期权激励、媒体关注与税收激进行为:基于媒体情绪的公司治理机制研究
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摘要
基于期权激励收益风险的不对称特性,本文从管理者风险偏好视角研究期权激励对税收激进行为的影响,检验媒体关注的外部监督作用,探究不同媒体情绪对媒体发挥监督作用的影响。在控制内生性的基础上,以2011-2014中国A股上市公司为研究样本,使用上市公司媒体新闻报道的大数据分析作为媒体关注的代理变量,进行了实证研究,结果发现:期权激励可以有效提升管理者的风险偏好,提高其税收激进程度,同时媒体关注由于加速信息传递,暴露上市公司问题等功能,可以有效发挥外部监督作用,抑制税收激进行为。另外,不同的媒体情绪对其发挥外部监督作用的结果也有很大的影响,在极端正面或极端负面的媒体情绪下,媒体关注的外部监督作用会得到增强。研究拓展了期权激励研究领域,将媒体关注研究推进到媒体情绪层面,有着重要的理论和实际意义。
The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations creates a conflict between shareholders and managers. Based on equity incentives, executive compensation contracts are one potential mechanism for aligning the interests of stakeholders, which can expose the managers' wealth to the fluctuation of stock price. Compared to stock incentives, options could stimulate the risk aggressiveness of managers owing to its convex function. The primary purpose of this paper is to explore whether option incentives are positively related to managers' tax aggressiveness propensity.However, every coin has two sides. The high sensitivity of managers' wealth to stock price offered by options holdings motivates managers to engage in short-termism behavior of inflating current stock price at the expense of long-term firm value by manipulating accounting numbers, and even educing future stock crashes. Therefore, we want to investigate whether there exists an effective corporate governance mechanism to limit this effect. Considering the function of information spreading, we regard media coverage as an effective external supervision mechanism to restrict the excessive aggressiveness from option incentives. Moreover, we explore this supervision function under different coverage modes. After controlling endogenous problem, we chose listed companies in Chinese capital market from 2011-2014 as our research sample and use big-data analysis to identify the proxy variable of media coverage to implement empirical research. The result shows that option incentives are an effective way to motivate managers' risk appetite, encourage a company to take a more aggressive tax position. However, media coverage plays a vital role in external supervision mechanism to constrain this aggressive behavior by exposing the company under the general public. Moreover, we examined the function of media coverage under different coverage modes, and found that the supervision effect would increase in extreme consensus environment(both extreme positive and extreme negative environments). Compared to options, we didn't find the same result on stock incentives in future researches due to the symmetric influence of risks and returns, which further justifies the risk-stimulus function of option incentives. These results are still robust if other measurements of option incentives are chosen. This paper extends the research of option incentives on tax aggressive area and push the research of media coverage into substantial content level, which has important theoretical and practical implications.
The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations creates a conflict between shareholders and managers. Based on equity incentives, executive compensation contracts are one potential mechanism for aligning the interests of stakeholders, which can expose the managers' wealth to the fluctuation of stock price. Compared to stock incentives, options could stimulate the risk aggressiveness of managers owing to its convex function. The primary purpose of this paper is to explore whether option incentives are positively related to managers' tax aggressiveness propensity.However, every coin has two sides. The high sensitivity of managers' wealth to stock price offered by options holdings motivates managers to engage in short-termism behavior of inflating current stock price at the expense of long-term firm value by manipulating accounting numbers, and even educing future stock crashes. Therefore, we want to investigate whether there exists an effective corporate governance mechanism to limit this effect. Considering the function of information spreading, we regard media coverage as an effective external supervision mechanism to restrict the excessive aggressiveness from option incentives. Moreover, we explore this supervision function under different coverage modes. After controlling endogenous problem, we chose listed companies in Chinese capital market from 2011-2014 as our research sample and use big-data analysis to identify the proxy variable of media coverage to implement empirical research. The result shows that option incentives are an effective way to motivate managers' risk appetite, encourage a company to take a more aggressive tax position. However, media coverage plays a vital role in external supervision mechanism to constrain this aggressive behavior by exposing the company under the general public. Moreover, we examined the function of media coverage under different coverage modes, and found that the supervision effect would increase in extreme consensus environment(both extreme positive and extreme negative environments). Compared to options, we didn't find the same result on stock incentives in future researches due to the symmetric influence of risks and returns, which further justifies the risk-stimulus function of option incentives. These results are still robust if other measurements of option incentives are chosen. This paper extends the research of option incentives on tax aggressive area and push the research of media coverage into substantial content level, which has important theoretical and practical implications.
引文
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[2]Jensen MC,Murphy KJ.CEO incentives:It's not how much you pay,but how[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1990,3:36-49.
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[11]于忠泊,田高良,齐保垒,et al.媒体关注的公司治理机制--基于盈余管理视角的考察[J].管理世界,2011,(9):127-140.
[12]丁保利,王胜海,刘西友.股票期权激励机制在我国的发展方向探析[J].会计研究,2012,(6):76-80.
[13]张先治.股票期权理论及在公司激励中的应用研究[J].会计研究,2002,(7):16-24.
