Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction

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• 作者：Garry Young
• 关键词：Intellectualism ; Knowing how ; Knowing that ; Ability entailment ; Action ; type ; Action ; token ; Epistemic reduction
• 刊名：Synthese
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：February 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：194
• 期：2
• 页码：593-607
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
• 刊物主题：Philosophy of Science; Epistemology; Logic; Philosophy of Language; Metaphysics;
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1573-0964
• 卷排序：194

文摘

This paper examines the relationship between knowing how to G and the ability to G, which is typically presented in one of the following ways: (a) knowing how to G entails the ability to G; (b) knowing how to G does not entail the ability to G. In an attempt to reconcile these two putatively opposing positions, I distinguish between type and token actions. It is my contention that S can know how to G in the absence of an ability to \(\hbox {G}_{\mathrm{token}}\), where this action is derived from an action-type, but not in the absence of the ability to perform the action-type itself \((\hbox {G}_{\mathrm{type}})\). This refinement is an attempt to reconcile differences between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism (broadly construed) with regard to knowledge how and ability.