orientation [J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2014,31(1):47-68.
[5] Troilo G,Luca L M D,Atuahene-Gima K.More innovation with less?a strategic contingency view of slack resources,information search,and radical innovation [J].Journal Product Innovation Management,2014,31(2):259-277.
[6] Chen C J,Huang Y.Creative workforce density,organizational slack,and innovation performance [J].Journal of Business Research,2009,63(4):411-418.
[7] Pang C W,Shen H,Li Y.How organizational slack affects new venture performance in China:a contingent perspective [J].Chinese Management Studies,2011,5(2):181-193.
[8] George G.Slack resources and the performance of privately held firms [J].Academy of Management Journal,2005,48(4):661-676.
[9] 陈晓红,王艳,关勇军.财务冗余、制度环境与中小企业研发投资[J].科学学研究,2012,30(10):1538-1545.
[10] Alessandri T,Cerrato D,Depperu D.Organizational slack,experience,and acquisition behavior across varying economic environments [J].Management Decision,2014,52(5):967-982.
[11] 刘端,王雅帆,陈收.财务冗余对企业竞争战略选择的影响——基于中国制造业全行业实证数据[J].系统管理学报,2018,27(1):85-92.
[12] Hill C W L,Snell S A.External control,corporate strategy,and firm performance in research-intensive industries [J].Strategic Management Journal,1988,9(6):577-590.
[13] Francis J,Smith A.Agency costs and innovation some empirical evidence [J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,1995,19(2):383-409.
[14] Lee P M,O'neill H M.Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S.and Japanese firms:agency and stewardship perspectives [J].Academy of Management Journal,2003,46(2):212-225.
[15] Baker N,Freeland J.Recent advances in R&D benefit measurement and project selection methods [J].Management Science,1975,21 (10):1164-1175.
[16] Hall B H,Lerner J.The financing of R&D and innovation [J].Handbook of the Economics of Innovation,2010,(1):609-639.
[17] Hall B H.The financing of research and development [J].Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2002,18(1):35-51.
[18] Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and ownership structure [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):303-360.
[19] 郭瑾,刘志远,彭涛.银行贷款对企业风险承担的影响:推动还是抑制?[J].会计研究,2017 (2):42-48.
[20] 杨皎平,徐维隆,赵宏霞.产业集群下经理人隐性激励机制作用效果分析[J].管理评论,2010,22(5):63-68.
[21] 李云鹤.企业成长、管理者代理与公司资本配置效率[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(6):788-796.
[22] Li D W,Li J L.Intellectual capital,slack resources and corporate value:empirical analysis of a moderating effect model [D].11th Wuhan Internal Conference one-Business,WuHan,2012:347-356.
[23] Harford J,Mansi S A,Maxwell W F.Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87(3):535-555.
[24] Chatterji A K,Fabrizio K R.Using users:when does external knowledge enhance corporate product innovation [J].Strategic Management Journal,2014,35(10):1427-1445.
[25] 毕晓方,翟淑萍,姜宝强.政府补贴、财务冗余对高新技术企业双元创新的影响[J].会计研究,2017 (1):46-52.
[26] Arellano M,Bond S R.Some tests of specification for panel data:monte carlo evidence and an application to employment equations [J].The Review of Economic Studies,1991,58(2):277-297.
[27] Blundell R,Bond S.Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models [J].Journal of Econometrics,1998,87(1):115-143.