[14]金雪军,余津津.“股票期权”激励机制与国有企业改革[J].管理世界,2000,(5):207-209.
[15]Morck R,Shleifer A,Vishny RW.Management ownership and market valuation:An empirical analysis[J].Journal of financial economics,1988,20:293-315.
[16]Mc Connell JJ,Servaes H.Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value[J].Journal of financial economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[17]Mehran H.Executive compensation structure,ownership,and firm performance[J].Journal of financial economics,1995,38(2):163-184.
[18]Rajgopal S,Shevlin T.Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2002,33(02):145-171.
[19]Coles JL,Daniel ND,Naveen L.Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J].Journal of financial economics,2006,79(2):431-468.
[20]Chen Y,Gul FA,Veeraraghavan M,et al.Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Audit Pricing[J].The Accounting Review,2015,.
[21]Stickney CP,Mcgee VE.Effective corporate tax rates the effect of size,capital intensity,leverage,and other factors*[J].Journal of Accounting&Public Policy,1982,1(2):125-152.
[22]Zimmerman JL.Taxes and firm size[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1983,5(2):119-149.
[23]Porcano TM.Corporate Tax Rates:Progressive,Proportional,or Regressive[J].Journal of the American Taxation Association,1986,7(2):17-31.
[24]Shevlin TJ,Porter S.The corporate tax comeback in 1987:Some further evidence[J].Journal of the American Taxation Association,1992,14(1):58-79.
[25]Graham JR,Tucker AL.Tax shelters and corporate debt policy[J].Journal of financial economics,2006,81(3):563-594.
[26]Wilson RJ.An examination of corporate tax shelter participants[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(3):969-999.
[27]Lisowsky,Petro.Seeking Shelter:Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial Statement Information[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(5):1693-1720.
[28]Chen S,Chen X,Cheng Q,et al.Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?[J].Journal of financial economics,2010,95(1):41-61.
[29]Crocker KJ,Slemrod J.Corporate tax evasion with agency costs[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9-10):1593-1610.
[30]Chava S,Purnanandam A.CEOs versus CFOs:Incentives and corporate policies☆[J].Journal of financial economics,2010,97(2):263-278.
[31]Jiang J,Petroni KR,Wang IY.CFOs and CEOs:Who have the most influence on earnings management?[J].Journal of financial economics,2010,96(3):513-526.
[32]张兆国,郑宝红,李明.公司治理、税收规避和现金持有价值--来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):15-24.
[33]严晓宁.媒体在上市公司治理中的角色和功能[J].经济管理,2008,(09):72-76.
[34]李培功,沈艺峰.媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据[J].经济研究,2010,(4):14-27.
[35]Dyck A,Volchkova N,Zingales L.The Corporate Governance Role of the Media:Evidence from Russia[J].Working Papers,2008,63(3):1093-1135.
[36]Fang L,Peress J.Media Coverage and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2008,64(5):2023-2052.
[37]Kim JB,Yu Z,Zhang H.Can Media Exposure Improve Stock Price Efficiency in China and Why?[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2015,.
[38]田高良,司毅,韩洁.媒体关注与税收激进-基于公司治理视角的考察[J].管理科学,2016,29(2):104-121..
[39]吴联生.国有股权、税收优惠与公司税负[J].经济研究,2009,(10):109-120.
[40]Hanlon M,Rajgopal S,Shevlin T.Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2002,36(1-3):3-43.
[41]吕长江,严明珠,郑慧莲,et al.为什么上市公司选择股权激励计划?[J].会计研究,2011,(01):68-75.
[42]Hanlon M,Heitzman S.A review of tax research[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2010,50(2-3):127-178.
[43]金鑫,雷光勇.审计监督、最终控制人性质与税收激进度[J].审计研究,2011,(5):98-106.
[44]夏立军,陈信元.市场化进程、国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定[J].经济研究,2007,(7):82-95.
[45]樊纲,王小鲁,马光荣.中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J].经济研究,2011,(9):4-16.
[46]江轩宇.税收征管、税收激进与股价崩盘风险[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(5):152-160.
[47]刘行,李小荣.金字塔结构、税收负担与企业价值:基于地方国有企业的证据[J].管理世界,2012,(8):91-105
[2]Jensen MC,Murphy KJ.CEO incentives:It's not how much you pay,but how[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1990,3:36-49.
[3]Smith CW,Stulz RM.The determinants of firms'hedging policies[J].Journal of financial and quantitative analysis,1985,20(04):391-405.
[4]Guay WR.The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk:an analysis of the magnitude and determinants[J].Journal of financial economics,1999,53(1):43-71.
[5]Rego SO,Wilson R.Equity risk incentives and corporate tax aggressiveness[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(3):775-810.
[6]Bebchuk L.Written testimony,hearing on compensation structures and systemic risk[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2009,24(1):3-37.
[7]Levitt A.The numbers game.Speech delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business,New York,1998,September 28.
[8]Benmelech E,Kandel E,Veronesi P.Stock-based compensation and CEO(dis)incentives[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2008,125(4):1769-1820.
