Voting as a lottery

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• 作者：Giuseppe Attanasi^a ; ^b ; ^{giuseppe.attanasi@univ-lille1.fr} ; Luca Corazzini^c ; ^d ; ^{lcorazzini@unime.it} ; Francesco Passarelli^e ; ^f ; ^{francesco.passarelli@unibocconi.it}
• 关键词：D72 ; H11 ; D81 ; D03
• 刊名：Journal of Public Economics
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：146
• 期：Complete
• 页码：129-137
• 全文大小：558 K
• 卷排序：146

文摘

We characterize individual preferences for majority thresholds. We consider risk aversion, loss aversion, overconfidence, and weighted votes. Unanimity or the simple majority often represents the most preferred threshold. We characterize a constitutional bargaining game “à la Nash”. In the presence of weak minorities, negotiations yield quite protective constitutions.