How to Overcome Strawson鈥檚 Point: Defending a Value-Oriented Foundation for Contractualism

详细信息    查看全文

• 作者：Douglas Paletta (1)
  
• 关键词：Contractualism ; Darwall ; Strawson鈥檚 point ; Ethics ; Authority ; Values
• 刊名：Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：February 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：16
• 期：1
• 页码：9-20
• 全文大小：148KB
• 参考文献：1. Darwall S (2006) The second-person standpoint. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
  2. Darwall S (2007) Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace and Watson. Ethics 118:52鈥?9 CrossRef
  3. Freeman S (1991) Contractualism, moral motivation, and practical reason. J Philos 88:281鈥?03 CrossRef
  4. Rabinowicz W, Ronnow-Rasmussen T (2000) A distinction in value: intrinsic and for its own sake. Proc Aristot Soc 100:33鈥?1 CrossRef
  5. R酶nnow-Rasmussen T (2002) Instrumental values: strong and weak. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 5:23鈥?3 CrossRef
  6. R酶nnow-Rasmussen T (2009) On for someone鈥檚 sake attitudes. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 12:397鈥?11 CrossRef
  7. Scanlon TM (1982) Contractualism and utilitarianism. In: Sen A, Williams B (eds) Utilitarianism and beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 103鈥?28 CrossRef
  8. Scanlon TM (1998) What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
  9. Strawson PF (1962) Freedom and resentment. Proc Br Acad 48:1鈥?5 CrossRef
  10. Watson G (2007) Morality as equal accountability: comments on Stephen Darwall鈥檚 the second-person standpoint. Ethics 118:37鈥?1 CrossRef
  
• 作者单位：Douglas Paletta (1)
  
  1. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
  

文摘

In The Second Person Standpoint, Darwall charges that all value-oriented foundations for ethics make a category mistake. Calling it Strawson鈥檚 point, he argues these foundations explain moral authority, which concerns whether someone has standing to hold another accountable, in terms of a value, which essentially concerns what makes the world go best. However, whether it would be good for me to blame you simply asks a different question than whether I have standing to blame you. I defend a valueoriented foundation for contractualism by identifying one way to overcome Strawson鈥檚 point. At bottom, Darwall鈥檚 objection relies on the assumption that all values are worldregarding. I argue that another class of values exists: second-personal values. Grounding morality in one of these values does not make the category mistake at the heart of Strawson鈥檚 point. In particular, I argue that grounding morality on one secondpersonal value, the ideal of acting justifiably towards others, better captures traditional contractualist ideals than Darwall鈥檚 formal foundation.