文摘
In this paper, I will recover the issue of the “third gender” in archaeological analysis in order to argue that the use of a “third,” despite what it may appear at first sight, does not challenge the logic inherent in gender and sexual binaries, that is, the use of universal, ahistorical, and stagnated categories. As an alternative, I will rely on Almudena Hernando’s genealogical work on gender and identity, as well as on Lucía Moragón-Martínez’s arguments regarding corporeality, to state that in “oral societies” (like prehistoric ones), body and person cannot be ontologically distinguished and, as a consequence, the anatomical features that we categorize as “sex” can neither be thought nor defined abstractly. I will further examine the implications of this claim in relation to the sex–gender fluidity that can be seen in those oral societies, formerly pigeonholed into the third gender category. In addition, I will analyze current literature developed by gender archaeologists in order to show the strengths and limitations of my proposal in relation to recent works on the topic.
