Antitrust Correction for Qualcomm’s SEPs Package Licensing and Its Flexibility in China

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• 作者：Yan Bing Li
• 关键词：Wireless communication standards ; SEPs package licensing ; Abuse of dominant position ; Antitrust sanctions
• 刊名：IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：May 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：47
• 期：3
• 页码：336-351
• 全文大小：459 KB
• 参考文献：Ciu GB (2014) Standard-Essential Patents and Injunctive Relief. In: Luginbuehl S, Ganea P (eds) Patent Law in Greater China, Chapter 18. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham
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  King I (2015) Qualcomm to Cut 15 Percent of Workforce After Worst Quarterly Sales Drop Since 2009, Bloomberg news. http://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​articles/​2015-07-22/​qualcomm-to-cut-jobs-after-worst-quarterly-sales-drop-since-2009 . Accessed 23 July 2015
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  Lee J, King I (2015) Samsung Said to Drop Qualcomm Chip From Next Galaxy S, Bloomberg News. http://​www.​bloomberg.​com/​news/​articles/​2015-01-20/​samsung-said-to-drop-qualcomm-chip-from-next-galaxy-smartphone . Accessed 21 Jan 2015
  Ning LZ, Ghosh S, Zhou W (2015) Price discrimination in patent licensing and the application of FRAND. J Antitrust Enforcement 3(suppl. 1):207–227CrossRef
  Picht P (2015) The ECJ Rules on Standard-Essential Patents: Thoughts and Issues Post-Huawei, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 15-11 (November 16, 2015), available at SSRN: http://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​2691314 or doi:10.​2139/​ssrn.​2691314
  
• 作者单位：Yan Bing Li (1)
  
  1. School of Law, Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Germany
  
• 刊物主题：International IT and Media Law, Intellectual Property Law;
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：2195-0237
• 卷排序：47

文摘

China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued its first antitrust administrative sanction decision relating to SEP licensing in 2015, finding that Qualcomm had abused its dominant position in the CDMA, WCDMA and LTE wireless communication standard-essential patents (SEPs) licensing market and baseband chip sale market by: (a) charging unfairly excessive royalties, (b) unreasonably bundling SEPs licensing with non-SEPs, and (c) making the sale of baseband chips conditional upon the buyer signing a patent license agreement with a patent no-challenge clause and other unfair clauses. As a result, Qualcomm was ordered to cease its abusive acts and was fined RMB 6.088 billion (approx. USD 975 million), the severest ever imposed by the NDRC or any other Chinese Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authorities (AMEAs) under its Anti-Monopoly Law (AML). This article provides a structured description of the NDRC’s findings, explores the NDRC’s two-step approach of “the rebuttable assumed dominance” for SEPs and its flexible antitrust approach to correct Qualcomm’s SEPs package licensing practice, and lastly comments on the commercial and industrial significance of this decision in China and beyond. Keywords Wireless communication standards SEPs package licensing Abuse of dominant position Antitrust sanctions