文摘
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are becoming ubiquitous, providing low-cost, low-power, and low-complexity systems in which communication and control are tightly integrated. Although much security research into WSNs has been accomplished, researchers struggle to conduct thorough analyses of closed-source proprietary protocols. Of the numerous available and underanalyzed proprietary protocols, those based on the ITU-T G.9959 recommendation specifying narrow-band sub-GHz communications have recently experienced significant growth. The Z-Wave protocol is the most common implementation of this recommendation. Z-Wave developers are required to sign nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements, limiting the availability of tools to perform open source research. Given recently demonstrated attacks against Z-Wave networks, defensive countermeasures are needed. This work extends an existing implementation of a Z-Wave Misuse-Based Intrusion Detection System (MBIDS). A side-by-side comparison is performed through experimentation to measure misuse detection accuracy of the baseline and extended MBIDS implementations. Experiment results determine the extended MBIDS achieves a mean misuse detection rate of 99%, significantly improving the security posture in MBIDS-monitored Z-Wave networks.
