Quality contests

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Marco Serena ^{marco.serena@tax.mpg.de}
• 关键词：C72 ; D72
• 刊名：European Journal of Political Economy
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：46
• 期：Complete
• 页码：15-25
• 全文大小：622 K
• 卷排序：46

文摘

Expected winner's effort is maximized in lottery contests (i.e., quality contests). Exclusion of all but the two highest players may be beneficial in quality contests. Unleveling the playing field is beneficial in quality contests. Weakening the underdog may be beneficial in quality contests. Results are in sharp contrast with the standard sum of efforts maximization.