Exclusive contracts with private information in successive differentiated oligopolies

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• 作者：Barna Bakó
• 关键词：Exclusive contracts ; Product differentiation ; Vertical integration
• 刊名：European Journal of Law and Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：December 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：42
• 期：3
• 页码：539-546
• 全文大小：374 KB
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Law and Economics
  European Integration
  Public Finance and Economics
  Commercial Law
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-9990
• 卷排序：42

文摘

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. In contrast with the previous literature, exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers selling highly differentiated products, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that exclusive contracts decrease both consumer and social welfare.