[9]Kim J-B,Li Y,Zhang L.CFOs versus CEOs:Equity incentives and crashes[J].Journal of financial economics,2011,101(3):713-730.
[10]Burns N,Kedia S.The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting[J].Journal of financial economics,2006,79(1):35-67.
[11]于忠泊,田高良,齐保垒,et al.媒体关注的公司治理机制--基于盈余管理视角的考察[J].管理世界,2011,(9):127-140.
[12]丁保利,王胜海,刘西友.股票期权激励机制在我国的发展方向探析[J].会计研究,2012,(6):76-80.
[13]张先治.股票期权理论及在公司激励中的应用研究[J].会计研究,2002,(7):16-24.
[14]金雪军,余津津.“股票期权”激励机制与国有企业改革[J].管理世界,2000,(5):207-209.
[15]Morck R,Shleifer A,Vishny RW.Management ownership and market valuation:An empirical analysis[J].Journal of financial economics,1988,20:293-315.
[16]Mc Connell JJ,Servaes H.Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value[J].Journal of financial economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[17]Mehran H.Executive compensation structure,ownership,and firm performance[J].Journal of financial economics,1995,38(2):163-184.
[18]Rajgopal S,Shevlin T.Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,2002,33(02):145-171.
[19]Coles JL,Daniel ND,Naveen L.Managerial incentives and risk-taking[J].Journal of financial economics,2006,79(2):431-468.
[20]Chen Y,Gul FA,Veeraraghavan M,et al.Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Audit Pricing[J].The Accounting Review,2015,.
[21]Stickney CP,Mcgee VE.Effective corporate tax rates the effect of size,capital intensity,leverage,and other factors*[J].Journal of Accounting&Public Policy,1982,1(2):125-152.
[22]Zimmerman JL.Taxes and firm size[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1983,5(2):119-149.
[23]Porcano TM.Corporate Tax Rates:Progressive,Proportional,or Regressive[J].Journal of the American Taxation Association,1986,7(2):17-31.
[24]Shevlin TJ,Porter S.The corporate tax comeback in 1987:Some further evidence[J].Journal of the American Taxation Association,1992,14(1):58-79.
[25]Graham JR,Tucker AL.Tax shelters and corporate debt policy[J].Journal of financial economics,2006,81(3):563-594.
[26]Wilson RJ.An examination of corporate tax shelter participants[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(3):969-999.
[27]Lisowsky,Petro.Seeking Shelter:Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial Statement Information[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(5):1693-1720.
[28]Chen S,Chen X,Cheng Q,et al.Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?[J].Journal of financial economics,2010,95(1):41-61.
[29]Crocker KJ,Slemrod J.Corporate tax evasion with agency costs[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9-10):1593-1610.
[30]Chava S,Purnanandam A.CEOs versus CFOs:Incentives and corporate policies☆[J].Journal of financial economics,2010,97(2):263-278.
[31]Jiang J,Petroni KR,Wang IY.CFOs and CEOs:Who have the most influence on earnings management?[J].Journal of financial economics,2010,96(3):513-526.
[32]张兆国,郑宝红,李明.公司治理、税收规避和现金持有价值--来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(1):15-24.
[33]严晓宁.媒体在上市公司治理中的角色和功能[J].经济管理,2008,(09):72-76.
[34]李培功,沈艺峰.媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据[J].经济研究,2010,(4):14-27.
[35]Dyck A,Volchkova N,Zingales L.The Corporate Governance Role of the Media:Evidence from Russia[J].Working Papers,2008,63(3):1093-1135.
[36]Fang L,Peress J.Media Coverage and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2008,64(5):2023-2052.
[37]Kim JB,Yu Z,Zhang H.Can Media Exposure Improve Stock Price Efficiency in China and Why?[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2015,.
[38]田高良,司毅,韩洁.媒体关注与税收激进-基于公司治理视角的考察[J].管理科学,2016,29(2):104-121..
[39]吴联生.国有股权、税收优惠与公司税负[J].经济研究,2009,(10):109-120.
[40]Hanlon M,Rajgopal S,Shevlin T.Are executive stock options associated with future earnings?[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2002,36(1-3):3-43.
[41]吕长江,严明珠,郑慧莲,et al.为什么上市公司选择股权激励计划?[J].会计研究,2011,(01):68-75.
[42]Hanlon M,Heitzman S.A review of tax research[J].Ssrn Electronic Journal,2010,50(2-3):127-178.
[43]金鑫,雷光勇.审计监督、最终控制人性质与税收激进度[J].审计研究,2011,(5):98-106.
[44]夏立军,陈信元.市场化进程、国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定[J].经济研究,2007,(7):82-95.
[45]樊纲,王小鲁,马光荣.中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J].经济研究,2011,(9):4-16.
[46]江轩宇.税收征管、税收激进与股价崩盘风险[J].南开管理评论,2013,16(5):152-160.
[47]刘行,李小荣.金字塔结构、税收负担与企业价值:基于地方国有企业的证据[J].管理世界,2012,(8):91-105