Appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support - Prequalifications and penalties

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• 作者：Jan Kreiss^a ; ^b ; ^{kreiss@takon.com} ; Karl-Martin Ehrhart^a ; ^b ; ^{ehrhart@takon.com} ; Marie-Christin Haufe^b ; ^{haufe@takon.com}
• 关键词：Renewable Energy Support ; Auction design ; Prequalification ; Securities ; Penalties ; Sunk costs
• 刊名：Energy Policy
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：101
• 期：Complete
• 页码：512-520
• 全文大小：468 K
• 卷排序：101

文摘

The non-realization risk is a major problem of auctions for RES. Designated measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties. Prequalifications and penalties have different effects on auction outcome. The non-realization option violates the revenue equivalence theorem. We recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications.