企业家地方政治关联对企业创新意愿影响的实证研究
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摘要
企业家通过政治关联获得的重要资源可以对企业创新产生影响,进而对企业的整体发展产生深远的影响。研究企业家地方政治关联对企业创新意愿的影响关系,选择金融资源和政府补助作为中介变量,以金融业的市场化和行政审批简捷程度为调节变量,分别探讨两条路径上各变量间的相互作用关系。本研究以深圳证券交易所创业板的公司为研究样本,样本数共401家企业。运用SPSS19.0统计分析软件,对样本数据进行了描述性统计分析,并进行实证检验。结果表明,企业家地方政治关联可以加强企业创新意愿,同时有利于企业获取金融资源和政府补助,金融资源和政府补助可以激发企业的创新意愿,金融资源和政府补助在其中发挥着中介桥梁作用。金融业的市场化和行政审批简捷程度分别发挥着正向调节作用。根据研究所得结论,本文从政治关联、创新意愿、金融资源、政府补助以及制度环境方面提出了相应的建议。
Market plays an important role in resource allocation, so does the government. In China, enterprises can obtain more scarce resources through the government. Important resources obtained by entrepreneur's political connection have a profound impact on enterprise innovation and thus affect the overall development of enterprises.With financial resources and government subsidies as intermediary variables, marketization of financial industry and simplicity of administrative examination and approval as moderator variables, this paper mainly studies the influence of entrepreneur's political connections with local government on innovation intention and discusses the relationship among the variables on the two paths respectively. In this study, 401 enterprises in Chinext of Shenzhen Stock Exchange are used as samples in the study. Descriptive statistical analysis is made to sample data and empirical tests are made to test each hypothesis by using SPSS19.0 statistical analysis software. The results show that entrepreneur's political connections with local government can strengthen innovation intention, and help enterprises acquire financial resources and government subsidies. Financial resources and government subsidies can stimulate innovation intention. Financial resources and government subsidies play intermediary role. Marketization of financial industry and simplicity of administrative examination and approval play moderator role respectively. The higher degree of marketization of financial industry and simplicity of administrative examination and approval are, the stronger innovation intention of political connection will be. According to the conclusions, this paper presents recommendations from the aspects of political connection, innovation intention, financial resources, government subsidies, and institutional environment. First, this study pays attention to social capital of political connections and attach great importance to the cultivation of enterprise innovation intention. Second, this study integrates and utilizes financial resources and government subsidies effectively. Third, this study promotes the marketization of financial industry and accelerates the construction of simplicity of administrative examination and approval. This study doesn't focus on independent directors' political connections, as well as the relationship of entrepreneur's political connections and listed enterprises. Further study can be specified from the above aspects.
Market plays an important role in resource allocation, so does the government. In China, enterprises can obtain more scarce resources through the government. Important resources obtained by entrepreneur's political connection have a profound impact on enterprise innovation and thus affect the overall development of enterprises.With financial resources and government subsidies as intermediary variables, marketization of financial industry and simplicity of administrative examination and approval as moderator variables, this paper mainly studies the influence of entrepreneur's political connections with local government on innovation intention and discusses the relationship among the variables on the two paths respectively. In this study, 401 enterprises in Chinext of Shenzhen Stock Exchange are used as samples in the study. Descriptive statistical analysis is made to sample data and empirical tests are made to test each hypothesis by using SPSS19.0 statistical analysis software. The results show that entrepreneur's political connections with local government can strengthen innovation intention, and help enterprises acquire financial resources and government subsidies. Financial resources and government subsidies can stimulate innovation intention. Financial resources and government subsidies play intermediary role. Marketization of financial industry and simplicity of administrative examination and approval play moderator role respectively. The higher degree of marketization of financial industry and simplicity of administrative examination and approval are, the stronger innovation intention of political connection will be. According to the conclusions, this paper presents recommendations from the aspects of political connection, innovation intention, financial resources, government subsidies, and institutional environment. First, this study pays attention to social capital of political connections and attach great importance to the cultivation of enterprise innovation intention. Second, this study integrates and utilizes financial resources and government subsidies effectively. Third, this study promotes the marketization of financial industry and accelerates the construction of simplicity of administrative examination and approval. This study doesn't focus on independent directors' political connections, as well as the relationship of entrepreneur's political connections and listed enterprises. Further study can be specified from the above aspects.
引文
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