Consistent location conjectures under spatial price discrimination

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• 作者：John S. Heywood ; Zheng Wang
• 关键词：Spatial price discrimination ; Consistent conjecture
• 刊名：Journal of Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：March 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：117
• 期：2
• 页码：167-180
• 全文大小：537 KB
• 参考文献：Aliprantis CD, Chakrabarti SK (2000) Games and decision making. Oxford University Press, New York
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• 作者单位：John S. Heywood (1)
  Zheng Wang (2)
  
  1. Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, WI, 53211, USA
  2. International School of Economics and Management, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, China
  
• 刊物主题：Economics general; Economic Theory; International Economics; Microeconomics; R & D/Technology Policy;
• 出版者：Springer Vienna
• ISSN：1617-7134

文摘

This paper is the first to model consistent location conjectures under spatial price discrimination. With linear production cost, the well-known association of spatial price discrimination with efficiency vanishes as duopolists with consistent conjectures collocate at the center. With convex production cost, the duopolists do not collocate but continue to locate closer to the center than under Nash conjectures. Yet, with sufficient cost convexity, this movement to the center can actually increase welfare relative to Nash. We extend the results with linear costs to multiple private firms.