Private agenda and re-election incentives

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• 作者：Javier Rivas
• 刊名：Social Choice and Welfare
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：April 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：46
• 期：4
• 页码：899-915
• 全文大小：513 KB
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• 作者单位：Javier Rivas (1)
  
  1. Department of Economics, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK
  
• 刊物主题：Economic Theory; Economics general;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1432-217X

文摘

Consider a politician who has to take two sequential decisions during his term in office. For each decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be the decision that generates a public benefit, thus increasing his chances of re-election, and taking the decision that increases his private gain but is likely to decrease his chances of re-election. In our results we find that if the politician is a good enough decision maker and he desires to be re-elected enough, he takes the action that generates a public benefit regardless of his private interests. Moreover, we find that the behavior such that the politician delays taking the action that generates a public benefit to the last period of his term in office before he is up for re-election is optimal if and only if he has either very high or very low decision making skills.