Quantum Key Distribution in the Classical Authenticated Key Exchange Framework

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• 作者：Michele Mosca (17) (18)
  Douglas Stebila (19)
  Berkant Ustao?lu (20)
  
• 关键词：quantum key distribution ; authenticated key exchange ; cryptographic protocols ; security models
• 刊名：Lecture Notes in Computer Science
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：7932
• 期：1
• 页码：155-164
• 全文大小：287KB
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• 作者单位：Michele Mosca (17) (18)
  Douglas Stebila (19)
  Berkant Ustao?lu (20)
  
  17. Institute for Quantum Computing and Dept. of Combinatorics & Optimization, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
  18. Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
  19. Information Security Discipline, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
  20. Department of Mathematics, Izmir Institute of Technology, Urla, Izmir, Turkey
  
• ISSN：1611-3349

文摘

Key establishment is a crucial primitive for building secure channels in a multi-party setting. Without quantum mechanics, key establishment can only be done under the assumption that some computational problem is hard. Since digital communication can be easily eavesdropped and recorded, it is important to consider the secrecy of information anticipating future algorithmic and computational discoveries which could break the secrecy of past keys, violating the secrecy of the confidential channel. Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used generate secret keys that are secure against any future algorithmic or computational improvements. QKD protocols still require authentication of classical communication, although existing security proofs of QKD typically assume idealized authentication. It is generally considered folklore that QKD when used with computationally secure authentication is still secure against an unbounded adversary, provided the adversary did not break the authentication during the run of the protocol. We describe a security model for quantum key distribution extending classical authenticated key exchange (AKE) security models. Using our model, we characterize the long-term security of the BB84 QKD protocol with computationally secure authentication against an eventually unbounded adversary. By basing our model on traditional AKE models, we can more readily compare the relative merits of various forms of QKD and existing classical AKE protocols. This comparison illustrates in which types of adversarial environments different quantum and classical key agreement protocols can be secure.