Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret

详细信息    查看全文

• 关键词：D8 ; C7 ; D7
• 刊名：Economics Letters
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：150
• 期：Complete
• 页码：99-103
• 全文大小：1744 K
• 卷排序：150

文摘

For repeated Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimum Effort Coordination games the short-run dynamics of expected actions can be predicted by unconditional regret matching procedure. The unconditional regret matching with bounded memory can speed up the convergence to the long-run equilibrium. The example of Pareto improving Coarse Correlated Equilibrium for Traveler’s Dilemma game is provided.