Steady-state stock and group size: An approach of dynamic voluntary provisions of public goods

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• 作者：Yuankan Huang ; ^{huangyk@valdes.titech.ac.jp" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; ^{huangyuankan@gmail.com" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author} ; Takehiro Inohara ^{inohara@valdes.titech.ac.jp" class="auth_mail" title="E-mail the corresponding author}
• 关键词：Differential games ; Provisions of public goods ; Group size
• 刊名：Applied Mathematics and Computation
• 出版年：2015
• 出版时间：1 November 2015
• 年：2015
• 卷：270
• 期：Complete
• 页码：505-510
• 全文大小：545 K

文摘

This note analyzes the effect from group sizes (i.e., the number of consumers) on steady-state stocks in the model of dynamic voluntary provisions of public goods. The model follows Itaya and Shimomura [4]. We focus on feedback Nash equilibrium strategies and find that (1) it is possible to clarify the condition such that the steady-state stock decreases as the group size is larger when consumers take linear feedback Nash equilibrium strategies and (2) when consumers take nonlinear ones, the set of possible steady-state stocks is enlarged as the group size is bigger.